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Types of Responsibility:  
Challenges and Opportunities 
 
One of the fundamental questions in justice is who is responsible to do 
what for whom? Therefore a central consideration in the arena of justice is that  
responsibility comes in many forms and that a robust discussion of the 
complexity of responsibility is useful when considering different justice 
initiatives. Individuals and groups can be actively or passively involved in 
different aspects of social and political responsibility. Limiting the scope of 
responsibility accounts to select individuals in isolation from other mechanisms 
and actors creates an escape for systems, bystanders, entrepreneurs, and 
members of society who approved of or supported indirectly uncivil acts. The 
German philosopher Karl Japsers explored some of these elements in his classic 
The Question of German Guilt in questioning how the mass extermination of Jews 
and others could happen within a seemingly otherwise German civil society. 
Below is an expanded list of types of responsibility.  The following was developed 
primarily in the context of my exploring transitional justice problems, issues, 
programs and accountabilities.1  The key to attributing "responsibility" is that 
this also attributes agency. With agency comes the capability to act and do 
otherwise. Likewise, what began as a list of challenges slowly evolved into 
including a correlating list of opportunities.  If transitional justice is nothing 
short of transforming society then these transformations  proceed through a 
series of challenges and opportunities. Connecting challenges and opportunities 
to responsibility not only locates accountability but it also locates the possibility 
of change. This is what Max Weber would refer to as the irony of historical 
consequences. Again, the following is developed from the perspective and 
concerns of transitional justice, but these can be redefined to apply to different 
scenarios. The following lists a range of possible responsibilities in the context 
of transitional justice that can be incurred with accompanying challenges and 
opportunities: 
 
Criminal responsibility when a code of law is violated 
Challenge: primary mechanisms are trials and punishments, outcome is 
often disappointing because justice system is ill-suited to address collective 
crimes of atrocity. Additionally, they often lead to perverse outcomes as 
individual scapegoats shield state and society, remove urgency of 
addressing policies that led to abuse and causes of crime, and individuals 
                                                          
1 This list and the following descriptions were developed from extensive readings in social theory and practice in 
transitional justice for a project funded by the International Sites of Conscience in Guinea, 2018.  
1
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act through state institutions on behalf of the state and that it is 
administratively daunting to prosecute large numbers of individuals. 
Opportunity: to formally name that wrong was done and to re-establish 
that law is a fundamental aspect of society 
Individual responsibility for one’s own values, beliefs and actions (or inactions)  
Challenge: to convince perpetrators to change values, beliefs, and actions 
Opportunity: to establish values, beliefs, and actions that respect all 
members of society 
Command leaders, and officials who ordered mass atrocity and the masterminds 
of atrocity policy  
Challenge: these individuals are in positions of power and control of 
resources  
Opportunity: relatively small number and can be identified and dealt with 
directly 
Political responsibility because individuals are related to the state in which they 
live  
Challenge: those who benefit from the previous system and may be afraid 
or reluctant to change the system 
Opportunity: demand and exercise full consideration and participation in 
governing decision-making and policies  
Metaphysical responsibility when we knew but did not act 
Challenge: those who ignored or tacitly complied to acts of atrocity may 
be reluctant to acknowledge that they could have intervened or could have 
been less compliant 
Opportunity: clarify that all members of a society are to some degree 
responsible for the actions of their government and to encourage all 
citizens to be more engaged 
Proximal responsibility of those organizations and governments geographically 
neighboring the location of mass atrocity 
 Challenge: may be reluctant to intervene or use resources 
Opportunity: strengthen ties of collaboration and accountability across 
nation-state borders 
State responsibility to ensure rule of law, protect citizens, and appropriate use 
of force in a given territory.  
Challenge: Most often, massive atrocities and abuses are committed by the 
state apparatus. Citizens, through voting and taxation, etc., have either 
allowed policies of atrocities or failed to stop them. 
Opportunity: state recognition and apology, reparations, and 
commemorations (such as roads, schools, parks, and memorial sites). 
2
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Victims can petition claims of reparation and a new regime can use to 
signal a profound break with past regimes.  
Regime responsibility: control of the state apparatus by faction or leader and 
group of followers 
Challenge: formally advantaged group(s) and elites need to be removed 
and/or convinced that the system will not simply be reversed with them 
on the bottom and the formally oppressed at the top; at the same time, re-
construction must directly address issues of violence and domination of 
oppressed groups. 
Opportunity: replace oppressive regime with ruling party that respects 
rule of law and all citizens 
Social responsibility is often missing in transitional accounts. It refers to an 
enduring social group whose members have generated, organized and 
institutionalized patterns of interactions and structures that permit mass 
atrocity.   
 Challenge: re-construct group thoughts and actions 
Opportunity: in dealing with criminal past, hateful ideologies and 
organizations can be de-legitimized and neutralized and the perpetrator 
society can come to understanding that mass atrocity was wrong and that 
change must be made operate a decent and civil society. Here truth 
commissions, research and investigative commissions, commissions of 
memory, education reform and media analysis can reform societal norms, 
values, beliefs and practices, which needs to be a priority for transitional 
justice. Linda Radzik explained the perspective of the victim: 
Even if I believe you did not kill with your hands, I don’t know how 
you feel about the people who did…I don’t know whether you will 
act like them in the future…If you apologies and express regret, I 
will have less reason to be afraid, and maybe we can find a way to 
live in peace together (2001: 465). 
Coming to terms with societal responsibility is complex and has many 
parts. Positive change can be made in many different areas and by a wide 
range of members of society.  
Cultural responsibility is the extent to which a dominant social subgroup forms 
a national identity based upon a belief in common culture, traditions, interests, 
and purpose 
Challenge: generates or permits social and political environment often 
based on group characteristics (such as ethnicity, religion, gender, race) by 
perpetrators who act on behalf of their groups from an ideology of 
superiority. 
Opportunity: recognizing and addressing group influence on individual 
actions that commit crimes in the name of the group undermine myths of 
collective innocence  
3
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Future responsibility goes beyond the past and present conditions to consider 
what is forthcoming, for those living and for next generations 
Challenge: predicting the costs and outcomes of todays actions for a 
future is difficult 
Opportunity: can re-construct society to be less violent and respectful of 
human rights 
This list is not intended to be exhaustive.  It does attempt to be comprehensive. 
Exploring different possibilities of the attribution of responsibility also means 
that at many different intersections in social life individuals and groups can have 
positive social influence and can promote prosocial transformations. Change can 
happen at any of these levels and ripple through society. Finally,  challenges are 
accompanied by opportunities, and often the greatest challenges provide the 










International Journal on Responsibility, Vol. I Issue 1.2 (May) 2018 
3 | P a g e  
 
Restorative Justice and the Gandhian Tradition 
Gandhi Award Comments 
 
Howard Zehr 
Distinguished Professor of Restorative Justice  
Zehr Institute 
Eastern Mennonite University 





 I am honored to receive this award.1  However, although my name is on it, I 
receive it for the field of restorative justice and the promise it holds, and the 
many people contributing to it, and especially my former students who are 
involved in the field. 
This fall, 2013, is a significant season for me:  I’m honored to receive this 
award - and on India’s national holiday celebrating his birthday!  It is also my 
first semester in many years that I have not taught; I’m moving into semi-
retirement.  Finally, it is the 50th anniversary of the March on Washington, 
and also my departure, as a 19-year-old sophomore-to-be, for Atlanta to enter 
Morehouse College, an historically African American college, from which I 
graduated in 1966.  Recently, on the actual day of this anniversary, I had the 
opportunity to talk with Dr. Vincent Harding who was a significant influence 
on my decision to go to Morehouse and my resulting commitment to justice.  
As a Mennonite, I grew up in a family and tradition of nonviolence and 
peacemaking, and knew something of Gandhi.  But it was at Morehouse, 
during the civil rights movement, that I engaged more deeply.  So my 
understanding of the Gandhian tradition was mediated through the work of 
Dr. King, Dr. Harding, my professors and the civil rights activists with whom I 
came in contact. 
After finishing graduate school, I went on to teach at Talladega College, 
another historically Black college in Alabama, and there became active in 
criminal justice.  All of this is part of the mix that led me into restorative 
justice. 
The occasion of this award has given me the impetus to reflect on the 
points of resonance between restorative justice and the Gandhian tradition, and 
to have conversations with some of my friends about this. I especially want to 
thank my restorative lawyer friend Sujatha Baliga for her help.  
                                                            
1 Howard Zehr was awarded the Local Peace Award from the Mahatma Gandhi Center for 
Global Nonviolence at James Madison University in May of 2013. Zehr is considered by many 
as the "grandfather" and early pioneer of restorative justice.  Zehr authored a widely read book, 
Changing Lenses: Restorative Justice for Our Times and helped to establish the Zehr Institute 
for Restorative Justice at Eastern Mennonite University. 
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Many, and not only those working in the “peacemaking criminology” 
tradition, have noted that the criminal justice system is based on, and enforced 
by, violence or the threat of it.  Political scientists often note that the essence of 
the modern state is the “legitimate monopoly of violence,” and criminal justice 
is how this monopoly of violence is enacted and expressed:   “You’ve harmed 
us, so we’ll harm you.” 
Criminologists Quinney & Wildeman, in The Problem of Punishment, put it 
like this:   
 
From its earliest beginnings in the 18th C Enlightenment, the primary focus of 
criminology has been on retribution, punishment and vengeance in the cause of 
maintaining an existing social order. 
 
Historically, the focal concerns of western criminology have not centered on the 
themes of personal peace and social justice…We have had a reactionary 
criminology of violence and repression in defense of an existing social order 
rather than a criminology of peace, justice & liberation. 
 
The historical drift in criminological theory has been that if crime is violence 
and wrecks violence on our fellows and our social relations, then the effort to 
understand and control crime must also be violence & repressive … (p. 40) 
 
With that background, I’ll explore the Gandhian tradition through three terms 
associated with it. 
Ahimsa is often translated “nonviolence,” but shouldn’t be articulated as a 
negative.  It is a term of positive action grounded in a worldview of respect for 
one another and a vision of how we live together 
Likewise, restorative justice is grounded on the value of respect. 
Restorative justice is not just nonviolent but involves a positive act of caring 
for one another and our needs and our relationships.  I often articulate the 
underlying values of restorative justice as the three R’s – respect, 
responsibility, relationships. 
In my faith tradition, the vision is expressed in what I call the “shalom 
triangle”: We are called to live in right relationships with each other, the 
Creator and the Creation.  But regardless of faith tradition, by the nature of the 
human condition, we are all inevitably embedded in a web of relationships in 
which our actions affect, and are affected by, others.  Both Gandhian and 
restorative justice approaches articulate a vision of respectful relationships in 
which the dignity and needs of each person are recognized.   
Respectful relationships imply a responsibility for our actions and for each 
other.  This goes beyond passive responsibility, as when we accept a judgment 
that we have done something wrong.  Rather, it calls for what John Braithwaite 
and others have called “active” responsibility to put things right, an approach 
to justice as promoting a better future.  Thus the three R’s – respect, 
responsibility, relationship - are intertwined, like a triple helix. 
Swaraj connotes a kind of self-rule. The Gandhian tradition is a 
movement for self-governance, personally and socially.  Similarly, restorative 
justice argues that individuals and communities have the potential and 
6
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resources to govern themselves and in its practices, encourages both 
individuals and communities to call upon their best selves. In practice, this is 
often seen in the power of circle processes that are being used here at James 
Madison University.  Restorative justice is about developing individuals’ and 
communities’ ability to be self-governing. 
Satyayraha is often translated as “nonviolent resistance” but more 
accurately is “truth force” or action from truth; again, it is a positive, not a 
negative.  Restorative justice also represents an active movement toward truth-
telling and truth-seeking.  While the legal system often discourages a holistic 
telling of the truth, restorative justice encourages it.  In fact, restorative justice 
could be, should be, a nonviolent, truth-seeking challenge to the prison-
industrial complex that drives our criminal justice system. I will end with three 
quotes or paraphrases attributed to Gandhi: 
“An eye for eye makes the whole world blind.” This is a powerful reminder of 
the dangers of revenge and retribution. 
“Be the change you wish to see.”  This is often attributed to Gandhi but it 
isn’t clear whether he actually said quite this, however. The closest quote I 
could find is this:  
 
“If we could change ourselves, the tendencies in the world would also change. As a man 
changes his own nature, so does the attitude of the world change towards him. … We 
need not wait to see what others do.”2 
 
We see those happening in restorative justice conferences and circles. 
Restorative justice asks us to be this change – to live it, practice it – as 
practitioners and also as participants.  Some say we are called to approach 
restorative justice as a way of life. 
 "That action alone is just which does not harm either party to a dispute." 
Here is a direct challenge to the prevailing criminology of violence. 
Thank you for the honor but again, let’s envision this award not so 
much as an acknowledgement of me personally, but of the field of restorative 
justice and the potential it has for transforming lives and communities, a 










2 Mohandas K. Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi , vol. 19 (Delhi: Government 
of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, 1958), 233; quoted in 
Erik Erikson, Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1969), 342. 
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Responsibility for Peacemaking in the Context of 
Structural Violence 
 
Richard E. Rubenstein 
 
University Professor of Conflict Resolution and Public Affairs 
School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution 
George Mason University 
Arlington, VA  USA 
 
 
“They cry Peace, Peace, but there is no peace.”  Jeremiah’s complaint resounds 
loudly in a period in which many of the most intractable social conflicts are products 
not just of prejudice, malice, or misunderstanding, but also of the normal operations of 
structurally violent systems.  This essay begins by outlining and modifying the theory 
of structural violence originally presented by Johan Galtung.  It goes on to describe 
several types of conflict-generating systems, including the capitalist economy that 
produces crime and mass incarceration and the neo-empire that produces terrorism 
and the “war on terror.”  Finally, it inquires into the responsibility of would-be conflict 
resolvers for system transformation, stressing the need for new forms of conflict 
resolution theory and practice, and suggesting several processes that might help to 
satisfy this need. 
 
Structural Violence as a Problem for Peacemakers 
In a recent book, I suggested that the field of conflict resolution has 
experienced three “waves” of praxis, each of which continues to influence thinking and 
practice among would-be peacemakers.3  In the first wave, conflict was thought of 
primarily as a clash of interests that could be managed or resolved through warfare, 
power-based negotiation, or various forms of alternative dispute resolution.  Conflict 
resolvers of the second wave pictured serious conflict as a product of unsatisfied human 
needs, arguing that basic needs for identity, belonging, security, and development 
could be satisfied only by collaborative processes that produced significant changes in 
intergroup relationships.  The third wave of praxis, which is now gaining momentum, 






3 Resolving Structural Conflicts: How Violent Systems Can Be Transformed (Abingdon and 
New York: Routledge, 2017), 36-44, 53 et seq. The publisher’s permission to use material from 
the book in this essay is gratefully acknowledged. 
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“dysfunctional,” produce bitter intergroup strife as a predictable feature of their 
normal operations.  Which forms of peacemaking are appropriate to deal with 
structural conflicts is a disputed issue, but the peacemaker’s responsibility in 
such cases seems clear: it is to assist conflicting parties to replace or restructure 
the violence-producing system.             
The theoretical progenitor of the third wave was the Norwegian peace 
theorist, polymath, and gadfly Johan Galtung.  Almost fifty years ago, Galtung 
published an article in The Journal of Peace Research that introduced the idea of 
structural violence to the conflict studies field.  Structural violence, he stated, is 
force or influence exerted in accordance with patterned social arrangements 
that prevent people from realizing their human potential and satisfying basic 
developmental needs.4  Unlike direct violence, which involves one person acting 
to harm another, it is indirect and may or may not involve people acting 
deliberately.  If I withhold food from you intending to starve you to death, that 
is direct violence.  If the system of food production delivers food only to those 
who can afford to pay for it, and you starve because you can’t afford the price, 
that violence is structural.  In both cases, “individuals may be killed or 
mutilated . . . hit or hurt . . . and manipulated by means of stick or carrot 
strategies.”  But, where structural violence takes place, “The violence is built 
into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal 
life chances.”5  Of course, this sort of violence need not take a form as dramatic 
as the physical starvation of one of the system’s “bottom dogs.”  Stressing the 
difference between human potentiality and actuality means that preventing a 
child from going to school or a woman from working out of the home should 
also be considered violent, at least where these restrictions are avoidable.      
There are three primary reasons for expanding the usual common sense 
definition of violence to include structural components.  The first is that it 
renders visible forms of destruction which many people in relatively static 
societies consider natural, hence invisible:  
 
In a static society, personal violence will be registered, whereas 
structural violence may be seen as about as natural as the air around 
us. Conversely, in a highly dynamic society, personal violence may 
be seen as wrong and harmful, but still somehow congruent with the 
order of things, whereas structural violence becomes apparent 
because it stands out like an enormous rock in a creek, impeding the 
free flow, creating all kinds of eddies and turbulences.6  
 
     Second, the concept provides a corrective to a common view that the 
first parties in conflict to resort to direct violence are breakers of the peace, 
when, as to them, the apparent peace is often already violent.  (One thinks of 
                                                            
4 “Violence exists when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and 
mental realizations are below their potential realizations.” Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and 
Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research, 6:3 (1969), 167-191 at 168.  In “Cultural Violence,” 
Journal of Peace Research, 27:3 (1990), 291-305, at 292, he reframed this definition as “avoidable 
insults to basic human needs.”  
5 Johan Galtung, op. cit., 170-171. 
6 Ibid., 173. 
9
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terrorist attacks in the West, which local residents consider virtually 
unprovoked breaches of the peace, but which are often done to retaliate for 
attacks by Western forces in other regions.)  Conflict begins with an “avoidable 
insult to human needs,” not with one’s response to the insult.  In fact, a 
reciprocal causal relationship between direct violence and structural violence 
exists in which each form tends to provoke or generate the other.  Third and 
finally, “an extended concept of violence leads to an extended concept of peace.”  
If the absence of direct violence, at least for the time being, can be considered 
peace in a negative sense, the absence of structural violence and the 
replacement of abusive or exploitative relationships by valued, mutually 
rewarding relationships should be considered “positive peace.” 7 
     Although Johan Galtung’s detractors joked that the activist scholar had 
redefined violence to include everything he did not like, his definition of 
structural violence is coherent enough.  His theory makes it clear that the 
systems which administer and provoke violence can be political and cultural as 
well as socioeconomic, but it puts considerably more emphasis on the unequal 
distribution of socioeconomic power than do many other approaches.  Under 
capitalism, he notes, the distribution of resources, including income, education, 
and medical services, is grossly unequal, with “rank dimensions . . . tied 
together in the social structure.”   
In other words, as Karl Marx had said, society is sharply divided into 
classes: Marxist criticism of capitalist society emphasizes how power to decide 
over the surplus from the production process is reserved for the owners of the 
means of production, who then can buy themselves into top positions on all 
other rank dimensions because money is highly convertible in a capitalist 
society – if you have money to convert, that is. 
Galtung then goes on to cite, apparently with approval, the liberal 
critique that “socialist” (i.e., Stalinized) systems also concentrate economic 
power in a few hands, thus opening the door to structural violence from non-
capitalist regimes as well. 8  His dislike of vertically ranked systems clearly 
extends to those whose advocates declare themselves to be leftists.  Even so, 
his social vision, departing from the generally accepted assumption that the 
capitalist ‘free market’ is the final stage of socioeconomic development, owes a 
great deal to Marxist and post-Marxist traditions of critical analysis.    
Galtung’s passion for social equality eventually produced a famous 
exchange of views between the Norwegian polymath and an equally acute and 
energetic British colleague, Kenneth E. Boulding.  In 1977, Boulding produced 
“Twelve Friendly Quarrels With Johan Galtung,” an essay that, as Galtung 
pointed out in a reply published a decade later (“Only One Quarrel With 
Kenneth Boulding”), boils down to a single large disagreement over the 
necessity of transforming elitist social structures.9  Essentially accusing 
                                                            
7 Ibid., 183. 
8 Ibid., 171. Galtung does not discuss socialist alternatives to Stalinism, either Trotskyist, 
Bukharinist, or anarcho-syndicalist, perhaps because of his deep commitment to Gandhian 
nonviolence and the values of social democracy.  
9 Kenneth E.  Boulding, “Twelve Friendly Quarrels With Johan Galtung.” Journal of Peace 
Research, 14:1 (1977), 75-86; Johan Galtung, “Only One Quarrel With Kenneth Boulding.” 
Journal of Peace Research, 24: 2 (Jun., 1987), 199-203.     
10
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Galtung of being a Marxist without portfolio, Boulding criticized his insistence 
that violence is deeply related to social inequality and cannot be reduced 
significantly without eliminating exploitation and repression.  On the contrary, 
Boulding maintained, since violence and poverty (or powerlessness) derive 
from different sources, equalizing social positions will not necessarily have the 
potent peacemaking effects predicted by Galtung.  His own perspective, which 
he termed “evolutionary,” suggested that society is developing autonomously, 
in accordance with entropic laws, in the direction of “human betterment.”  The 
implication (distantly reminiscent of Burke’s objections to the French 
Revolution) was that deliberate attempts to restructure social institutions are 
likely to interfere with this natural process.  In his reply, Galtung insisted that 
greater social and political equality is not just one long-term goal, among 
many.  It is a sine qua non for the resolution of structural conflicts and the 
creation of positive peace.  
        Of course, this exchange left many questions unanswered.  A less 
sweeping critique of Galtung’s approach might have noted that, despite some 
intriguing speculation about the relationship between structural and direct 
violence, his essay did not clearly indicate the conditions under which the 
former is likely to produce the latter, or vice versa.  When (if ever) will an 
unjust or oppressive social system produce violent rebellion?  When (if ever) 
will the spread of personal violence generate violent repression?  Adding the 
social-structural dimension to psychologically based theories such as human 
needs, relative deprivation, and historical trauma brings the answers to such 
questions closer, but still leaves a large area indeterminate and subject to 
influence by multiple variables.  For this reason, some analysts (including 
Galtung himself in later works) have employed psycho-political notions like 
Paolo Freire’s theory of “conscientization” to explain why passive victims of 
social injustice sometimes – but far from always – become active resisters or 
rebels.10   
              In addition, Galtung offered two important concepts that help explain 
how one form of violence can be converted into the other: nested systems and 
cultural violence. To illustrate nested systems, consider the prison, which one 
can describe as a violence-generating system based on structural inequality and 
the non-satisfaction of human needs.  Even before going behind bars, most 
prison inmates-to-be already live in an “iron cage”: a society organized so as to 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for the poor, people of color, and members of 
other marginalized groups living in certain communities to get a decent 
education, hold a remunerative job, feel safe and at peace with others, or enjoy 
a satisfying family life.  We know that poverty and income inequality gestate 
crime, and that crime gestates prisons.11  Prisons, in turn, recycle prisoners, 
                                                            
10 Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness (1974) (London and New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2013).  See also Jolle Demmers, Theories of Violent Conflict (Oxford and New 
York: Routledge, 2012), 61-61, 77-87. 
11 See Jeffrey Reiman and Paul Leighton, The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: 
Ideology, Class, and Criminal Justice, 10th Ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2016); 
Gregg Barak, et al., Class, Race, Gender and Crime: The Social Realities of Justice in America, 
3d Ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).  For a cross-national study of the causes 
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sending them impoverished and stigmatized into structurally violent 
environments that insure that a substantial majority of them will be arrested 
again within three years.12  This situation illustrates the fact that social 
systems almost never exist in isolation; to use Galtung’s metaphor, they are 
nested like “Chinese boxes.” 13  Each system may form part of a larger 
structure, a tendency that becomes more pronounced as the social world 
(including structures of domination) becomes more interconnected on a global 
scale.  As a result, the inequalities associated with structural violence appear 
and are aggravated at all levels from the local to the national, regional, and 
international.   
       Within these nested systems, Galtung points out, structural violence 
and direct violence “crossbreed.”  Repressive structures generate rebellion, 
crime, and self-destructive behaviors such as suicide and substance abuse, while 
rebellious acts incubate repressive institutions and punitive norms.  To 
illustrate how this crossbreeding occurs, the theorist introduces a third element 
of the conflict triangle, cultural violence, defined as “those aspects of culture . . . 
that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.” 14  The 
cultural products that he considers especially potent in this regard are religion, 
ideology, language, art, science, and cosmology, although he might also have 
noted the peculiar importance in today’s world of narrative forms, including 
the graphic arts (films, videogames, images and stories shared on social media), 
as well as the subconscious imagery explored by psychoanalysts like Freud, 
Jung, and Lacan.  Like Pierre Bourdieu, who sees “symbolic violence” as 
authority’s most effective tool, Galtung stresses the extent to which cultural 
conditioning maintains the oppressive structures that end by provoking and 
delivering violence:   
The culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into seeing 
exploitation and/or repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them 
(particularly not exploitation) at all. Then come the eruptions, the efforts to use 
direct violence to get out of the structural iron cage . . . and counter-violence to 
keep the cage intact.15 
                                                            
of crime, see Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, “What causes violent 
crime?”  European Economic Review 46 (2002), 1323-1357. 
12 U.S. Department of Justice, Special Report: Multistate Criminal History Patterns of Prisoners 
Released in 30 States (September 2015). 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mschpprts05.pdf 
13 A somewhat similar concept, “intersocietal systems,” is developed by Anthony Giddens in 
The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1984), 164, 244.  See also Maire Dugan, “A Nested Theory of 
Conflict.” Leadership Journal: Women in Leadership – Sharing the Vision, 1:1 (Summer 1996), 
14. 
14 Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” op. cit. at 291.  Of course, cultural violence can also be 
considered structural, since culture is patterned and institutionalized.  See, for example, John R. 
Hall, “Cultural Meanings and Cultural Structures in Historical Explanation,” History and Theory, 
39:3 (Oct., 2000), 331-347.  
15 Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” op. cit. at 295.  “Iron cage” is from Max Weber’s The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), 123. 
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Other commentators, noting that cultural ideas and practices tend to 
lag behind changes in the system of production, consider deep-rooted 
socioeconomic shifts the primary causal factor.16  But the causes can flow in any 
direction once the triangle – an integrated violent system – has been 
established.  Moreover, Galtung’s theory points to the fact that the generation 
and crossbreeding of violent conflict can take place in a wide variety of social 
systems.  The family, school, workplace, religious community, nation, and 
empire – all can become sites and producers of direct, structural, and cultural 
violence.  This is especially likely to happen under certain conditions, which 
will be described differently, of course, by those challenging the system and 
those defending it.  What are those conditions?  And, what sorts of violent 
system do they produce?  
The Varieties of Violent Systems 
From the perspective of those challenging a sociopolitical system they 
deem oppressive, violence erupts when: 
(a) a system marked by a seriously unequal and inequitable distribution 
of wealth, power, or honor  
(b) fails to satisfy the basic needs or legitimate expectations of 
disadvantaged groups at a time when:  
(c) these groups have become strongly convinced of the legitimacy of 
their basic needs and expectations, and  
(d) systemic injustice has become manifest to them despite the 
ideological and cultural weapons usually employed to justify or disguise 
it.       
        From the perspective of the system’s defenders or deniers, on the other 
hand, violence is likely to erupt when: 
(a) groups alienated and embittered by their failure to succeed in society 
and/or their self-destructive ideas and lifestyles 
(b) are manipulated by ambitious leaders to believe that their unrealistic 
expectations are just and reasonable and that 
(c) relevant sociopolitical systems are rigged to favor others and exploit 
or oppress them, notwithstanding that: 
                                                            
16 An example of this disagreement is the difference of opinion between Marxists and Weberians 
over the role of religion in the development of European capitalism. Max Weber thought 
considered the “worldly asceticism” of the early Protestant Reformers, the Calvinists in 
particular, an essential part of the explanation of why capitalism developed in the West rather 
than the East.  Marxists insist that capitalist relations of production developed in Europe earlier 
than Weber thought, and that Protestant ethics were more an effect of this transformation than 
a cause.  See Anthony Giddens, “Introduction” to Weber, op. cit., vii et seq.       
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(d) these systems (which can never be perfect) are generally successful in 
rewarding meritorious individuals and groups and disfavoring those 
who lack merit. 
 
These conflicting perspectives draw attention to a number of important, 
still unanswered questions about the resolution of structural conflicts.  The 
theory of structural violence seems to assume that the existence and character 
of relevant social systems is a matter of common knowledge.  But the system’s 
role in generating conflict may itself be a major subject of contention between 
the parties.  Although all parties to intense conflicts personalize their enemy to 
some extent, the rebels tend to be determinist vis a vis the system.  That is, 
they blame an unjust social order, and those representing or profiting it, for 
failing to satisfy the legitimate needs and expectations of less favored groups.17  
The system’s defenders, on the other hand, tend to attribute such groups’ 
misfortunes to their failure to meet legitimate standards.  That is, they tend to 
be voluntarist vis a vis disfavored groups.  A classic example is their tendency 
to blame a high rate of unemployment on unemployed people’s personal or 
collective failings (laziness, indiscipline, unwillingness to stay in school, 
disrupted families, etc.), rather than seeing it as a product of late capitalist 
structural features and a cause of personal or cultural problems.18    
How, indeed, is the conflict-causing system to be identified and defined?  
The existence and functions of social systems are not self-evident; they are 
matters of inference to be determined by interpreting events and people’s 
behavior.  The parties to a serious social conflict may therefore agree that its 
sources are to some degree systemic, but still disagree strongly about the 
nature and dynamics of the system.  Such disagreements (a form of what Oliver 
Ramsbotham calls “radical disagreement”) are fairly common.19  To many 
libertarians, the state is the culprit responsible for much human misery, 
whereas others tend to focus on the system’s socioeconomic or cultural 
dimensions.  Many left-leaning analysts, when asked what system is 
responsible for violence in Africa or the Middle East, would immediately 
respond, “capitalist imperialism,” while many on the right would name 
“militant Islam” or “tribalized politics.”  How should a would-be peacemaker 
approach radical differences of this sort, which involve conflicting narratives as 
well as clashes of philosophy and political values?         
  
Before suggesting answers to this question, it may be useful to note the 
range and major types of systems that tend to produce radical disagreements.20  
                                                            
17 A good illustration is Kwame Ture and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of 
Liberation (New York: Vintage Books, 1992). 
18 See Thomas Janoski, et al., The Causes of Structural Unemployment: Four Factors that Keep People 
from the Jobs They Deserve (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014); Charles E. Hurst, Social Inequality: 
Forms, Causes, and Consequences (London and New York: Routledge, 2016). 
19 See Oliver Ramsbotham, Transforming Violent Conflict: Radical Disagreement, Dialogue and 
Survival.  Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010. 
20 Although protracted conflicts can themselves be analyzed as “dynamical systems,” as Peter T. 
Coleman does in works like The Five Percent: Finding Solutions to Seemingly Impossible Conflicts 
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Legal and political systems define de jure and de facto constitutions that 
distribute legitimacy, authority, and influence among groups incorporated in a 
body politic.  Socioeconomic systems define modes of production that distribute 
property, economic roles, and privileges among groups incorporated in an 
economic market.  Cultural systems define modes of discourse and behavioral 
norms that distribute social roles, status, and access to the means of 
communication among groups incorporated in a cultural network.  A trend 
noted by social analysts since Hegel is that these systems tend to become 
increasingly integrated as history takes its course.  Disagreements about the 
causal primacy of this systemic type or that persist, as do arguments about the 
relationship between social structure and individual agency.21  Clearly, 
“nesting” is too simple and straightforward a metaphor to describe complex 
inter-system relationships.  For example, structural integration, which tends 
toward the creation of a single global System, does not mean the elimination of 
contradictions; it may actually intensify key contradictions.22 Even so, an 
adequate analysis of any social system must take into account its political, 
cultural, and socioeconomic dimensions and determinants.  
Consider, for example, the U.S. legal/political system, one of whose 
manifestations is the incarceration of about 1.5 million Americans, a higher 
percentage of the population per capita than any other nation on earth.23  The 
essential role of the socioeconomic system in producing this violence can 
hardly be doubted in light of more than fifty years of research concluding that 
crime rates (rates of violent crime in particular) rise predictably with increased 
unemployment, lower income levels, the economic decline of neighborhoods, 
and growing income and wealth inequality.24  The authors of the pioneering 
U.S. Crime Commission report, “The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society” 
(1965), put the matter simply: “Warring on poverty, inadequate housing and 
unemployment, is warring on crime.”25  A more recent transnational study 
                                                            
(New York: Public Affairs, 2011), the discussion here focuses on the social context of such 
conflicts. 
21 See, e.g., my discussion of Anthony Giddens’ perspective in Resolving Structural Conflicts, op.cit. 
at 12-13, 63-65. 
22 Slavoj Zizek makes this argument in Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical 
Materialism (London and New York: Verso, 2013), 245 et seq.  
23 See The Sentencing Project, “Trends in U.S. Corrections” (2015), 
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf  
The same study shows almost four million people “under the control” of the U.S. corrections 
system. 
24 See the comprehensive and judicious summary of research in “The Causes of Crime,” David F. 
Greenberg’s Introduction to Crime and Capitalism: Readings in Marxist Criminology (Philadelphia, 
PA: Temple University Press, 1993), 58-99.  For updated research, see Elliott Currie, Crime and 
Punishment in America, Rev. Ed. (London and New York: Picador, 2013), 106-142.   
25 “The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,” Report of the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1967), 6. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf 
The same conclusion is reached with more elaboration by James S. Campbell, et al., of the Task 
Force on Law and Law Enforcement of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention 
of Violence in their report entitled, “Law and Order Reconsidered” (1970), 44 et seq. 
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extends the same analysis globally, but puts special emphasis in the correlation 
of overall economic growth, income inequality, and violent crime: 
Both economic growth and income inequality are robust determinants 
of violent crime rates. Furthermore, even after controlling for country-
specific effects (including systematic measurement error), there is clear 
evidence that violent crime is self-perpetuating. These variables 
(economic growth, inequality, and past crime rates) worked well for 
homicides and remarkably well for robbery rates. Their sign and 
statistical significance survived the addition of other explanatory 
variables, including measures of crime deterrence, illicit drug activities, 
demographic characteristics, and cultural traits.26  
It is not only crime that increases with the growth of social inequality, 
but also a wide variety of violent intergroup conflicts, including ethno-national, 
racial, and religious struggles.  As a recent study by Ravi Kanbur for the 
International Peace Academy puts it, “Theory and evidence support the view 
that it is the between -group dimension of inequality that is crucial.  Given 
structural cleavages such as caste, religion, ethnicity, race and region, if income 
disparities align with these splits they exacerbate tension and conflict.”27  This 
finding has important implications for the connection of crime with the 
operations of the cultural system, as we will see in a moment. 
Given the relatively clear connections between poverty, inequality, and 
crime outlined above, one might expect conflict specialists to seek to resolve 
the conflict between lawbreakers and authorities by helping the parties 
discover how to eliminate these conditions.  The difficulty, however, is that 
that poverty and inequality have persisted and even deepened (along with 
“precarity,” the mode of existence one step removed from poverty in which vast 
numbers of working people currently find themselves), notwithstanding more 
then eighty years of strenuous effort to mitigate them by creating capitalist 
welfare states.  To some analysts, this persistence suggests that economic 
misery is systemically generated – a product of globalizing capitalism at its 
current stage of development.  If so, elimination of the problem will very likely 
require some sort of large-scale system transformation.28  This is not a 
                                                            
https://archive.org/stream/laworderreconsid00camprich/laworderreconsid00camprich_djvu.tx
t    
26 Pablo Fajnzylber, et al., “What Causes Violent Crime?” European Economic Review 46 (2002), 
1323-1357 at 1349.  Cf. Elliott Currie, op. cit., at 120: “Countries where there is a wide gap 
between rich and poor routinely show higher levels of violent crime . . . . Societies with weak 
‘safety nets’ for the poor and economically insecure are more likely than others at a comparable 
level of development to be wracked by violence.” 
27 Ravi Kanbur, “Poverty and Conflict: The Inequality Link.” Coping With Crisis Working Paper 
Series (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 3.  See also Henri Jan Brinkman, et al., 
“Addressing Horizontal Inequalities as Drivers of Conflict in the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda.” (New York: UN Peacebuilding Support Office, February, 2013). 
28 See, for example, Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Universtiy Press, 2013); David Harvey, Marx, Capital, and the Madness of Economic 
Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).  
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prospect most analysts view with pleasure or even resigned acceptance.  For a 
number of reasons, including the ideological legacy of the Cold War, the 
unevenness of economic development, and the dizzying pace of technological 
change, conflict specialists (among others) tend to avert their gaze from the 
systemic socioeconomic causes of poverty and crime.  Instead, they are likely to 
conceive of clashes between criminals and authorities as grounded primarily in 
racial, ethnic, and cultural attitudes.  The result is a tendency to classify 
conflicts between ‘the police’ and ‘the community’ as identity-group struggles 
rather than as products of the class structure.    
This classification (dating back to the Kerner Commission’s 1968 
Report on U.S. racial disorders) leads quite naturally to the multiplication of 
academic studies, intergroup dialogues, and government-funded projects 
designed to improve police-community relations.29  These efforts have 
produced a number of reform programs, some of which have apparently had a 
favorable impact on police-community relations. 30 Nevertheless, it seems clear 
that the continuing state of war between authorities and lawbreakers in many 
communities will continue until the conflict’s systemic socioeconomic causes 
have also been identified and removed.  As Elliott Currie puts it the updated 
2013 edition of Crime and Punishment in America: 
Today, as in the 1990s, the United States is distinguished by its 
unusually high levels of poverty, its wide spread of income 
inequality, and its relatively weak and hesitant provision of social 
benefits to the vulnerable. The key difference is that these problems 
have worsened since the first edition [of this book], and that has a 
great deal to do with why America’s cities remain the most violent in 
the advanced industrial world.31 
   
  These words resound with particular force: “America’s cities remain the 
most violent in the advanced industrial world.”  People lacking a systemic 
framework for interpreting this reality are unable to understand that, where 
crime and punishment are concerned, the fundamental problem is neither bad 
criminals nor bad cops., but a social system that has turned large urban areas 
into war zones.  In a war zone, one is not surprised to learn that soldiers 
frequently abuse their power and brutalize civilians, or that armed civilians 
consider soldiers their enemy and fair game for retaliation.  In most discussions 
of the crime/punishment syndrome, however, the extent to which all the actors 
in the drama play roles scripted by the economic structure as well as by 
cultural attitudes is downplayed or even ignored.  Furthermore, those averse to 
system analysis often reduce the cultural system to a set of racially biased 
                                                            
29 See Report of National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 1968).   
30 David L. Carter, The Police and the Community, 7th Ed. (London and New York: Pearson, 2001); 
Vinita Pandey, “Community Policing for Conflict Resolution and Community Reslience.” 
International Journal of Social Work and Human Services Practice, 2:6 (December 2014, 228-33); 
http://www.hrpub.org/download/20141201/IJRH4-19290153.pdf; Megan Clare Price, “The 
Processes and Partnerships Behind Insight Policing. Criminal Justice Policy Review (2015), 1-15.   
31 Elliott Currie, op. cit., 223.  
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thoughts and behaviors rather than seeing racism as part of a discursive 
structure linking ideas about “us” and “them” to praxes involving the family, 
work, the nation, and religious or ethical values.  The result of this habit of 
thought is to obscure the links between the cultural and socioeconomic 
systems. 
  Clearly, in important respects, the clash between police and 
communities in many Western nations is also a racial or ethnic identity group 
struggle.  Reliable statistics in the U.S. and U.K. show that a 
disproportionately high number of people of color are arrested, convicted, and 
imprisoned for crime and suffer its effects as victims.32  There is no longer 
much doubt that police and prosecutors focus particularly intense attention on 
ethnic and racial ghettos, that racial profiling takes place as a matter of course, 
and that many criminal laws and institutions are designed to treat people of 
color more harshly than whites.33  But, Elliott Currie is surely right to insist 
that the underlying reality is an overlap between economic deprivation and 
race.  “Being poor in America means being at the bottom of an exceptionally 
harsh system of inequality; being black greatly increases the chances of being 
impoverished and, therefore, trapped at the lower end of the social ladder.”  
Empirical studies show a particularly sharp correlation between extreme 
poverty and crime, with the result that extremely poor white neighborhoods 
“suffered more violence than somewhat less poor, but still deprived black 
communities.  And they suffered almost twice the violent crime rates of black 
neighborhoods characterized by ‘low’ poverty.” 34   
  Pierre Bourdieu and Johan Galtung explain this by noting that in many 
societies, direct violence, such as police brutality against minorities, is visible 
and outrageous, while structural violence seems so ‘natural’ as to be virtually 
invisible.35  But, this seems a bit facile.  As Galtung’s theory suggests, 
structural, cultural, and direct violence produce each other.  Moreover, the 
violence attributable to class structure is not really invisible.  When people lose 
their jobs or their homes because of business failures or relocations, when some 
under-employed people turn to drugs, alcohol, or criminal activities, or when 
whole neighborhoods or regions are depressed by economic reversals, these 
                                                            
32 See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, 
op. cit.; Shaun L. Gabbidon and Helen Taylor Greene, Race and Crime, 4th Ed. (New York: Sage, 
2015); U.K. Ministry of Justice, Statistic on Race and the Justice System, 2014 (26 November 2015). 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/480250/bull
etin.pdf 
33 A commonly cited example is the law punishing the sale and possession of crack cocaine more 
severely than the sale and possession of powdered cocaine.  But there is also a vast differential in 
the enforcement of laws against street crime and “white collar” crime.  See D.O. Friedrichs, 
Trusted Criminals: White-Collar Crime in Contemporary Society, 4th Ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 2009). 
See also the well-researched senior honors thesis by Joseph P. Martinez, “Unpunished 
Criminals: The Social Acceptability of White Collar Crimes in America.” (Ypsilanti, MI: Eastern 
Michigan University, 2014). 
http://commons.emich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1381&context=honors 
34 Elliott Currie, op. cit., 122, 126. 
35 Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” op. cit. at 295; Pierre Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State: 
Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field.” Sociological Theory, 12:1 (March 1994), 3-4. 
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effects are quite visible.    
  In fact, what disappears from view in such cases is the connection 
between these violent effects and their systemic causes.  The sufferers and their 
neighbors have learned not to view the business closure or the depressed 
neighborhood as an avoidable insult to their basic needs produced by a profit-
driven system.  The messages delivered constantly and in multifarious ways by 
cultural agencies ranging from the school and church to news shows and 
television dramas are that business trends (and catastrophes) are as mysterious 
and uncontrollable as the weather; that the ‘free market’ system is basically 
beneficent and healthy, although it occasionally needs tweaking; that, in any 
case, there is no conceivably better alternative system; and that individuals are 
ultimately morally responsible for their own economic destiny.36  These 
networked beliefs serve as a particularly dramatic illustration of the integration 
of the socioeconomic and deep-cultural systems, which collaborate to shift the 
attention of both in-groups and protest groups away from systemic defects and 
toward the personal level of analysis.  All parties are invited to participate in 
the mode of thought and behavior that I have elsewhere termed “partisan 
moralism” – a propensity to personalize struggles by classifying warring 
parties either as innocent or culpable, as ‘good guys’ or ‘bad guys.’  “Parties 
who earn the positive label are thought of as well-intentioned, rational actors 
defending themselves against unjustified aggression, while those branded 
wrongdoers are considered malicious or deluded fanatics with a natural bent 
toward cruelty and violence.”37 
  Partisan moralism is particularly evident in attempts to rally support 
for efforts by powerful nation-states to impose their will on other states or on 
dissident groups such as those named as enemies in the so-called “war on 
terror.”  This highly personalized, Manichean form of nationalist ideology 
distracts attention from another violence-generating system – a globalized 
structure of production and power that some analysts term neo-imperialism.   
  It may help, to begin with, to distinguish neo-imperialism from 
globalization per se.  Globalization is a multi-faceted, self-engendering process 
involving the rapid multiplication and proliferation of transnational contacts 
and relationships of all sorts.   It takes place when diverse peoples visit or trade 
with each other, learn each other’s songs, contract each other’s diseases, or 
marry each other’s children.  Neo-imperialism is globalization promoted, 
shaped, and ultimately limited by elites driven to expand their own commercial 
infrastructure and values, modes of research and communication, and basic 
principles of government, education, and social life.  What globalizing elites 
send abroad, of course, is an ‘export version’ of their home system – a technique 
first developed by the Romans in order to diffuse the fundamentals of Roman 
Law throughout their empire.38  Even so, it is a total system that is exported, 
                                                            
36 The classic study of the impact of these messages on industrial workers in the U.S. is Richard 
Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993).  
See also Nancy Isenberg, White Trash: The 400 Year Untold History of Class in America (New 
York: Viking, 2016). 
37 Resolving Structural Conflicts, op. cit. 7. 
38 See, e.g., George Mousourakis, Roman Law and the Origins of the Civil Law Tradition (New 
York: Springer, 2015), esp. 84 et seq. 
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including socioeconomic, political, and cultural structures.  
  This neo-imperial system, I believe, provides the structural context 
needed to help us to understand the plague of religious violence and related 
warfare that has beset the world since the 1980s.  After a long period of 
relative silence, the study of empire, fueled by the perception that the United 
States has succeeded to the role once played by the old imperial powers, has 
again become acceptable in some academic and journalistic circles.  An early 
study of the conflict between Muslim jihadists and pro-Western forces named 
the neo-imperial system “McWorld”: Benjamin Barber’s way of describing the 
rapid and pervasive spread of American hegemony around the globe after 1945, 
culminating in the United States’ emergence as the world’s sole military 
superpower following the Cold War.39  This vast expansion of influence has 
been perceived by many groups abroad, particularly in volatile, resource-rich 
regions subject to foreign economic and military intervention, as an invasion 
that undermines local and regional autonomy, divides and conquers subject 
peoples, generates massive political corruption, disrupts long-established 
patterns of social interaction, and exposes local communities to a barrage of 
imports that challenge traditional religious values and threaten people’s core 
identities.  It therefore generates numerous forms of violence, including 
rebellion, repression, and inter-imperialist warfare. 
  “Invasion,” in the case of neo-imperialism, is more than a metaphor.  
The modern era of religious politicization and extremism began with the 
Iranian Revolution of the 1970s and accelerated in the following decade with 
U.S. aid to jihadi forces rebelling against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  
It did not involve attacks against the West, however, until the President 
George H.W. Bush sent an army to Saudi Arabia and invaded Kuwait in 1991.  
The stated purpose of the invasion was to expel Iraqi president Saddam 
Hussein’s troops from Kuwait, but Bush’s war was also intended to inaugurate 
a new era of U.S. neo-imperial activism by overcoming the so-called ‘Vietnam 
syndrome’ and eliminating Saddam’s Iraq as a major player in Middle Eastern 
affairs.40  The first communiqué issued by al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden 
called for the U.S. to remove its troops from Saudi Arabia’s sacred soil, 
terminate military operations and deadly civil sanctions against Iraq, and end 
its one-sided support to Israel.41  Little more than a decade later, lured by the 
promise of oil wealth, regional ‘democratization,’ and the establishment of U.S. 
control over the region, the second President Bush invaded Iraq proper.  
Saddam Hussein was deposed and killed, and the region was plunged into 
sectarian chaos.  From the recipients’ perspective, it seemed clear that, stylistic 
differences aside, the Americans’ neo-imperial ‘mission’ differed hardly at all 
                                                            
39 Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995). 
40 On March 1, 1991, in the midst of Operation Desert Storm (Iraq), President Bush gave a 
speech at the Executive Office Building in Washington, D.C. in which he stated, “It’s a proud 
day for America.  And we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.” 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19351. On U.S. war aims, see my Reasons to Kill: 
Why Americans Choose War (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010), 139-43. 
41 See Sharon Otterman, “Saudi Arabia: Withdrawal of U.S. Forces.”  Council on Foreign 
Relations Backgrounder, May 2, 2003. http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-
withdrawl-us-forces/p7739 
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from that of the Western imperialists who had carved up the Middle East 
following World War I, and who had dominated most of the non-Western 
world ever since the eighteenth century.  
  Military imposition, however, is not an adequate explanation for either 
the relative success of the neo-imperial project or the current wave of 
rebellions against it.  Although force was clearly used to expand and maintain 
the system, it is also true that certain groups in the receiving nations welcomed 
the spread of Western economic activity and cultural products in their lands, at 
least up to a point.  Younger, more urbanized people in particular displayed 
great interest in Western consumer goods, technologies, and fashions, in 
greater freedom of expression, travel, and opportunities to study in Europe or 
America, in gender rights, internet access, and parliamentary democracy, on-
line investment opportunities, pop music, and religious pluralism, not to 
mention TV satellite dishes, mobile phones, and a whole panoply of American 
and European lifestyles and politico-cultural values.42  Yet the desire for these 
goods and services can be intensely ambivalent and guilt-producing, since they 
threaten traditional identities, patterns of social order, and belief systems, and 
often extract a heavy price in the loss of personal dignity and national 
independence.  For decades, to cite just one example, this price has included the 
wholesale bribery of public officials and business executives in nations 
incorporated into the neo-imperial system.43  Intense ambivalence about 
Western mores may help to explain why the al Qaeda operatives living in 
Florida prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. targets imbibed alcohol 
and visited strip bars before going into battle; it was one way to ‘sharpen the 
contradictions.’44       
  The two faces of neo-imperialism are therefore intimidation and 
temptation, a combination that has been a potent stimulus to religious 
rebellions throughout history.  One recalls the popular resistance to the French 
in the Mahgreb, to the British in old China, India, and East Africa, to the 
Russians in Central Asia, and to the United States in Iraq.  Everywhere that 
secular leadership was unwilling or unable to push back against foreign 
political and economic domination, religious leaders mobilized mass 
insurgencies by fusing traditional values and behaviors with modern ideas and 
organizing techniques.  Religious movements not only offered followers the 
opportunity to purify themselves and defend their traditions, they often 
provided the only opposition capable of organizing across the lines of class, 
region, and ethnicity.  Moreover, they linked the promise of personal 
transformation – repentance and spiritual rebirth – to the achievement of social 
reform.  Frequently, they practiced what they preached by organizing social 
welfare and relief programs that corrupt or callous governments seemed 
                                                            
42 Barber, op. cit., 17-20, passim. See also Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: 
Understanding Globalization (New York: Picador, 2012), which portrays the process as 
essentially consumer-driven. 
43 See, e.g., Janine Wedel, The Shadow Elite: How the World’s New Power Brokers Undermine 
Democracy, Government, and the Free Market (New York: Basic Books, 2009). 
44 Cf. Juan Cole, “Sharpening Contradictions: Why al-Qaeda attacked Satirists in Paris.” 
Informed Comment (January 7, 2015). http://www.juancole.com/2015/01/sharpening-
contradictions-satirists.html. 
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incapable of providing, as well as organizing resistance to imperial claims and 
impositions.  These examples of sacrificial action linked to promises of personal 
and social transformation appealed to many believers at a time when secular 
movements that promised radical change had been discredited, and when 
Western thought no longer inspired movements of cultural revival and 
national liberation.  Given the choice between a pallid, collaborationist 
secularism and a fiery religious fundamentalism, it is not surprising that many 
people yearning for change preferred the latter.    
  This analysis, of course, may be challenged by those who do not believe 
that “neo-imperialism” accurately describes the current global order or the U.S. 
role in creating and maintaining it.  Similarly, some may object that I have not 
accurately described the systemic basis for poverty and inequality in the United 
States and the role of socioeconomic conditions in producing crime and mass 
incarceration.  Those challenges are welcome, so long as they lead to a full 
discussion of the role played by social systems, as well as individual decisions 
and attitudes, in generating structural and direct violence.  One might say, 
then, that the first responsibility of a peacemaker, in the context of structural 
violence, is to facilitate discussions among individuals and groups about the 
extent to which social systems are generating violence, the nature of those 
systems, and the most effective ways to transform them.     
Systemic Change and the Peacemaker’s Responsibility 
 
  For would-be peacemakers, two forms of responsibility in the context of 
structural violence seem preeminent.  The first is their responsibility to help 
move thinking about mass incarceration, the “war on terror” and other forms of 
state-supported violence out of the mode of partisan moralism and toward 
identification and analysis of the social systems that generate them.  The 
second is to develop practical methods of assisting conflicting parties to 
transform violent systems into systems of peace.  The problem, in a nutshell, is 
how to accomplish a socioeconomic and cultural transformation that is both 
radical and nonviolent.  Inegalitarian structures that fail to satisfy basic human 
needs generate violent conflict in two ways: directly, as when social classes 
struggle for economic and political supremacy, and indirectly, as when 
frustrated people conditioned to think of themselves in national, racial, ethnic, 
or religious terms hold other identity-groups responsible for their problems 
and target them for punishment.  Conflict resolution requires that ranked 
socioeconomic structures be altered in order to satisfy the basic needs and vital 
interests of lower class and lower status groups.  But how can this be 
accomplished without provoking violence by the old regime and its 
challengers?  And, if a nonviolent social transformation is feasible, what roles 
can specialists in conflict resolution play in the process?   
  The first question demands attention because of the historic association 
of radical social transformations with intense mass violence.  In some situations 
where the goal was to replace or alter legal and political institutions without 
overturning the old socioeconomic order, significant change took place without 
large-scale bloodshed.  The nonviolent movement led by Mohandas Gandhi 
and the Congress Party ousted the British from India, and the campaign led by 
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Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress overthrew the apartheid 
system in South Africa, without a revolutionary civil war, but also without 
reordering those nations’ socioeconomic structures and priorities.45  Other 
upheavals that aimed at transforming the system of class and property 
relations as well as the system of governance proved more destructive.  In 
certain instances  (the Russian and Chinese revolutions come to mind), 
significant system changes were, indeed, accomplished, but state and 
revolutionary violence exacted a high price both in human lives and subsequent 
political deformation.  Of course, this does not mean that leaving an old social 
regime in place produces peace!  The slow collapse of a defunct system (for 
example, the centuries-long decay of feudalism in Europe) can be even more 
costly, generating religious upheavals, communal wars, and struggles between 
secular rulers, as well as horrendous structural violence.   
          This history must give us pause.  It should also lead us to understand 
that our social thought and peacemaking practice remain uncomfortably 
constrained by a dichotomous understanding of “reform” and “revolution.”  For 
example, we know that in some cases, significant socioeconomic changes were 
made relatively rapidly without serious violence.  One recalls the mass 
mobilizations led by New Dealers in the United States and social democrats in 
Europe that legitimized the labor movement and created the welfare/interest 
group state.46  During the 1930s in the U.S., a series of hard-fought strikes and 
demonstrations led by far-left organizations posed the threat of a violent mass 
uprising and enabled those advocating structural reforms to portray 
themselves as relative moderates.  Revolutionary violence was avoided, 
although many of the tactics employed by the labor movement were either 
quasi-legal or illegal and were branded violent by the old regime.  Such 
innovations in the U.S. as ‘sit-down strikes’ (i.e., factory occupations) and ‘one-
cent sales’ (mass demonstrations to prevent property foreclosures) were 
borderline tactics that the state decided not to challenge in order to avoid a 
dangerous conflict escalation.  One also recalls that American courts declared 
much of the original New Deal legislative program unconstitutional before the 
U.S. Supreme Court finally decided to validate it.     
        Interestingly, the size and militancy of the mass movement seems to 
correlate positively with the avoidance of civil violence.  When people are 
politically aroused to demand significant structural change, but also have the 
organized means to express themselves collectively, nonviolent 
                                                            
45 Barrington Moore discussed “the price of peaceful change” in India in Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World, op. cit. at  
See also Alex Callinicos, “South Africa After Apartheid.” Socialist Review: 70 (March 1996). 
http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj70/safrica.htm.  Of course, the 40-year struggle 
against apartheid involved periods of armed struggle, state repression, extra-judicial killings, 
and mass uprisings in the townships.  See Sheridan Johns and R. Hunt Davis, Eds., Mandela, 
Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle Against Apartheid, 1948-1990 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991). 
46 See, e.g., William E. Leuchtenberg, Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New 
York: Harper, 2009); Jefferson Cowie, The Great Exception: The New Deal and the Limits of 
American Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); William A. Pelz, Against 
Capitalism: The European Left on the March (Peter Lang, 2007). 
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transformations can occur.   That being said, the extent to which these reform 
movements actually succeeded in altering the old social system remains a 
matter of debate.  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s enemies branded him a 
revolutionary tyrant, and the new principles and institutions brought to life by 
the New Deal were more than cosmetic, but in hindsight, the claim that his 
administration rescued American capitalism by reforming labor-management 
relations, strengthening the social “safety net,” and regulating the banking and 
securities industries seems not at all far-fetched.47  While the changes 
implemented by the New Deal and social-democratic movements were in some 
ways substantial, they did not eliminate old classes or create new ones, 
permanently reverse relations of class domination/subordination, or transform 
the system of property relations that reflects and embodies the power of these 
groupings. This leaves us with a key question that current social science has 
done little to answer.  How can we evaluate the transformative potential of a 
specific reform program?  To do this requires a better understanding of the 
processes of system change than scholarship now possesses.    
          A second example of substantial nonviolent socioeconomic change is the 
rapid and unexpected movement of former Communist systems in the direction 
of capitalism that has taken place over the past two or three decades in Russia, 
the former Soviet republics and satellites, China, and Vietnam.  In the former 
U.S.S.R. and its dependencies, as well as in Yugoslavia, the old system virtually 
collapsed and was replaced by a version of Western-style oligopoly capitalism, 
while in China and Vietnam, capitalist institutions and markets were permitted 
to develop under Communist Party control.  Major questions concerning these 
developments remain unanswered.  Was violence largely avoided because 
bureaucratic elites were able to maintain political power or to transform 
themselves into business elites under the new system?  Can the parties now in 
control of formerly Communist regimes prevent the return of the gross 
inequalities and related social ills associated with capitalism?  Do their 
activities in the world represent a new model of international behavior, or are 
they repeating the process of empire building that has so often led to global 
warfare?    
      Even with these major issues awaiting exploration, the historical 
materials suggest that rapid and far-reaching socioeconomic changes can be 
made without unleashing state and revolutionary violence, at least under 
certain conditions, and that conflict specialists can play useful roles in 
facilitating processes of transformation.  Taking Crane Brinton’s classic study 
of violent revolutions, The Anatomy of Revolution, as a rough template, one can 
imagine an “Anatomy of Nonviolent Transformation” that would involve the 
following stages of development:      
 
1. The old social system’s functions and basic unfairness become evident, provoking 
multifarious and contradictory demands for change.   
                                                            
47 See, e.g., Barton J. Bernstein, Toward a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New 
York: Pantheon, 1968). 
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  Historians such as Brinton discuss the decline of the ancien regime at 
length, emphasizing the role played by the “transfer of allegiance of the 
intellectuals” in delegitimizing old authority systems.48  Conflict specialists can 
play a role in this process by focusing attention on the systemic causes of social 
problems, the forms of structural violence, and the possibilities of helping to 
create less violent systems.  Like the French Encyclopedists, scholars in 
conflict studies and related fields can produce publications, new course offerings, 
conferences, and practice projects applying the ‘structural turn’ to specific issues of 
class and class conflict.  The audiences for such presentations can be students, 
community residents, journalists, or policymakers.  In January 2016, for 
example, several scholar/activists at George Mason University’s School for 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution organized a two-day conference at United 
Nations headquarters in New York to discuss “Poverty, Inequality, and Global 
Conflict,” and to consider what types of national and international policies 
might help to solve the problems of system-generated violence.  A report of the 
conference was distributed to a group of ‘opinion-makers’ who could help 
spread the word that poverty and inequality were systemic causes of violence 
that needed to be combated by new national and international policies, as well 
as new community-based programs. 49   
2. In a growing atmosphere of crisis, mass movements organize and demand that 
substantial changes, not yet carefully specified, be made in the old system.  They 
support their demands by resorting to unusual political tactics.      
  A further sign that the situation may be ripe for systemic change is the 
emergence of political movements both to the left and to the right of 
established elite-dominated parties.  This indicates that people are moving 
toward accepting the need for some sort of social and political reconstruction, 
although they have not yet agreed on its content.  As feelings of 
disenchantment with the existing socioeconomic order spread, people feel the 
need for public and private discussions of what has gone wrong with the 
system and what the possibilities are of changing it.  Under these 
circumstances, conflict resolvers are well positioned to facilitate various forms 
of public dialogue that may be convened by community groups to help people air 
their discontents, identify key social structures requiring alteration, and 
envisage possible methods of altering them.50  They can offer to inform 
political groups formally or informally of the results of relevant academic 
                                                            
48 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Random House, 1965), 39 et seq. 
49 The Conference on Poverty, Inequality, and Global Conflict (January 11-12, 2106) was 
cosponsored by George Mason University, the UN Academic Impact, and the Chicago-based 
People Program International.  The Conference Report is available from the School for Conflict 
Analysis and Resolution at scar.gmu.edu. 
50 See, for example, the descriptions of “public dialogue,” “policy dialogue,” and “public 
conversations” at Beyond Intractability (Peter S. Adler and Kristi Parker Celico, “Policy 
Dialogue,” December 2003). http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/policy-dialogue. See 
also Public Conversations Project website, http://www.publicconversations.org/. 
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research, as well as undertaking new research needed to throw further light on 
systemic problems and possible solutions.  Skilled facilitators can also offer to 
assist such groups to work through their internal differences and/or their 
differences with competing organizations by using the problem-solving workshop 
methods developed by practitioners like John Burton, Herbert Kelman, and 
Christopher Mitchell, the sustained dialogue approach pioneered by Harold 
Saunders, Johan Galtung’s transcend and transform methods, and other relevant 
techniques for intergroup analysis and communication.51  These techniques, 
originally designed to deal with ultra-violent ethno-nationalist conflicts, may 
be well suited to facilitate discussions reflecting disagreements about the 
nature of the conflict-generating system.    
3. As ferment spreads, social-constitutional discussions erupt on street corners, in 
churches, and in workplaces, while economic and social experiments take place 
in numerous communities. 
  People mobilizing for change select new leaders at the local as well as 
national and international levels.  Rather than await the outcome of some final 
struggle, however, they begin to imagine and implement local solutions to the 
problems that most concern them.  Conflict specialists can play various useful 
roles in this process, including advising the members of new organizations how to 
use tactics that are militant and nonviolent, and how to employ conflict resolution 
techniques in dealing with their political adversaries.  Moreover, they are well 
positioned to investigate, evaluate, and publicize the community-based programs 
and experimental projects that have already begun to appear in response to 
perceptions that the current socioeconomic system is in crisis.   
  In contemplating further system change, people want to know ‘what 
works.’  What existing programs already help to get young people in poor 
neighborhoods off the streets, provide them with useful, well-paid work, and 
keep them out of the hands of violent gangs?52  How have older people and 
others declared ‘superfluous’ by the market economy managed to provide 
services for each other in exchange for ‘time-dollars’: a program now operating 
in more than 30 U.S. cities?53  What alternative forms of cooperative business 
and public service enterprise already permit workers and local residents in 
scores of communities to own their own companies and plan their own 
economic futures?54  Some activists believe that the spread of these local 
                                                            
51 See Chapter Two, supra, at 46-47. 
52 Unfortunately, most programs designed to combat or prevent gang violence define the gang 
problem in noneconomic terms and do not contain plans for economic reconstruction of poor 
communities.  Some, however, have had produced good results, however, temporary, in 
lowering rates of violence.  See James C. Howell, “Gang Prevention: An Overview of Research 
and Programs.”  OJJPD Juvenile Justice Bulletin.  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (December 2010). 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/231116.pdf  
53 Edgar S. Cahn, No More Throw-Away People: The Co-Production Imperative, 2d Ed.  (London: 
Essential Books, Ltd., 2004) 
54 Gar Alperovitz, What Then Must We Do? Straight Talk About the Next American Revolution 
(White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishers, 2013).  
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initiatives and cooperative enterprises is the key to a nonviolent socioeconomic 
transformation. 55   Others fear that local movements will be co-opted or 
repressed as struggle intensifies.  Conflict specialists can make a valuable 
contribution to the discussion by studying and evaluating the evidence for 
these claims and working to develop programs that they believe are 
transformative.           
4. Political conflict intensifies at local and national levels, with old elites dividing 
and political coalitions reorganizing to support competing visions of system 
change.  Specific programs for structural transformation are presented to the 
public in elections, referenda, and other forms of public decision-making. 
   As political conflict escalates and moves toward a possible resolution, 
conflict specialists could play very important, although virtually unprecedented 
roles in facilitating agreement on a new social constitution.  All the ‘third 
party’ techniques mentioned earlier can be employed to assist the parties to 
reach specific agreements on needed changes.  Moreover, conflict resolvers 
skilled in improvising new public decision-making processes could help design 
political forums to permit open and thoughtful discussion of proposed 
structural changes.56  They could also advise conflicting parties how to deal 
with two factors that often obstruct nonviolent agreement on new 
socioeconomic relations: elite groups’ fear of total loss, and all parties’ 
reluctance to consent to irrevocable changes.  Conflict resolvers will 
understand the need to assure privileged groups that changes agreed upon will 
not render them non-people, expose them to vengeance, or ignore their basic 
human needs.  They will also work to ensure that any new structural 
arrangement embodies the ‘principle of reversibility.’  In the same way that 
citizens can now work to amend a political constitution, the parties to class 
conflicts need to be assured that restructured socioeconomic systems can also 
be re-altered to reflect changes in the popular will.  
This brings our discussion full circle.  The work of peaceful system 
transformation must involve public education on a large scale.  Strenuous new 
efforts are required to help our fellow citizens and fellow humans worldwide, at 
a time of increasing insecurity and frustration, to move beyond partisan 
moralism to a new appreciation of their own responsibility and the system’s 
responsibility for avoidable violence.  The bad news is that, where violent 
conflict is concerned, no party to the conflict and few bystanders are guiltless.  
As the Rolling Stones sing (in “Sympathy for the Devil”), “I shouted out/Who 
killed the Kennedys?/When after all/It was you and me.”57  The good news is 
                                                            
55 The project is described at http://democracycollaborative.org/content/next-system-project 
and thenextsystem.org.  
53 Lawrence E. Susskind and Sarah McKearnan, ‘The Evolution of Public Policy Dispute 
Resolution.” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research, 16:2 (Summer, 1999), 96-115  
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that no party is solely responsible for violence sponsored or provoked by an 
oppressive social structure.  And the best news is that, once people decide to 
transform such a structure, they can help each other to do so.  Each of these 
steps – acknowledging responsibility for violence, perceiving that a system is 
also responsible for it, and deciding to change that system through collective 
effort – challenges peacemakers to overcome serious (but not insuperable) 
political and psychological obstacles to public understanding of such issues.  
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The further from 9/11, the more vivid its scares remain in the collective conscience. 
This seems to justify perhaps what has become a persistent state of a global war on terror. A 
war which in turn has given rise to a persistent surge of violent extremists with resolve for a 
perpetual state of global warfare. Consequently, now more than before, there is everywhere a 
shared sense of insecurity and a parallel awareness of vulnerable statehood and state capacity. I 
argue in this article that the current state of affairs has serious implications for statehood, state 
responsibility, state obligation and state duties in various forms and spheres of meaningful 
governance.  I reassess how the principles of State responsibility and State duty can be 
meaningfully understood in light of current global security challenges to common notion of 
State monopoly to the use of force. I ask how culpability can be assessed and responsibility 
attributed to bring to end the scourges of terror by violent extremists. To that end, I explore 
practices, events, and cases to supply explanations and thus, lay conditions for accountability. 
 
Introduction 
During war and peace times, there is a question of State responsibility 
and what obligation sovereign States must legitimately and morally shoulder. 
This is particularly true during the so-called ‘war on terror;’ a war lacking the 
conventional warfare framework where the enemies, the Violent non State actors 
(VNSA), are illusive, and unpredictable with the capacity to morph into different 
forms in different contexts. Terror or terrorism, the object, is highly contested 
as lacking in an academic or political consensus in terms of definition.58 Is it an 
idea, an ideology or a barbaric strategy in posture? Be it as it may in the face of 
all of the upsurge in terrorist extremist activities in since 9/11, concerns have 
been raised about the increased vulnerability of the State; Statehood as well as 
its diminished coercive capacity. Sure enough, the continuous state of the global 
war on terror post 9/11 has not been helpful; instead it has ushered in with it an 
ambiguous sense of security.  
                                                            
58 See Wilkinson, Paul (1977) Terrorism and the Liberal State, London: Macmillan.  To Paul 
Wilkenson, a proclaimed expert on terrorism conceives of “terrorism in its broadest sense, as the 
use of intentionally indiscriminate violence - the systematic use of murder, injury, and destruction or threat 
of same -- as a means to create terror or fear, in order to achieve a political, religious, or ideological aim.”  
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In the international community, what once was a sovereign State’s 
enduring claim to the monopoly of the use of force within territorial borders is 
today highly contestable, and to a large measure, is in jeopardy.  From so-called 
failed states to the most powerful, there is no exception. In that sense the score 
card on the effort of contemporary domestic and international counter-terrorism 
goals, in the long haul, prompt more questions than the answers supplied. One 
of these questions is whether the all or nothing claim in the fight against 
terrorism has made the world a safer place today than yesterday. The continued 
mayhem caused by extremists, the Al-Qaeda of yesterday, ISIS of today and their 
extended affiliates around the world, and the new global jihadist59 insurgent 
types such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)60 in Syria and Iraq, Boka-
Aram in Nigeria and Northern Cameroon, to name but a few, speaks volumes to 
any conclusion one may draw of a safer world, today. 
The recent movement by the United States to exclude persons, and 
justifications supplied to ban visitations and immigration from those parts of the 
world, speaks to the felt sense of global insecurity from the US perspective, and 
more importantly, to the confusion in sorting the appropriate measures for 
accountability. It also undoubtedly speaks to a corresponding vulnerability in 
the US capacity to properly counter precise dangers posed perhaps by 
immigrants apart from the violent extremists from these parts of the world.61 
Section 2 of the Executive Order 13769 of January 27, 2017 provides that: “It is 
the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from foreign nationals who 
intend to commit terrorist attacks in the United States; and to prevent the 
admission of foreign nationals who intend to exploit US immigration laws for 
malevolent purposes.” 
Recent Global Terrorism Index death statistics of terrorist attacks and 
fatalities show increase in terrorist activity by 80% in 2014 to its highest 
recorded level to date.62 This colossal in that, it is the largest ever year-on-year 
increase in deaths from terrorism recorded in 2014, rising from 18,111 in 2013 
to 32,685 in 2014. Indeed, the number of people who have died from terrorist 
activity has increased nine-fold since the year 2000.  With a much refined source 
of terror of “non-state terrorism” recorded, the Global Terrorism Database 
                                                            
59 The new insurgent types would be the global jihadist movements groups made of non-state 
actors composed of al Qaeda-affiliated and -inspired groups and individuals who see Al Qaeda 
not only as an organization but also as an ideology. 
60 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL), 
currently controls about one-third of Iraq and Syria. They are a combination of: (a) revival of 
the al-Qaeda-sponsored Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) organization that tried to take over western 
Iraq 2003—2006, and Sunni Syrian rebel groups including the Nusra Front (Jabhat al Nusra), 
which also has ties to al Qaeda, see Shoshana Bryen and Michael Johnson “TO KNOW YOUR 
ENEMY: What is ISIS, Where did it Come From, and When Did the US Know it was There?” 
http://chainsoff.wordpress.com/2014/08/26/ 
61 See Executive Order 13769 of January 27, 2017, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign 
Terrorist Entry into the United States” 
“https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/01/2017-02281/...  
62 LaFree G. (2012) Generating Terrorism Event Databases: Results from the Global Terrorism 
Database, 1970 to 2008. In: Lum C., Kennedy L. (eds) Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy. 
Springer Series on Evidence-Based Crime Policy, vol 3. Springer, New York, NY 
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provides that more than 61,000 incidents resulted in 140,000 deaths between 
2000 and 2014.63 As depicted in Table 1A, of the 37 deaths from terrorism in 
Western countries in 2014, 18 fatalities took place in the United States in that 
year alone. In the eight other countries that reported a fatal terrorist attack, 
there were a combined total of 19 deaths from terrorist attacks.  
 















The Federal Bureau of Investigation bulletin with focus on the United States with 
implications around the world reports that terrorist extremists such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda and 
affiliated groups to include other Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVE), continue to 
attempt terroristic attacks on the US homeland. New tactics and tradecraft, the FBI report 
observes, have emerged which further complicates the innumerable threats facing the 
United States.64  The FBI report seemingly hinges on whether the reported terrorist threats 
                                                            
63 See The Global Terrorism Database (GTD): a database of incidents of terrorism from 1970 
onward to 2017 maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, College Park. It is also the 
basis for other terrorism-related measures, such as the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) published 
by the Institute for Economics and Peace. 
64 See Lauren B. O’Brien, “The Evolution of Terrorism Since 911,” The FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin, (2011) http://www.fbi.gov /stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-
bulletin/september-2011/the-evolution-of-terrorism-since-9-11, Accessed June 8, 2012 and  
October 2, 2017 
Table 1.a 
Deaths	from	Terrorist	Attacks	in	Western	Countries	in	2014	
Country	 Deaths	 Attacks	 Country	 Deaths	 Attacks	
1	 United	States	 18	 19	 13	 Germany	 0	 12	
2	 Australia	 4	 7	 14	 Italy	 0	 7	
3	 Canada	 4	 2	 15	 Sweden	 0	 6	
4	 Belgium	 4	 1	 16	 Cyprus	 0	 4	
5	 Kosovo	 2	 1	 17	 Bosnia	Herzegovina	 0	 3	
6	 Austria	 2	 1	 18	 Macedonia	 0	 3	
7	 France	 1	 11	 19	 Spain	 0	 3	
8	 Czech	Republic	 1	 3	 20	 Bulgaria	 0	 1	
9	 Albania	 1	 2	 21	 Hungary	 0	 1	
10	 United	Kingdom	 0	 102	 22	 Iceland	 0	 1	
11	 Ireland	 0	 30	 23	 Netherland	 0	 1	
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were domestic to the United States and therefore unique, or international and therefore 
widespread and global. A 2010 study by Seung-Whan Choi (2010) presented causal 
explanation that tends to dampen the domestic terror source hypothesis. Choi suggests 
instead that “because ordinary citizens can peacefully resolve grievances through 
democratic rule of law systems, they lack the hopelessness and desperation that motivates 
international terrorist actions.”65 Consequently, from that view, legitimately held rule of 
law systems serve to insulate democracies from terrorist attacks from within.66  
      Choi therefore invites a thinking that differentiates the impact of terrorism into 
brands or types (i.e., home grown extremists versus international violent extremists) and 
political systems (i.e., democratic versus non-democratic or authoritarian regimes). In 
that view, “home grown domestic extremists” is a category quite distinct from 
“international terrorism.” Yet terrorist attacks of the kind of 9/11 and most recently ISIS’s 
gruesome targets in France and Belgium and before that Western journalists in Iraq and 
Syria, suggest the predominance and magnitude of trans-border flow of persons and to a 
larger extent, of terrorist groups. That is, it is possible to imagine that the ease of traveling 
from one point to another may exacerbate the movement of persons and also conclude 
that it may also facilitate the formation and movement of terror groups as well. For all its 
positives, “openness” and therefore the increased freedom in the movement of persons 
across borders, fosters opportunities for terrorist activities predisposed with insidious 
motives to destabilize international peace and security. This conclusion is not only critical 
but also controversial, as it invokes serious reconsiderations that are more likely to 
undermine than foster the free movements of persons.  
      This article focuses on the global impact of terror unleashed by Violent non-State 
Actors [VNSA]. It examines linkages between the principles of state responsibility, 
statehood and sovereignty, especially how these concepts can be properly understood in 
light of challenges posed by VNSAs within the rapid shifts in State practices in the post 
9/11 era. It questions whether statehood, an inherent aspect of a State, and therefore 
conferring sovereignty - a state’s ultimate liberty to define, as it sees fit, its domestic 
structures and more. To that end, the article contemplates (a) conditions under which 
States can be held responsible for their direct wrongful actions; and (b) conditions under 
which host States can be held responsible for acts of those that use their territories as safe-
haven to lunch attacks on other States or groups especially where they fail to act or 
incapable of doing so.   
     While the attribution of responsibility to a State for its direct action may be less 
complicated, attribution to a State for acts of a third party, for example, a Violent non-
State Actors (VNSA) party is almost always controversial. By definition VNSAs are 
elusive organizations that utilize illegal violence as the primary means to achieve political 
goals. These may include the use of unsanctioned forces which complicates any direct 
attribution of responsibility under the theory of Sate responsibility. As argued below, the 
continued growth of terrorist organizations since 9/11 suggests more, and not less anxiety 
among those who are the primary target States, notably the United States, Israel, and most 
European countries. Since 2001, the US Department of State Office of Counterterrorism 
has documented well over fifty groups and organizations as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO) with well-known attack agendas against western interests (see 
Table 1b and c).67  Amongst those designated FTOs, ten at the very least have for avowed 
                                                            
65 Seung-Whan Choi. "Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law” (2010) 54 Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, (6) 840-966 
66 See Note 8 Seung-Whan Choi (2010: 941). 
67 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (January 27, 2012). "Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations." www.state.gov. U.S. State Department. 
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purpose and dedication the elimination of the State of Israel, or to replace Israel with a 
Palestine Islamic State using violence at their primary vehicle.  The remaining forty FTOs 
on the list pursue a similar agenda but directed to other targets all over the world. 
      Astonishingly, from a much broader scale, the US Department of State Office of 
Counterterrorism also reports that over the past years there was a total of 6,771 
terrorist attacks worldwide which resulted in more than 11,000 deaths and more 
than 21,600 injuries. In addition, more than 1,280 people were kidnapped or taken 
hostage during the same period.68 
 
Table 1B – Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
Table 
1.b 
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO)* 
(Non-State Actors) 
**As of October 2017** 
 Date 
Designated  
Group  Date 
Designated 
Group 
1 10/8/1997  Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)  32 12/17/2004 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (formerly al-Qa'ida in Iraq) 
2 10/8/1997  Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)  33 6/17/2005  Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)  
3 10/8/1997  Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)  34 3/5/2008  Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)  
4 10/8/1997  Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) (IG)  35 3/18/2008  al-Shabaab  
5 10/8/1997  HAMAS  36 5/18/2009  Revolutionary Struggle (RS)  
6 10/8/1997  Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)  37 7/2/2009  Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)  
7 10/8/1997  Hizballah  38 1/19/2010  al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)  
8 10/8/1997  Kahane Chai (Kach)  39 8/6/2010  Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)  
9 10/8/1997  Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (Kongra-Gel)  40 9/1/2010  Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)  
10 10/8/1997  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)  41 11/4/2010  Jundallah  
11 10/8/1997  National Liberation Army (ELN)  42 5/23/2011  Army of Islam (AOI)  
12 10/8/1997  Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)  43 9/19/2011  Indian Mujahedeen (IM)  
13 10/8/1997  Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)  44 3/13/2012 Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) 
14 10/8/1997  Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF)  45 5/30/2012 Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) 
15 10/8/1997  PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)  46 9/19/2012  Haqqani Network (HQN)  
16 10/8/1997  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)  47 3/22/2013  Ansar al-Dine (AAD)  
17 10/8/1997  Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front 
(DHKP/C)  
48 11/14/2013  Boko Haram  
18 10/8/1997  Shining Path (SL)  49 11/14/2013  Ansaru 
19 10/8/1999  al-Qa’ida (AQ)  50 12/19/2013  al-Mulathamun Battalion 
20 9/25/2000  Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)  51 1/13/2014  Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi 
21 5/16/2001  Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)  52 1/13/2014  Ansar al-Shari'a in Darnah 
22 12/26/2001  Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)  53 1/13/2014  Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia 
23 12/26/2001  Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT)  54 4/10/2014  ISIL Sinai Province (formally Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis)  
24 3/27/2002  Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)  55 5/15/2014  al-Nusrah Front  
25 3/27/2002  Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)  56 8/20/2014  Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC)  
26 3/27/2002  al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)  57 9/30/2015  Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al Naqshabandi (JRTN)  
27 8/9/2002  Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's 
Army 
58 1/14/2016  ISIL-Khorasan (ISIL-K)  
28 10/23/2002  Jemaah Islamiya (JI)  59 5/20/2016 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's Branch in Libya (ISIL-Libya)  
29 1/30/2003  Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)  60 6/30/2016 Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent  
30 3/22/2004  Ansar al-Islam (AAI) 61 8/16/2017 Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) 
31 7/13/2004 Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)    
Source: US Department of State.  Bureau of Counterterrorism, October 2017, reassembled by author (M.G. Pufong). 
 
Criteria for FTO Designation:  
                                                            
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm., Accessed June 8, 2017; Also see most 
resent posting for September 2017 on Table 1b and 1c.  
68 See National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of 
Statistical Information, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism “Country Reports on 
Terrorism 2012-17,” http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/210017.htm,  Assessed October 
1, 2017. 
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The Legal Criteria for group Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended in 2004 requires that (1) the organization 
upon which a FTO designation is visited upon is a foreign organization. (2) the organization must engage in terrorist activity, as 
defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and intent 
to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism, and (3) the organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of 
U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States. 
Identification and Designation:  
For identification and designation purposes, the Bureau of Counterterrorism in the State Department (CT) continually monitors 
the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential 
targets, CT looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged 
in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.  
Designation: 
Once a target is identified, CT prepares a detailed "administrative record," which is a compilation of information, typically 
including both classified and open sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been 
satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make 
the designation, Congress is notified of the Secretary’s intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the 
designation, as the INA requires. Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period and in the absence of Congressional action 
to block the designation, notice of the designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes 
effect. By law an organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register.  
Unlike before when the INA provided that FTOs had to be re-designated every 2 years or the designation would lapse, under the 




Table 1C – Delisted Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
Table 1.c Delisted Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO)** 
 Date Removed from 
Designated Listing  
Name  Date Originally Designated  
1 10/8/1999  Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine -Hawatmeh Faction  10/8/1997  
2 10/8/1999  Khmer Rouge  10/8/1997  
3 10/8/1999  Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents  10/8/1997  
4 10/8/2001  Japanese Red Army  10/8/1997  
5 10/8/2001  Tupac Amaru Revolution Movement  10/8/1997  
6 5/18/2009  Revolutionary Nuclei  10/8/1997  
7 10/15/2010  Armed Islamic Group (GIA)  10/8/1997  
8 9/28/2012  Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)  10/8/1997  
9 5/28/2013  Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) 10/11/2005  
10 7/15/2014  United Self Defense Forces of Colombia  9/10/2001  
11 9/3/2015  Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) 10/8/1997  
12 12/9/2015  Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 12/17/2004  
13 6/1/2017  Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 10/8/1997  
 
**Delisting/Revocation of FTO Designation 
The act of delisting or revocation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) designation under the US Immigration and Nationality Act has 
three possible basis: First, that Secretary of State has determined that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed 
in such a manner as to warrant a revocation; second, that the Secretary of State has determined that the national security of the United 
States warrants a revocation; and thirdly, that the Secretary of State may revoke a designation at any time. Further, that Any revocation 
shall take effect on the date specified in the revocation or upon publication in the Federal Register if no effective date is specified. The 
revocation of a designation shall not affect any action or proceeding based on conduct committed prior to the effective date of such 
revocation. 
Source: US Department of State. Bureau of Counterterrorism, October 2017, reassembled by author (M.G. Pufong) 
 
 
Methodology, Application & Outline 
 
     The methodological approach adopted in this article for assessment is primarily 
analytical and explanatory. Specifically, I use international incidents that depict State 
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practices, events, and court cases as case studies to explain outcome consistency or 
inconsistency with prevailing principle, practices and international norms. So for 
example, an invasion targeting the capture or to neutralize a Violent Non-State Actor 
under this approach would invite inquiry into many features of the context or the invasion 
in light of prevailing international principles. Elsewhere, Riesman and Willard (1988) 
confirm the relevance of using incidents as method of assessment.  Riesman and Willard 
argue that “incidents” frame the international disputes that shapes and reinforces elite 
expectations about the lawfulness of acts for which the appraisal of the relevance of 
international actors occurs in a non-formal setting.”69 
     In the first and second parts of this article I provide summary explanations 
associated with how one should understand the link between Statehood and State 
responsibility as important principles under international law. Both principles are further 
reiterated and their consequences made relevant in subsequent assessments of incidents of 
State behavior, practices, cases, and events on State responsibility. The third part of the 
article focuses on the principle of sovereignty and its practical implications for nation 
states. Specifically, I explore circumstances under which sovereignty may or may not 
confer to States the absolute right that absolve them from wrongful acts. Particular 
attention is directed to states that harbor violent terrorist groups. 
      The article concludes that under narrow circumstances, where a conduct or an 
incident can be attributed to a specific State – its actions or failure to act – international 
law and politics permits the use of force for its wrongful acts or for the acts of a violent 
non-State actor (VNSA) under its jurisdiction or control. Absent direct acknowledgment 
of responsibility for the initial transgression or the attribution of responsibility that links 
or inculpates the host State, the use of force is likely only where the host State is unable 
or unwilling to remove the source-of-threat from its territory. 
The last part of the article on the targeted use of drones and the invasion of 
Pakistan set forth the justification for permissible use of force. Specifically this section 
argues that the invasion and killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan’s territory falls under 
the latter “unwilling” category and therefore triggered the permissible use of force by the 
United States.  Above all, this article argues that under current status quo, any diminished 
impact on the State sovereign capacity and more important in terms of cost associated 
with the increased measures taken to avert global terrorism, is offset by rival gains in the 
long term security. This is particularly true for the international community absent the 
initial source-of-threat to its stability. 
 
Explaining Statehood and State Responsibility 
 
The most prominent form of violent conflict in the world today occurs within 
States rather than between them. Since 1945, over 75% of militarized disputes have been 
civil conflicts, i.e., non-international armed wars.70 With the increase in terrorist 
extremists (VNSA), who use domestic structure of States as safe-havens to launch attacks 
on other States, it triggers questions of distinctions and clarification of this important 
                                                            
69 Michael Riesman and Andrew R Willard, International Incidents: The Law That Counts in 
World Politics, (Princeton University Press 1998), vii-viii. 
70 Nils Petter Gleditsch; Håvard Strand; Mikael Eriksson; Margareta Sollenberg & Peter 
Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict 1946–99: A New Dataset,” Paper presented at the 42nd Annual 
Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, 20–24 February 2001. 
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principle in international law and politics. To understand what really is State 
responsibility requires foremost that we disentangle what constitutes Statehood.  
 
The 1933 Montevideo Convention on Right and Duty of States which sets out the 
definition, rights, and duties of statehood is particularly instructive here.71 It outlines the 
four elements required for the claim of statehood that heretofore has been recognized as 
an accurate statement of customary international law. Inherent in them are specific 
attributes a State must possess, and which upon doing so, sets forth the basis for State 
responsibility.  Accordingly, these attributes require that a state possesses (a) a well-
defined territory; (b) a permanent population; (c) a government or an effective rule within 
the territory; and (d) independence or the competence to conduct international relations.  
In fact, these attributes differentiate States from so-called non-State actors or units such 
as belligerent communities (e.g., rebel groups), domestic protectorates (e.g., Indian 
nations), international organizations etc.  As shown in this article, the essence of 
statehood also conveys statuses that are associated with the various sets of rights and 
duties, and carry with them obligations and jurisdictional competences. While the 
Montevideo attributes have traditionally been viewed as legitimate standards that State 
must possess, serious debate between the constitutive and declarative views of statehood 
persists.72   
More recently, David Miller argued that the rights over territory standardly 
claimed by states can be separated into three main elements: the right of jurisdiction, the 
right to the territory's resources, and the right to control borders.73 Arguably, statehood 
and its derivative rights and duties under international law create a framework for extant 
State responsibility.  According to the 2001 (final) “Article on the Responsibility of States…” 
the principle of State responsibility embraces the conception that State rights and duties 
must be respected.  It outlines the conditions under which violators will be held to account 
for their action or inactions, as well as the consequences that flow from committing 
wrongs that violate State rights. It links wrongful acts to the direct State actions or to 
those that are indirectly the result of State inaction (ARSIWA, 2001).   
By connecting breach of rights and duties (norms) with responsibility and 
sanctions for breaches, State responsibility in the end forms the basis for implementing 
international law and obligation.  For example, Article 1 of all four Geneva Conventions is 
a key provision when it comes to determining State responsibilities under international 
humanitarian law (IHL).74 It provides that states are responsible to “respect and ensure 
respect” for the Conventions in all circumstances.  To respect, means that all state 
                                                            
71 See the "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,” Montevideo, Uruguay, 
December 26, 1933 Accessed Oct, 2017. 
72 For the constitutive basis of state see the 1815 Final Acts, Congress of Vienna and  for the 
declarative basis of statehood and also see the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties 
of States, 1933.  For further discussion, see Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law, 
(Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1958) and Hans Kelsen, Principles of International 
Law, (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc 1952). 
73 See David Miller, Territorial Rights: Concept and Justification. (2012) 60 Political Studies, 
252–268. 
74 The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. Article 2 Convention (IV) relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Geneva, 153-221, http://www.icrc. org/ihl.nsf/WebList? Read Form&id=380&t=com> 
Accessed November 25, 2017. 
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institutions, and all other individuals or bodies under their authority follow the rules of 
the Geneva Conventions.75  
 
Article 1 however, seems to apply only to traditional State actors.  The lack of the 
requisite attributes of statehood perhaps explains the lack of inclusion of non-state actors 
who even though very elusive, are also prevalent on the international stage through 
various trans-border activities. Also, the lack of territorial jurisdiction suggests that non-
State actors cannot absorb direct responsibility as understood under the traditional 
meaning of state responsibility. A question of significant interest for State responsibility, 
therefore, is under what circumstances can the wrongful act of a purely non-State actor 
be attributed to a traditional State actor as the host of a country where the action or 
wrongful act occurred?76   
To establish that state responsibility, the outcome of state action and therefore a 
consequence of statehood, is explained below. I further discuss other practical situations 
that may apply to the principles of State responsibility using case opinions of the 
International Court of Justice, the international arbitration tribunals, and human rights 
courts.  Finally, I provide a comprehensive understanding of the main principles of the 
law of State responsibility as an enforcement mechanism in international law, short of 
other options such as the use of force.   
 
State Responsibility as a Consequence of Statehood 
 
What is the link between state responsibility, state action, and statehood? The 
concept of statehood is central in establishing what in modern understanding is a State, 
and therefore whether a State by its actions or omissions breaches an international 
obligation, and incurs international responsibility.  This assumes first and foremost that 
the State indeed, is authentic.  The responsibility incurred is said to be either derived or 
is a consequences to its status and act(s) committed or omitted. Therefore the concept of 
statehood confers the status of a legal person and a subject under international law. As 
discussed below under attribution, this is an important concept because any attribution 
of State responsibility requires a determination based on specific attributes that a State 
must possess.77    
Beyond framing the rights and duties of statehood, the Montevideo Convention 
of 1933 establishes basic criteria that a State must possess to be recognized as a person 
under international law (See Section III above). These requirements are: a permanent 
population; a defined territory; a government; and lastly, the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states.78 By this action, the Convention effectively codified what is 
famously known as the declarative theory of statehood. It is this conception of Statehood 
that paved the way to the recognition of State responsibility as further grounds upon 
                                                            
75 See The Geneva Conventions, see Note 17 above. 
76  Shultz, Richard H, Douglas Farah, Itamara V. Lochard. (2004). "Armed Groups: A Tier-One 
Security Priority". INSS Occasional Paper (USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF 
Academy) (57) September http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/ocp57.pdf Accessed November 
25, 2017. 
77 Again, recall that these attributes owe their formal origin from the Montevideo Convention 
on the Rights and Duties of States as agreed to and signed into effect by member states on 
December 26, 1933.  See Montevideo Convention, see Note 14 above 
78  See note 14  
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which a State can be held liable for certain conduct.  Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention 
for example, explicitly provides that "The political existence of a state is independent of 
recognition by the other states.”79   
 
The declarative theory of Statehood was further sustained in 1991 by the EEC 
Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (commonly known as Badinter 
Arbitration Committee) which held that a state is defined by having a territory, a population, 
and a political authority.80  Its practical usefulness lies in the assertion that a State exists 
by law (de-jure), even if such a State (1) lack one of the attributes, or (2) some politically 
powerful entity elects not to recognize its existence.  The State of Palestine today is the 
clearest example yet.  It is recognized by many countries, but it does not have control 
over its claimed of the territory in Palestine and in spite of recent claims and movements 
in the United Nations’ towards statehood.81 That remains the case even if it has 
extraterritorial instrumentalities such embassies and consulates.82   
The declarative theory of statehood however, is in sharp contrast to the constitutive 
theory which steadfastly endorses the view of “recognition” as a primary requirement for 
statehood. The constitutive theory defines a State as a person under international law if, and 
only if, it is also recognized as a sovereign state by other states, especially the great powers.83  
Justification for this view is found in the logic that because new states cannot immediately 
become part of the international community or be bound by international law, the existing 
recognized nations do not have to respect international law in dealings with non-
recognized States.  
So as stated above, if state responsibility is a natural consequence of state 
statehood, being a state in either a de-jure or de-facto sense, is an important first step. 
Once it is established that statehood actually exists, and how it exists, under either the 
declarative or constitutive theory, it paves way to a fuller narrative of State responsibility.  
A showing that statehood exists in a particular instance therefore is foremost. Only upon 
doing so can a State be held to be liable for any purported wrongful act.  According to 
Article 1 of the 2001 (final) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (ARSIWA), “every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international 
responsibility of that State.”84 In an era increasingly thought to be transformative, from 
                                                            
79 See Montevideo Convention, note 8 above. 
80 Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee, A Second Breath for the 
Self-Determination of Peoples,” (1982) 3 European Journal of International Law, (1): 178-185. 
81 Louis Charbonneau, “Palestinians win implicit U.N. recognition of sovereign state,”(2012) 
http://www.reuters.com /assets/ print?aid  =USBRE8AR0EG20121129, Thu, Nov 25 2017. 
82 A distinction is important here. Israel allows the Palestine National Authority to execute 
some functions in the Palestinian territories, depending on special area classification. Israel 
however, maintains minimal interference (retaining control of borders: air, sea beyond internal 
waters, land) in the Gaza strip and maximum in "Administrative Division of the Oslo Accords." 
Palestine therefore does not meet the clear definition of state under Montevideo. 
83 See "Final Act of Vienna," The Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815. Encyclopedia Britannica, 
Accessed May 12, 2017. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/207113/Final-Act-of-
Vienna>.  
84 See The UN General Assembly, International Law Commission Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 2001; Also see James Crawford, The 
International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) pp. 110-113, 121-123; James R. Crawford. The International Law 
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the rigid veil of statehood, the emphases on the principles of State responsibility and 
sovereignty is important, even if both concepts are often thought to be conflicting. It is a 
common observation that States in their sovereign capacity would not surrender their 
rights or create conditions that would entice them to accept responsibilities that would 
undermine those rights. States would even go as far as avoiding responsibilities in 
situations where they initially agreed to accept one. Such a scenario is too common 
because States reserve the power to assert for themselves the right to decide their own 
interest in everything, and to recognize no other authority above them in their relations 
when dealing with each other.85 
Thus, questions of state responsibility assume that once statehood is acquired, the 
emergent State incurs obligations for its action, inactions, or omissions arising from the 
new international status. To meet this standard and be held to accountable under 
international law, State action must constitute a breach of an international instrument or 
must be one that is not in conformity with its international obligation or custom.86 Such 
an obligation may entail the responsibility for the breach of an existing or newly 
formulated obligation that impacts one state or the entire community of nations and for 
which the new State is required to make reparation. The requirement for reparations – 
that is,  payments or other compensation offered as an indemnity for loss or damage87 
speaks to the measures that a new State is obligated to take if and when a showing is made 
establishing that the wrongful act committed constituted a breach of responsibility, and 
consequently, a violation of its responsibility. Lastly, reparations viewed as a form of 
sanction, can be also be applied to remedying the wrongful acts attributed to a State 
regardless of whether those acts were committed by its agents or private parties under 
the color of its orders. In the section below, I examine further events and cases that provide 
clarity to the link that exist between statehood and state responsibility.  
 
Statehood and State Responsibility 
 
What are the consequences of the legal personality of a State? When a State 
commits a wrongful act against another State or the international community, its breach 
of international law triggers the duty that it makes reparation for the harmful 
infringement of its obligation. Under such circumstances, the state is said to have 
breached state responsibility.  In this section, I provide and discuss four events and/or 
cases that shed light on statehood and state responsibility. 
Case-in-point A: In August 2008, the Italian government apologized for Italy’s 
occupation of Libya from 1911-1943. Italy thus paid the equivalent of $5,000,000,000 to 
                                                            
Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Crawford, James Crawford and S. Olleson. 
"The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility," In International Law, ed. M. Evans. 
(Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
85 See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, (Princeton University Press, 
1999). 
86 See Article 12, ARSIWA, Note 21 above. 
87 See "Reparations." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. 2008. Encyclopedia.com. 
(October 12, 2013). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3045302236.html; also see Carl P 
Parrini and James I. Matray, "Reparations." Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy. 2002. 
Encyclopedia.com. (October 12, 2013). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-
3402300133.html. 
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compensate for this long term breach of Libya’s territory. Italy further provided Libya 
with electronic monitoring devises on the Libyan coastline to help prevent clandestine 
migration to Italy.  Summarily, three elements combine to trigger State responsibility in 
the expectation that there is (a) the existence of a legal obligation recognized by 
international law, (b) an act or omission that violates that obligation, and (c) some loss or 
articulable damage caused by the breach of that obligation. Whether actual damage is 
required is the subject of intense debate.88  These elements are drawn from a variety of 
sources, including various judicial and arbitration awards.   
Case-in-point B: The previously Permanent Court International Justice in a 1928 case 
The Factory at Chorzow89 is another example.  In this case the PCIJ ruled that “it is a 
principle of international law and even a greater conception of all law that any breach of 
an engagement (responsibility to another State) involves an obligation to make 
reparation.”90 This, according to the Court, reflects the fact that all legal systems require 
those who cause harm through illegal or wrongful acts to take action to repair the harm 
they have caused. In that case Germany had sued Poland seeking reparations for Poland’s 
breach of its treaty obligation not to impound a German factory once built in Poland.    
In addition, human rights treaties and declarations adopted by the United Nations 
guarantee individual victims the right to a remedy, that is, access to justice and 
reparations in national proceedings. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 8, 
proclaims that "[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted to him by the constitution or 
laws."91 This guarantee would, of course, include remedies for criminal acts that violate 
guaranteed rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains a 
similar guarantee in its Article 2(3).92 The UN Human Rights Committee overseeing 
compliance with the covenant has stated that when acts of torture occur, for example, a 
government is under a duty to: “Conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of [the 
victim's] torture, to punish those found guilty of torture and to take steps to ensure that 
similar violations do not occur in the future.”93 That committee has also called for 
investigation and prosecution in cases involving arbitrary executions and disappearances. 
All these acts constitute types of reparations for the wrong done for which State 
Responsibility are lodged.  Support for these principles can be found in many arbitration 
decisions. 
Case-in-point C:  In 1985, the crew of the Dutch-registered Greenpeace ship 
Rainbow Warrior protested French nuclear testing in the South Pacific.  The French 
                                                            
88 See Attila Tanzi, “Is Damage a Distinct Condition for the Existence of an International 
Wrongful Act?,” M. Spinedi and B. Simma (ed) in United Nations Codification of State 
Responsibility, (Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, 1987): 1-33. 
89 The Factory at Chorzow (1927), (Germ. v. Pol.), (PCIJ Ser. A, No. 9, at 29) Permanent Court 
International Justice,  
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.07.26_chorzow.htm. 
90 See note 26 above  
91 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," United Nations Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/pages/WorldRecord.aspx 
92 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976., http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html   
93 See UN Human Rights Council,  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/HRCIndex.aspx 
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military security service “Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure” then destroyed 
the vessel in a New Zealand harbor, killing one of the crew members. New Zealand was 
obviously upset because of this ostensible breach of its territorial sovereignty.  France 
consequently agreed to transfer the responsible French agents to its base in the Pacific 
where they would remain for the last three years. The agents however, were subsequently 
repatriated to France without New Zealand’s consent.   
 
In a 1986 arbitration decision, the UN Secretary General ruled that “in such cases 
where a state sends its agents abroad to commit acts which are illegal under international 
or the domestic law of the target country, it is customary for the state to take 
responsibility for the act and issue compensation …even where its agents are usually 
granted immunity from local courts.”94 Essentially, France had incurred State 
responsibility for its agents and related violation of its commitments to incarcerate its 
agent in the geographical region, which was the scene of the crime.  The Rainbow Warrior 
Arbitration decision affirmed that “the legal consequences of breach of a treaty, including 
the determination of circumstances that may exclude wrongfulness …the appropriate 
remedies for breach, and subjects that belong to the customary law of state 
responsibility.”95 Even though the actions of the French state were not a threat to 
"international peace and security" per the UN Charter, they were widely held to be acts 
of international delinquency comprising breach of sovereignty and espionage.  
The Rainbow Warrior case is important at several levels. First, it bolsters the 
notion that there is a doctrine of non-intervention in international law and that states will 
be punished for contravening it. Second, it is also an interesting study of state 
responsibility, individual responsibility, use of force and reparations. Third and lastly, it 
supports the thesis that attribution is an important instrument in the goal of righting 
justice under certain situations. France incurred State responsibility for its agents and 
related violation of its treaty commitments because it presumably failed, per the treaty, 
to incarcerate its agent in the geographical region which was the scene of the crime. The 
logic of State responsibility here is that there had been an initial finding of fault or intent 
on the part of a State’s agents from which State responsibility was imputed. The failure 
of its agent to respect the terms the imprisonment was attributable to France as its 
responsibility, for which it was held to pay reparations.  It is not at all consequential nor 
does matter if French State was itself at fault or its agents.   The 1949 Corfu case below 
clarify this problem.  
Case-in-point D: The Corfu Channel Incident refers to three separate events 
involving Royal Navy ships in the Channel of Corfu which took place in 1946.96  During 
                                                            
94 See New Zealand v France --- United Nations Reports of the International Arbitral Award 
concerning the interpretation of two agreements, concluded on 9 July 1986 … arising from the 
Rainbow Warrior Affair, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XX/215-284.pdf.  
95 See Michael Pugh, "Legal Aspects of the Rainbow Warrior Affair," (1987). 36 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (3 July): 655–669; Rainbow Warrior (NEW 
ZEALAND v. FRANCE) France-New Zealand Arbitration Tribunal. 30 April 1990; and Philip 
Shabecoff, “France Must Pay Greenpeace $8 Million in Sinking of Ship,” Special to the New 
York Times, October 03, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/03/world/france-must-pay-
greenpeace-8-million-in-sinking-of. Accessed March 28, 2017.   
96 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania); Assessment of Compensation, 15 XII 
49, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 15 December 1949, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid /402398c84.html [accessed 6 June 2017]. 
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the first incident, Royal Navy ships came under fire from Albanian fortifications. The 
second incident involved Royal Navy ships striking mines, and the third incident occurred 
when the Royal Navy conducted mine-clearing operations in the Corfu Channel, ventured 
into Albanian territorial waters, and Albania complained to the United Nations. On the 
question of whether a finding of fault or intent on the part of a State’s agents is required 
for State responsibility when one alleges State harms, the International Court of Justice 
in the 1949 Corfu Channel opinion suggests that some showing of fault is required for 
liability (responsibility) to arise.  Albania, the Court ruled, was responsible under 
international law for the explosions and for damages and loss of life resulting from them 
and that Albania owed a duty to Great Britain to pay compensation. In that case Great 
Britain had sued Albania when British naval vehicle hit mines that had been laid in an 
international strait off Albania’s coast.  Albania denied any knowledge of the presence of 
those mines in spite the rather suspicious circumstances.   The Court reasoned that in 
light of the facts of the case presented …. “it cannot be concluded …that the state 
[Albania] necessarily knew or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated 
therein, nor yet that it is necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors of the mine 
lying in the strait.”97  Restated, Albania knew… and should have known since its Coast 
Guards kept an eye [upon] and fired shots at potential violators and therefore fault is 
attributable to the State of Albania via its agents ….. who presumably laid the mines.” 
Finally, while judicial and academic writings are divided on the showing of fault, 
most writings tend to agree that a standard of “strict liability” is required. In that view, 
the State’s fault, intent, and apparent knowledge are not necessary conditions for State 
responsibility. Under this standard, Albania would again have been liable for the damages to British 
warships –even if it did not intend to harm another State, citizens, or property of Britain. Under a 
strict liability standard however, a state can be held liable for failure to act, such as when floating 
mines are placed in its territorial waters through which foreign vessels routinely navigate. 
This may also include a State being held liable for an act of its agent or a non-state actor 
within its jurisdiction under specified conditions. 
 
Explaining Attribution, State Responsibility and VNSA in the Post 9/11 World 
 
Can a State be held responsible for the wrongful acts of the violent non-State 
actors within their jurisdiction, and if so, under what condition?  This can only be possible 
through a procedural fiction known as attribution.  In the section below, I examine specific 
conditions for attributing state responsibility in the post 9/11. 
First, what is attribution? It is the direct theory under which responsibility is 
ascribed.  More generally Article 2 of the Act of State Responsibility sets out the required 
elements for the existence of an internationally wrongful act.98 A necessary requirement 
for holding any State responsible for wrongful conduct under this concept is a proven 
relationship between the State and the actual perpetrator of the wrongful conduct. This 
ranges from the most mundane cases to the most complicated.  An important aspect of 
this is that a State is not held responsible for the acts of private individuals.  The State of 
course, is an abstract entity that is unable to accomplish any physical act itself. Just as in 
domestic law, corporations act through their officers and agents, so too under 
                                                            
97 See Corfu Channel Opinion Note 39 above. 
98 See Article 2 …. The UN General Assembly, International Law Commission Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility, Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 2001. 
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international law, the State acts mostly through its organs, the legislative and executive 
officials.  There is however, a substantive difference between legal consequences of (a) 
attributing a non-State act to a State (for host of reasons that include direct sponsorship) 
and (b) a failure of a State to meet due diligence obligations (e.g., a duty to prevent 
terrorism …… or the unwillingness to hold accountable a non-state actors within the its 
control). In the latter case, the host State will bear responsibility for the failure to exercise 
due diligence rather than being held culpable, i.e., responsible for the act itself.  
When then can the acts of Violent non-State Actors be attributed to a state?   
 
First, the events of 9/11 make this question fundamentally an important one in 
the assessment of attribution responsibility in the general discussion of State 
responsibility. One has to be careful in assuming however, that in the post 9/11 world, 
all else goes. For example, it is a faulty assumption that the sovereign of country A is 
necessarily responsible and therefore liable just because bad guys, a terrorist, a 
revolutionary, or a guerilla group opposed to country B has been given safe haven in 
country A.  As observed in this article, the theory of attribution is in practice a framework 
under which the ascription of responsibility ideally flows under any assessment, the intent 
of which is to impute State responsibility. However, in practice, the result of that 
assessment may or may not necessarily lead to a conclusion worth making attribution to 
country A.   
Before a state can be held responsible for an act of a non-state actor, it is necessary 
to prove a significant causal connection between the injuries caused by the act of the non-
state actor. This is further imputed to the State assumed to have breached its international 
duty or obligations in the specific support provided to, for example, a terrorist 
organization. Such specific support may very well include the provision of safe-harbor to 
the violent non-State Actor. The Nicaragua v United States case in 1985 speaks to the reach 
of state responsibility and therefore set conditions and requirements for making 
attribution of a non-state act to a state.99 According to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) opinion in that case, in order for an act of a non-state armed group to be attributable 
to a nation State, there must be a showing of an "effective control" of that armed group. 
100 
Ordinarily, the degree to which the act of a non-state actor is attributable to a 
particular State would depend on some key factors. Famously amongst them is one where 
the attribution is clearly established. For example, India’s radical Hindi group invades 
Pakistan from India and kills women and children or a radical Islamist extremist invades 
Israel from Jordan or Lebanon and does the same in Israel. Here the causal connection 
between the injury (killing) and an act committed (invasion) by the Violent non-State 
Actor in both scenarios are unquestionable.  If proven, then the host States (India, Jordan 
or Lebanon) which provided comfort or looked the other way would incur international 
legal responsibility for the conduct of the Violent non-State Actors. This kind of 
attribution is increasingly important today for several reasons.  More than before because 
Violent non-State Actors such as Al-Qaeda, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of  
Columbia (FARC) in Ecuador, multinational corporations, and non-governmental 
                                                            
99 Nicaragua v. United States of America - Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 International Court of Justice 14, 25 International 
Legal Materials 1023 (1986) (Judgment of 27 June 1986). 
100 Nicaragua v United States of America Note 42 above.  
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organizations play variable roles in the international system.  Also more than before, 
governments around the world are at increasing rates farming out to non-state actors 
what use to be traditional State functions. 
In some situations, demonstrating the cause and effect connection may not be all 
that is standing on the way. The initial Act of State Responsibility (ARSIWA) commenced 
in 1950s made a seemingly easy question into a difficult one.101 For example, on the simple 
question “…who bears international responsibility when an armed non-state actor or 
group launches an attack in another country?” Is it the State from which the group 
operates or the non-state actor?  At first blush, ARSIWA Article 1 and 2 seem to provide 
a clear answer. 102  However, on close examination both provisions deal more with 
procedural than substantive rules in addressing which acts or omissions give rise to State 
responsibility for breach of international law.  After seventy years of tinkering, both 
Articles 1 and 2 of the ARSIWA in 2001 were restated in what appeared to specific terms. 
Article l of the 2001 version provides that “[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State 
entails the international responsibility of that State.”103 Article 2 concurs, stating that 
“[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action 
or omission (a) is attributable to the State under international law;” and the action (b) 
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.”104 What is unclear in this 
version, however, is the nature of the wrong - the type of wrong that constitutes State 
action versus those that are not. 
Beyond the unsettling aspects of Article 1 and 2, under the 2001 ARSIWA, there 
are five instances from which clear and undisputable State attribution can be made.105 The 
first clearest case of attribution is that of an organ of the State, notably, police officers, 
and the army. Their actions are attributable to the State even in situations where they 
flout orders or deploy orders that exceed authority under the national law.106  Article 7 
makes no distinction whatsoever between the levels of involvement of the particular State 
organ in the scheme of State organizational structure.107 So State responsibility can arise 
from say the actions of a local policeman, just as it can from the actions of the highest 
officials such as the head of state or Secretary of State.  
                                                            
101 See Resolution 799 (VIII) of 7 December 1953. By this resolution the General Assembly 
requested the International law Commission to undertake “the codification of the principles of 
international law governing State responsibility” as soon as it considered advisable.  Indeed, at 
the first session of the International Law Commission in 1949, the question of State 
responsibility was included on a provisional list of fourteen topics which were considered 
suitable for codification, but was not given priority (A/CN.4/13 and Corr. 1-3).  Also see 2001 
version of Articles on State Responsibility, The UN General Assembly, International Law 
Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 
2001. 
102 See Article 2, Articles on State Responsibility, The UN General Assembly, International Law 
Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 
2001 (herein abbreviated as ARSIWA). 
103 See United Nations Legislative Series, Materials on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ST/LEG/SER B/25, U.N. Sales. No. E.12.V.12).  
104 See Article 8, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above. 
105 See Article 1 and 5, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above. 
106 See Article 7, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above.  
107 See Article 7, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above. 
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Second, Article 5 provides that the rules of attribution cover situations in which 
individuals, not otherwise State organs, are exercising "elements of governmental 
authority.”108 
Third, Article 8 provides that acts of private individuals are attributable to the 
State if those individuals are acting on the instructions of the State, or under its effective 
direction or control.109  
 
Fourth, according to Article 9, in exceptional circumstances in which there is an 
absence of governmental authority, the acts of private individuals may be attributable to 
the State if those individuals perform necessary governmental functions. 110  Lastly, the State 
may incur responsibility even though actions have been carried out by private individuals, 
because the essence of the obligation is to ensure that a given result occurs.  However, 
events discussed below such as the Hezbollah in Lebanon, FARC in Ecuador, and the Al 
Qaida in Afghanistan-Taliban, seem to put in doubt aspecst of the five stated instances 
from which state attribution for responsibilities can be ascribed. 
 
Attributing State Responsibility in Practice 
 
Recent conflicts in Ecuador (with FARC, 2008) and in Lebanon and northern 
Israel (2006), occurring between Nation States and violent non-state armed opposition 
groups on the territory of States that had not themselves taken up arms, raise distinct 
challenges for interpreting international law related to attribution of responsibility under 
the most 2001 version of Act of State Responsibility (ARSIWA, 2001). 
Case in point I: Ecuador-Columbia incident: On March 1, 2008, Colombia attacked 
members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) located within Ecuador, 
killing the group's second highest-ranking member and 21 other militants.111 Colombia 
justified its action under the right to use force in self-defense insisting that State 
responsibility lay with Ecuador, which provided save haven to FARC to launch attacks 
on Colombia. Colombia argued that Ecuador equally failed to meet due diligence 
obligations in preventing the installation of terrorist cells within its territory.  Ecuador 
claimed that Columbia had violated its territorial sovereignty by engaging in hostile arm 
attack with it territory without its consent.   
The Organization of American States (AOS) ruled against Columbia, resolving in 
favor of Ecuador that “the principle that the territory of a state is inviolable and may not 
be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken 
by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever."112 Rejecting any 
                                                            
108 See Article 5, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above. 
109 See Article 8, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above. 
110 See Article 9, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above. 
111 For an in-depth assessment of Colombia root's causes of armed struggle see …. Marco 
Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-200, (Chapel Hill NC: Duke 
University Press, 2006) and Rafael Pardo, “Colombia's Two-Front War.” (2000) 79 Foreign 
Affairs, (4 July/August):64-73. 
112 The principle of non-intervention and the right to territorial integrity are recognized by the 
Charter of the OAS. According to Article 21, "The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not 
be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by 
another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or 
special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized." 
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right of a State to use force in self-defense against terrorist groups located in another 
State without that State's consent (since the OAS resolution does not mention the right 
of self-defense) the ruling place the OAS in collision course with US policy and practice, 
as well as with the UN Security Council's post 9/11 position on the matter.113  In a 
nutshell, that policy considers terrorist violence as a trigger of the right to use force in 
self-defense. Notwithstanding the outcome, the Colombia-Ecuador dispute is part of the 
ongoing controversy in international law about the legality of the use of force by States 
against Violent non-State actors that enjoy safe haven in the territory of other sovereign 
States.  Similar actions had been taken before by other States such as Israel, United States, 
and Turkey as part of response to terrorist threat or the ongoing global war against 
terror. 
 
Case in point II: Lebanon-Israeli conflict: While the facts of Ecuador-Columbia 
incident is one upon which a direct attribution and failure to meet due diligence 
obligations could not stand, a particularly interesting point in the Lebanon-Israeli conflict 
is whether the acts of Hezbollah can be attributed to Lebanon, Syria or Iran, given the 
multitude attribution scheme it presents. Press accounts and Israel’s own view are clear 
confirmation that Israel understands to whom attribution could be assessed in the Israeli-
Lebanese conflict. For example, Steven Erlanger of the International Herald Tribune 
quotes the Likud Party leader Benjamin Netanyahu as calling Hezbollah "an Iranian 
Army division" fighting in a war "conceived, organized, trained and equipped by Iran."114  
The Independent also reported that Israel claimed Lebanon was responsible for the initial 
Hezbollah attack.115 Even if one were to assume that attribution of State responsibility 
cannot adequately be made in light of all available information, it also raises interesting 
questions since Hezbollah and its professed stands against Israel are widely known.116  
Hezbollah’s obvious lack of transparency prompts the question of whether its acts 
are attributable to the three countries - Lebanon, Syria and Iran, or any combination of 
all three States in the attribution of State responsibility for the actions of Hezbollah. 
Assuming that proper attribution is made to Lebanon as the host country (or Iran and 
Syria) then the level of force used by Israel in Lebanon (that resulted in extensive human 
                                                            
113 As the main repository of international law, the UN plays an important role in strengthening 
legal approaches to terrorism and in the respect adopted a number of resolutions condemning 
acts of terrorism. For example, after 9/11 the UN Security Council called on states to take 
action to curb terrorism and established a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor 
such a progress. Table 2 provides a listing of United Nations countering terrorism efforts from 
9/11 through 2013. 
114 See Steven Erlanger, “In Late Drive, Israel Seeks Outcome that looks like Victory," (2006) 
International Herald Tribune, August 14, p.5, Accessed June 8, 2017. 
115 See Robert Fisk, “In the face of Bush's Lies, it's left to Assad to tell the truth ….” The 
Independent, August 16, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-
fisk-in-the-face-of-bushs-lies-its-left-to-assad-to-tell-the-truth-412046.html, 2006.  Accessed 
June 8, 2017. 
116 An umbrella organization of radical Islamic Shiite organizations, Hezbollah is a Lebanese 
group that opposes the West, and whose avowed purpose to create a Muslim fundamentalist 
State modelled on Iran, and bitterly opposes Israel’s existence.  Hezbollah is believed to be 
responsible for hundreds of attacks since its 1982 inception, which have killed about 1000 people 
(see Council of Foreign Relations <Http://www.cfr.org/Publications/9166>). Accessed June 8, 
2017. 
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casualties and property destruction) may raise further questions relative to how the 
existing international laws of arm conflict applies to the conflict.  This has to do with the 
separate legal principles that govern (1) “the legality to resort to armed force” (jus ad 
bellum) which generally turns on whether the U.N. Security Council has authorized the 
use of force or whether the force is properly used as self-defense, and (2) the regulation of 
“state conduct during of armed conflict” (jus in bello) which turn on whether in using the 
authorized force proper measures were taken primarily to protect civil population or non-
combatants and their property once an armed conflict has begun.  
  
Sanctioned State Practices 
 
An examination of recent state practices reveals a picture different from the 
outcome of the Ecuador-Colombia conflict settled by the Organization of American States 
(OAS) against Columbia. Recall that in that conflict, Colombia was held to have violated 
Ecuador’s territorial sovereignty for failure to seek consent even though a non-state was 
given safe-harbor in Ecuador, from which attacks were launched on Colombia. Recent 
practices go beyond the scope of the international law for attributing State responsibility.  
Under the circumstances presented below, the United States, Israel, and Turkey all used 
and defended military strikes against non-state actors terrorist groups located inside 
other sovereign nations.  
As it turned out, the important difference in the Ecuador-Columbia conflict was 
Colombia’s failure to seek Ecuadorian consent before entering its territorial space to 
strike the FARC forces.  The failure to seek consent according to OAS amounted to a 
violation of the OAS treaty obligation and therefore constitutes a violation under 
international law.  Colombia was at fault, according to OAS, even if it had a legal right to 
self-defense and Ecuador had in fact failed to take effective action to prevent the FARC 
groups from operating within its territories. Thus, the question is not whether Ecuador 
failed to take action against a terrorist group effectively enjoying safe-harbor within its 
territory but whether Colombia’s took all legal means necessary to assert its self-defense 
before invading Ecuador.   Colombia could not argue, for instance, that Ecuador was 
unwilling or unable to deter FARC faction within its territory.  
Below are discussion of facts and circumstance that explain how the United States, 
Israel, and Turkey in similar situation used and defended military strikes against non-
state actors or groups located within other sovereign nations. 
 
Case in point I - United States pre-and post 9/11: The United States launched military 
attacks against suspected terrorists in Sudan in 1998 as a response to the terrorist 
bombings on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.  At the wake of 9/11 and more 
specifically in spring of 2002, the United States again attacked Afghanistan with the 
intent to exterminate Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda.117  Afghanistan was a 
source of threat, and its territory was either held hostage or being actively used by Al-
Qaeda as safe-haven from which it launched attacks on United States and other countries.  
As impressively documented by the 2004 9/11 Commission Report, Al-Qaeda was 
the entity that launched the 9/11 commercial passenger jet attacks on US soil, killing 
                                                            
117 Thomas M. Frank, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002) 94-96; Frank M. Franck. Editorial Comment, “Terrorism 
and the Right of Self-Defense” (2001) American Journal of International Law 95(4) 839, 840. 
47
et al.: Volume 1, Issue 2
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2017 51
 
International Journal on Responsibility, Vol. I Issue 1.2 (May) 2018 
46 | P a g e  
 
over 3000 civilians in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania.118  Fallowing the 
theory of attribution in law of State responsibility presented above, would Al-Qaeda acta 
on 9/11 be attributed to Afghanistan, Iraq, or perhaps Saudi Arabia, the nationality of 
most of the 9/11 terrorists? Although the 9/11 Commission Report, issued two years 
later in 2004, confirmed most of what was already known right after the attacks, in 2002 
the US and its coalition of the willing invaded Afghanistan. The US never declared war 
against Afghanistan when it responded with deadly military force within its territory. 119 
That was only part of the story since the choice to invade Afghanistan in particular had 
been furnished earlier by the prior history of the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on United 
States and its consular services in Africa.  
Indeed, well before October 7, 2001 the United States had claimed self-defense as 
it struck parts of Sudan in a 1998 retaliation against terrorist attacks on US embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania which took place on August 7, 1998.  However, the US self-defense 
claims were supported by a series of UN Security Council Resolutions issued after the 
9/11 attacks and well before it.120  These resolutions condemned the terrorist attacks in 
Kenya and Tanzania as well as establishing an Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanction committee. 
It was this committee that charged the Taliban government of Afghanistan with serious 
violations of international law for its role in providing safe haven to the Al-Qaeda 
terrorist group, training and planning facilities, and allowing the continued use of the 
Afghan territory as safe-harbor for Al-Qaeda. These early resolutions passed in 1998 and 
1999, even though unanticipated, were instrumental as they laid the legal framework for 
the United States-led coalition for the armed incursion into Afghanistan territory in 
response to 9/11th terrorist attacks.  
Thus, as the world public opinion sympathetic to the United States after the 9/11 
increased, new resolutions such as Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001) further recognized 
the United States’ inherent right of self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter.  
Codenamed “Operation Enduring Freedom,” the invasion of Afghanistan had at least 
three major goals: capture Osama Bin Laden, eradicate Al-Qaeda terrorist safe havens in 
that country, and promote regime change in Afghanistan. Thus supported by Security 
Council findings and resolutions condemning Al-Qaeda, a non-state actor, the post 9/11 
resolutions doing the same, and a sympathetic world public opinion, the 2002 US attack 
on Afghanistan was properly within the law of self-defense of the UN Charter.   
 
Case in point II - Israel- Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon 2006: The State Department Bureau 
for Counterterrorism 2013 report presents terrorist attack statistics on Israel that have 
become very ordinary and routine. In other words, people have come to expect the worst 
but from Israel’s perspective it is no laughing matter – the danger of its destruction is 
immensely clear and present every day. It provides for example that some 224 mortar 
                                                            
118 The 9/11 Commission Report is the official report of the events leading up to the September 11, 
2001 attacks commissioned by the President and Congress.  The Commission concluded that 15 
of the 19 hijackers who carried out the attacks were from Saudi Arabia but found no evidence 
the government of Saudi Arabia conspired or funded the attackers. While the leader of the 
attacks, Mohamed Atta, was from Egypt, two were from the United Arab Emirates, and one was 
from Lebanon. All 19 hijackers however, were members of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, 
led by Osama bin Laden.  
119 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 
Report.  (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004). 
120 See UN Security Council Resolutions Res #1189, (1998) and #1267, (1999). 
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shells were launched toward Israel in 2013 compared to 2,331 rockets fired from Gaza at 
Israel for the same period. That figure, of course, was up from a previous high of 2,000 in 
2008.  Table 2 provides a list of terrorist groups with an avowed agenda, the destruction 
of Israel. 
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In 2006, responding to a similar attack, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) launched 
an armed attack on Hezbollah, a violent non-state terrorist group within the territory of 
Lebanon, a State that did not take up arms against Israel’s interest.  Specifically, Israel’s 
action was in response to Hezbollah’s capture of two IDF soldiers and the killing of three 
others. Israel’s response would escalate to what became the 34 day long Israel-Hezbollah 
war.121  The question of whether Israel’s actions constituted a well-founded self-defense 
within current State practices and within the spirit and letter of the UN Charter’s Article 
51 is one of interest. Relative to Israel State practice, Amos Guiora reports that even 
before the 2006 conflict, Israel maintained a policy that allowed for repeated target-
killings of Hezbollah, Hamas, PLO and Black September leaders in Gaza, South Lebanon, 
and Syria.122 For a country such as Israel the post 9/11 apprehension or state of 
apprehension is not new.  Israel for one and more than any country, lives under the 
constant threat of an attacked from known or unknown terrorist organizations.123 
By most accounts, the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict (July 12, 2006) began when the 
armed Islamic militant group Hezbollah crossed into Israel and attacked an IDF patrol, 
killing three and capturing two others. While Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah 
confirmed the capture of the two soldiers he said he was interested in setting up a prisoner 
swap with Israel. Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert response was that Hezbollah's 
attack constituted an "act of war" on Lebanon, to which he promised Israel’s strong 
response. Israel’s response however, never included asking Lebanon to locate Hezbollah 
nor did Israel seek Lebanon’s consent (as the first step of attributing State responsibility) 
before a formal encroachment into Lebanese territory. The month-long war between 
Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon caused heavy civilian deaths and property casualties in 
Lebanon, Israel, and the Israeli occupied territories, with the lion’s share being in 
Lebanon.  It is possible that having concluded that Lebanon did not have the capacity to 
suppress Hezbollah or Iran and Syria, Israel took matters into its own hands to launch 
the attack into Lebanon. Under the theory of attribution of State responsibility, Israel 
                                                            
121. One source attempt to offer a rational basis for diverse name for the war -- in Lebanon, the 
war is known as the "July War," while many Israelis call it the "Second Lebanon War" (see 
http://www.historyguy.com/israel-lebanon_war_2006.html) accessed January 20, 2017. 
122 For example, on February 1992, Israel killed Sheikh Abas Musawi, head of Hezbollah, in a 
targeted strike against his convoy in South Lebanon. On February 2008, Israel was the 
mastermind behind the targeted killing of another Hezbollah leader, Imad Mugniyah, the 
second in command of the organization, in the heart of Damascus, Syria.  The real argument is 
that targeted killing is a legitimate form of active self-defense in the context of anticipatory self-
defense. As Amos Guiora observe if the decision to target a particular individual is based on 
reliable and corroborated intelligence information and on the premise that no alternatives exist 
including arrest, and the individual being targeted is perhaps a leader whose death will impact 
upon the terrorist organization then the targeted killing is legal. See Amos Guiora “Targeted 
Killings as Active Self-defense.” (2004) 36 Case Western and Reserve Journal of International Law, 
(xx): 319-330 available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=759584. Also elsewhere Hunter 
define targeted as the premeditated, preemptive, and deliberate killing of an individual or 
individuals known to represent a clear and present threat to the safety and security of a state 
through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals.  See Thomas B. Hunter, Targeted Killing: 
Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terrorism, (Charleston, SC: BookSurge Publishing 2009). 
123 Table 3 listing terrorist organization with mission the express intent the elimination of the 
state of Israel paints the clearest picture of the level of concern Israel must have about her 
security and why she must take offensive measure for its protection. 
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could legitimately have gone after Iran and Syria, the known sources of Hezbollah and 
related terrorist support in Lebanon.  
In the end, reactions by other States and actors as the 2006 incident unfolded were 
generally that Israel was entitled in principle to act in self-defense, but that Israel’s 
actions were disproportionate  in the sense that it did not exclusively target Hezbollah. 
But neither the Israeli official position on its use of force, nor the international 
community’s reactions to it, were clear enough to be conclusively meaningful.  For 
example, the UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) which ended hostilities124 
called for the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, [the initial 
resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006)]. These resolutions required the disarmament 
of all armed groups in Lebanon, the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon (so that, pursuant 
to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006) there would be no weapons or authority 
in Lebanon other than the Lebanese government.125 If anything, the 2006 war and the 
UN Resolution that followed confirmed once again that the Lebanese government was 
impotent and could not either defend or keep others away from fighting proxy wars 
within its territorial space.  
Indeed, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had done the same in the 
1970s as they moved in and took over southern Lebanon to fight against Israel. The UN 
Resolution 1701 calling for a full implementation of the Taif Accords of 2004 suggests that 
had Israel sought UN permission before intervening into Lebanon in 2006 it would have 
met some difficulties.  At the very least, it is very likely that Israel could have been asked 
to see through the implementation of the outstanding peace accords.  For Israel, the 
alternative route –i.e., the war of July 2006 – did not accomplish much. In light of the 
human and capital damages inflicted on Lebanon, it is likely that Israel’s claim of self-
defense as the trigger for intervention could not have stood scrutiny under the standard 
of necessity and proportionality under the prevailing customary international law.  
The case between Uganda and the Republic of Congo (2006) is also instructive 
here.126  In its assessment of Uganda's claim that its use of armed force within Congo was 
in self-defense, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) observed that "the taking of airports 
and towns many hundreds of kilometers from Uganda's border would not seem 
proportionate to the series of trans-border attacks it claimed had given rise to asserted the 
right of self-defense ....”127 Indeed, most people remained unpersuaded that the customary 
right of self-defense is the strongest in light of its consequences. 
Case in point III - Turkey-Iraqi conflict in Northern Iraq: In 2008, Turkey launched a 
major military incursion into Iraq to attack Kurdish militants of the Kurdistan Worker 
Party (PKK) and killing at least 150 PKK fighters, which Turkey considered a terrorist 
group.  The ground offensive was preceded by Turkish Air Force aerial bombardments 
against PKK camps in northern Iraq, which began on December 16, 2007. This 
constituted the "first confirmed ground incursion" of Iraqi territory since the 2003 U.S. 
                                                            
124 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, Adopted by the UN Security Council 
at its 5511th meeting, on August 11, 2006  
125 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1680 (2006) [on implementation of 
Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) on political independence of Lebanon], 17 May 2006, 
S/RES/1680 (2006), available at: http://www.refworld.org /docid/453786a80.html [accessed 
October 16, 2017].   
126 See Congo v. Uganda - Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo in Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 2005 ICJ ___, 45 I.L.M. 271 (2006). 
127 Congo v. Uganda – Note 63 above. 
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led invasion. Turkey’s successful incursion into Iraqi’s territory, which was intended to 
destroy PKK bases, was accomplished with the help of well over 10, 000 troops who took 
part in the operation.128  Turkey's main argument was that Iraq had not been able to 
exercise its authority over the northern part of its country since 1991.129 
The Turkish government argued that a request was made to the Government of 
Iraq to fulfill its obligations under international law to prevent the use of its territory for 
the staging of terrorist acts against Turkey. Thus, while Turkey’s position could well 
have been that because of the failure to act in the part of Iraq, Turkey was then absolved 
of any responsibility for violating Iraqi sovereignty, it contended instead that it had acted 
within the legitimate measures to protect its own security in the face of Iraq's inability to 
exercise authority over the northern part of its country. Thus, the failure to prevent the 
use of its territory as staging ground to launch terrorist acts against Turkey compelled 
Turkey to take the necessary and proportionate actions.130 In a letter dated 24 July 1995 
to the UN Security Council refuting Libya's allegations of Turkey's violations of Iraqi 
sovereignty, Turkey claimed to have resorted to a legitimate measures to protect its own 
security in the face of Iraq's inability "to exercise authority over the Northern part of its 
country" to prevent "the use of its territory for the staging of terrorist acts against 
Turkey.131 
It is important to note that one can only assume the rightness of Turkey’s 
intervention in northern Iraq if one believes that (a) it sought permission and that Iraqi’s 
failure to respond or prevent the use of its territory justified such a military intervention; 
and (2) if one agrees also that the means used by Turkey to attack Kurdish militants of 
PKK and killing 150 of their fighters was proportionate to the harm inflicted by the PPK 
on Turkey.  The logic is self-defeating. 
 
Precedents on Responsibility  
 
By all accounts, the traditional approach to State responsibility for acts of non-
State actors was articulated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Nicaragua v. 
United States and later in the Iran Hostages judgments rendered by the Court in the 1980s.  
That precedent would later be reaffirmed, be it in a modified form, by the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the 
Tadic case in 1999.  The Court thus has spoken only on few cases leaving the rest to state 
practices which also serve as additional source of law.  
 
Case in point 1 – Nicaragua v United States and Tadic Cases: In the Nicaragua case, 
to establish State responsibility the Court required an effective State control of the non-
                                                            
128 See The Economist. The Kurds: Turkey invades northern Iraq. The Economist. Print 
Edition. Feb 28, 2008 to March 1, 2008, at. 42. http://www.economist.com/node/10766808, 
Accessed June 8, 2017 
129 The Economist March 1, 2008, Note 65 above.    
130 See UN Security Council Doc S/1995/605, 1995. 
131 United Nation Security Council Documents, UN Doc S/1995/605 (1995), “Letter of 24 July 
1995 refuting Libya's allegations of Turkey's violations of Iraqi sovereignty ….” 
http://habitat.igc.org/sc/600-699.html. 
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State actor.132 Thus for example, financing, organizing, training and equipping a group is 
not enough to trigger State responsibility per the standard adopted by the Court.  In the 
end, the US was found to be internationally responsible to Nicaragua but not under the 
“effective control” standard of attributing responsibility to a State. In this case the US 
was accused by Nicaragua for supporting the opposition group, the Contras.   According 
to the ICJ, in order for an act of a non-state armed group to be attributable to state, there 
must be an "effective control" wherein even 'financing, organizing, training, supplying 
and equipping" as well as "the selection of its military or paramilitary targets and the 
planning of the whole of its operation" is not enough to meet the exacting threshold. 133 
However, the 1999 Tadic ruling relaxed the "effective control" standard of 
attribution specifically for acts by non-state military organizations, but still required the 
State’s “overall control” going beyond the mere financing and equipping of such forces to 
also include participation in the planning and supervision of military operations.”134 
 
Case in point 2 – The Iran Hostage Case: Beyond the Nicaragua and Tadic rulings 
noted above, another way in which acts of non-state actors can be attributed to a State is 
if the State acknowledges and adopts such actions after they have occurred. That is, a 
State may incur responsibility, even if those individuals acted on their own initiative. This 
is precisely how the ICJ reasoned in Iran Hostage Case where foreign embassies were 
overrun by mobs and diplomatic staff were taken as hostages by private individuals.135 In 
that case, the Court opined that State Responsibility was extended to the Iranian 
government not only because it conceded the facts, but because “the government 
subsequently adopted the student-driven attacks on the US and Canadian diplomatic 
offices and hostage taking.”136 According to the Court, the Iranian government was 
responsible even if its position and those taken by the student had no affiliation at the 
time the hostage situation occurred.137 Thus, a State may incur responsibility even though 
actions have been carried out by private individuals, because the essence of the obligation 
is to ensure that a given result occurs.  
It is obvious from the Nicaragua, Iran, and Tadic cases discussed here that along 
the way it became evident that the Nicaragua standard for State responsibility became 
extremely difficult to sustain. Attributing State responsibility and therefore culpability 
became difficult to apply even where a State was in fact in the wrong. The International 
Law Commission’s 2001 report codifying customary law titled “Articles on State 
                                                            
132 See Nicaragua v. United States of America - Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 International Court of Justice 14, 25 International Legal 
Materials 1023 (1986) (Judgment of 27 June 1986) 
133 See Nicaragua v. United States of America – Note 61 above. 
134 See The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia. 14 July 1997. http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-sj970714e.pdf. Also 
see "Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić - Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 2 October 1995. 
http://www.iilj .org/courses/documents/Prosecutorv.Tadic.pdf. 
135 United States v Iran - Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran (United States of America v. Iran); Order, 12 V 81, International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), 12 May 1981, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4023aaf77.html 
[accessed 5 June 2012]. 
136 See United States v Iran, Note 78. 
137 See United States v Iran, Note 78. 
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Responsibility” sought to clarify this point of law in Articles 8 and 11.138  First it 
recognizes the effective control standard for State responsibility announced by ICJ in the 
Nicaragua Case in 1985. Articles 8 therefore asserts the prevailing view of State 
Responsibility relative to acts of Non-State actors by stating that “The conduct of a person 
or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or 
group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of that 
State in carrying out the conduct”.139  Prior to the adoption of the Articles on State 
Responsibility the conduct of the private individuals were not attributable to the State, 
and Article 8 of the 2001 version of the Articles on State Responsibility prospectively 
remedied that deficiency. With this adjustment made acts of private individuals occurring 
at a point where there is an existing relationship between an individual and the State is 
as 2001 applicable to host the State.140  
 
Second, also complementing Article 8 and providing much needed 
clarity, Article 11 provides that “Conduct which is not attributable to a State 
under the preceding articles (1 through 10) shall nevertheless be considered an 
act of that State under international law if … the State acknowledges and adopts 
the conduct in question as its own.”141  Thus, once the threshold of responsibility 
is met, the act of the non-state actor is considered an act of the State with all 
ensuing legal consequences. 
 
State Responsibility and Sovereignty 
 
There are obvious tension between the prohibitions against the use of force 
(UN Charter 2 (4)) intended to safeguard the political independence and 
territorial integrity of a UN member State and the right to self-defense to protect 
the territorial sovereignty of a member State (UN Charter, Article 51).  The use 
of predatory drones to hunt and to kill Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, the 
invasion and killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and the invasion and capture 
of Abu Anas al-Libi in Libya who planed Al Qaeda’s 1998 bombing of two US 
Embassies in East Africa are examples of self–defense par excellence that may 
be complicated by the initial territorial independence or sovereignty violation 
claims.  
 
Case in point – I:  The use of Drones: Ongoing studies by the New America 
Foundation show that between 2004 and 2013 they were 365 reported US drone 
strikes in the northwest Pakistan with 132 of these occurring between January 
                                                            
138 See Articles on State Responsibility 2001, Note 21 and 39 above.  Also see James Crawford 
(2002) [pp.  110-113, 121-123],  The International Law Commission's Articles on State 
Responsibility, Note 21. 
139 See Note 21 above, James Crawford (2002) [pp.  110-113, 121-123], commentary on The 
International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility. 
140 However, the new Articles 8 commentary cautioned that most common cases of the kind 
would arise mostly where a State organ supplements their own actions by instigating or 
recruiting a third party (private persons) to act either as an auxiliary while remaining outside 
the official structure of the State.   
141 See Articles on State Responsibility, ARSIWA Note 39 above. … Resolution A/RES/56/83 
of 12 December 2001 
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and September 30, 2013 alone. According to the New America Foundation, the 
365 drone strikes occasioned approximately 2065 to 3064 individual deaths, of 
whom 1611 to 2787 were described as militants. Non-militant fatality rates since 
2004 through 2013 were approximately 12%, a decrease of 6% from 2012 
percentages.142  The sheer number of US drone strikes alone begs the question 
whether, in the continued war on terror, the US encroached on the sovereignty 
of some other state (Pakistan) in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter? If 
not, at the very least, it raises the question whether under the new post 2001 
Article of State Responsibility, United States must obtain consent of the target 
State (Pakistan) before targeting Violent non-State Actors (VNSA) who engage 
in armed attacks against US military personnel within that country.  
Professor Kenneth Anderson takes the position that the right to use 
targeted predatory drones as weaponry in the war on terror to protect U.S. 
troops from continued Al-Qaeda and Taliban attacks is a valid asserted right 
of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.143 However, seen in 
isolation of any factual determination of US claim for self-defense, the notion 
that the US violated the territorial sovereignty of Pakistan is an incomplete 
assertion. What is necessary is an individualized and factual determination of 
any purported claim of self-defense. For example, UN Article 51 not only 
grants the right to self-defense but also requires proportionality in its 
execution. In the last few years there has been an emerging consensus among 
scholars that an armed attack by a violent non-State actor (VNSA) on a State, 
its embassies, its military post, or on its nationals abroad would trigger the 
right to self-defense, even if such an attack is directed to a safe-harbor in a 
foreign country.144 More recently (2010), Jordan Paust also confirmed that the 
                                                            
142 See The New America Foundation, “The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone 
Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013“ www.Newamerica.net. 
http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis?page=1 Accessed September 14 2013. 
143 See Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law (May 
11, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415070 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1415070. 
144 See Kimberly N. Trapp “Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right of Self-
Defense Against Non-State Actors,”(2007) 56 International & Comparative Law Quarterly,(01): 
141-156, doi:10.1093/iclq/lei153; Louis Henkin,  “War and Terrorism: Law or Metaphor,” 
(2005) 45 Santa Clara Law Review, pp. 817, 821; Emanuel Gross, “Thwarting Terrorist Acts by 
Attacking the Perpetrators or Their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights 
Versus the State’s Duty to Protect Its Citizens,” (2004) 15 Temple International Law & 
Comparative Journal, (36):195-217; Amos Guiora, “Targeted Killings as Active Self-defense.” 
(2004) 36 Case Western and Reserve Journal of  International Law, (xx):319-330 Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=759584; Derek, Remarks, “Self-Defense in an Age of 
Terrorism,” (2003) 97 American Society of International Law Proceeding,pp. 144- 146; Norman 
G. Printer, Jr. ,“The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors Under International Law: An 
Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen,” (2003) 8 University of California Los Angeles 
Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 8(Fall/Winter): 331-353; Jordan J. Paust, 
“Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad,” (1986) 8 Whittier 
Law Review (xx)pp. 711-729; Jordan J. Paust, “Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond,” (2002) 35 Cornell International Law Journal, (xx) pp. 533-35; 
Jordan J. Paust, “Self-Defense Targeting of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of 
Drones in Pakistan” (2002) 19 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, (2):pp. 237-279, available 
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use of targeted predatory drones is permissible if done in response to an armed 
attack by VNSA to protect US and NATO troops, and not to engage a foreign 
state or occupy its territory.145 Also, human rights treaties such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [(ICCPR Article 6(1)] 
and the European Convention on Human Rights [(ECHR Article 2(1)] 
recognize “the inherent right to life” and “prohibit arbitrary deprivations of 
life”146 as well as “allow[ing] for the intentional taking of life when absolutely 
necessary.”147  
Both the ICCPR and ECHR instruments require a State to show, for 
example, that an invasion and/or killing is necessary and that other non-lethal 
options were explored but were not viable. Thus for example, drone targeting 
of Al-Qaeda and Taliban membership does not constitute a violation of human 
rights treaties if actual arrests were difficult or even impossible to execute.   
 
Case in point – II: The Killing of Osama Bin Laden: The US invasion of Pakistan 
and killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan on May 2, 2011 raises several 
important legal and political issues under the international law of responsibility 
and territorial independence.  At the wake of the successful U.S. military 
operation, the Pakistan Government objected to the “unauthorized unilateral 
action” by the United States and cautioned that the event “shall not serve as a 
future precedent for any state.”148 Former President Musharraf also followed 
suite complaining that the operation violated Pakistan’s sovereignty.149 The UN 
Charter Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force against the political independence 
and territorial integrity of a UN Member State. But Article 51 speaks to the 
exception and therefore to the right to self-defense.  Both Charter provisions 
address what in practice are matters of law and state practices.  Beyond the 
                                                            
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520717, Accessed March 28, 2012; Oscar Schachter, “The 
Extra-Territorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases,” (1989) 11 Houston Journal of 
International Law,(02): pp. 309, 311-12; Thomas M, Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action 
Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Thomas M, Franck, 
Editorial Comment, “Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense” (2001) 95 American Journal of 
International Law (4)pp. 839, 840 ; Jules Lobel. (1999). “The Use of Force to Respond to 
Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan,” (1999) 24 Yale Journal of 
International Law (Summer): pp. 537-547; Sean D. Murphy, “Terrorism and the Concept of 
Armed Attack in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,” (2002) 43 Harvard Journal of International Law 
(1): pp. 41-52. 
145 See Jordan Paust, “Self-Defense Targeting of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. 
Use of Drones in Pakistan” (2009) 19 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, (2) (December 8): 
237, 2010; available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520717.  
146 See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) [adopted and opened 
for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI)] 
December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976.   
147 See Council of Europe, The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), ROME 4 
November 1950, F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex, http://conventions.coe.int. Accessed June 8, 2012. 
148 Jane Perlez & David Rohd, “Pakistan Pushes Back against U.S. Criticism on Bin Laden,” N.Y. 
Times, May 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/world/asia/04pakistan.html. 
149 John Bacon, “Musharraf: U.S. Violated Pakistan’s Sovereignty, “USA Today, May 3, 2011, 
http://content. usatoday.com /communities/ondeadline/post/2011/05/musharraf-us-
violatedpakistan-sovereignity/1, Accessed June 8, 2017.  
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trappings of the law and claim of sovereignty, state practices support the 
“unwilling or unable” standard of self-defense as a contemplative limit before 
invasion is executed.150  
As the Columbia-Ecuador conflict in 2008 discussed earlier exemplifies, 
non-State actors including terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda regularly launch 
attacks against States from bases within the State they enjoy safe-harbor. Such 
practices not only violate international law but they are risky undertakings 
which more often than not would instigate retaliatory measures.  However, 
victim-States (such as the United States) are well advised not to undertake any 
action without the consent of the source State. Specifically, any incursion of 
military forces into the territory of the source State would objectively violate its 
territorial sovereignty and formally the UN Charter Article 2(4), which prohibits 
the use of force against the political independence and territorial integrity of UN 
Member States.  The normal calculus for a victim State, who seeks to respond 
with force, is to consider whether to proceed with force on the territory of a State 
with whom it has no conflict.  Absent consent from the host State of the source 
of attack or an authorization from the UN Security Council, international law 
requires that a victim-State assess whether the host State is “unwilling or unable” 
to suppress the threat within its territory. Effectively, a balance between 
sovereignty and self-defense is necessary in that assessment.  
Writing in 1958, Ian Brownlie observed that military actions across 
national frontiers to suppress armed groups, which has been determine to be a 
“source of an attack” and which the host state was unable or unwilling to suppress, 
could be seen as a legitimate form of self-defense.151 In an August 2007 speech, 
then-Presidential candidate Barack Obama reasserted the Brownlie conception 
as he stated that, if elected, his Administration would take action against the 
leadership of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan if the United States had actionable 
intelligence about al Qaeda targets and President Musharraf had failed to act.152 
Obama would later clarify his position, stating that what he said instead was that 
“if we have actionable intelligence against Bin Laden or other key al Qaida 
officials . . . and Pakistan is unwilling or unable to strike against them, we 
should.”153  
                                                            
150 Also see David A Wallace, “Operation Neptune's Spear: The Lawful Killing of Osama Bin 
Laden.” (2012) 45 Israel Law Review, (2): 367-377. doi:10.1017/S0021223712000118. 
151 See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands,  (1958) 7 
International  & Comparative Law Quarterly 712, 732  for the thread of the argument that  the 
United States was well within its rights under international law to launch an attack into 
Pakistan against bin Laden. 
152 Dan Balz, “Obama Says He Would Take Fight to Pakistan,” Washington Post, Aug. 2, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com Presidential Candidates Debate Pakistan, Feb. 28, 2008, 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com /id/23392577/ns/politics-decision_08/ Accessed June 
8, 2012. 
153 Presidential Candidates Debate Pakistan, Feb. 28, 2008, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23392 577/ns/ politics-decision_08/ Accessed March 28, 
2017. 
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More recently, both Noam Lubell154 and Harold H. Koh155 have also 
recited the unwilling or unable test as the correct yard stick to determine when a 
victim State may take retaliatory measures against non-State actors within the 
territory of another State. The assessment is fact-based and intensive. In 
practice, States such as Israel, Russia, and Turkey are among those who have 
taken liberty of the unwilling or unable doctrine to exercise their self-defense right, 
thus establishing chronological records of contemporary state practices.156 The 
United States invasion and killing of Osama Bin Laden viewed in light of the 
US’s own views and related precedents on the matter also fit well with the 
unwilling or unable test. Here is why: both the Bush and Obama administrations 
took the view that the United States is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda. To 
both governments Al-Qaeda undertook an armed attack against the United 
States on September 11, 2001, which triggered the U.S. right of self-defense.  
Therefore given the nature of the enemy and the mayhem caused and 
likelihood yet of another hit, the ensuing conflict extends beyond any particular 
battlefield, be it in Afghanistan, Yemen or Bahrain to wherever members of Al-
Qaeda can be found, as the case Al-Aulaqi v. Obama 2010 makes abundantly 
clear.157 For those who adopt this position, once a state is in an armed conflict 
with a non-state armed group, that conflict follows the members of that group 
wherever they go, as long as the group’s members continue to engage in 
hostilities against that Victim State. The contrarian view is that armed conflicts 
have geographic limits as a matter of international law. That is, such a fact must 
be determined to establish the existence of an armed conflict before all things 
else. 
In light of the United States’ position in the war on terror, the US as the 
victim State had the option of seeking the consent of the source-of-attack State 
(Pakistan) before intervening in Pakistan to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden or 
go at it alone without notifying Pakistan.  It elected the later. The United States 
went after Bin Laden alone, but why? A New York Times piece of May 4, 2011 
suggest that “Pakistani officials were angry about C.I.A. Director Panetta’s post-
fact assertion that Washington did not share advance knowledge of the raid with 
Pakistan because it might have leaked, allowing Bin Laden to escape.”158 Also a 
Wall Street Journal piece of May 5, 2011, confirmed that “U.S. and European 
                                                            
154 See Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
155 See Keynote Address “The Obama Administration and International Law,” to the American 
Society of International Law in a Time of Change (Harold H. Koh Mar. 25, 2010) 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm, Accessed March 28, 2012. 
156 See John Bellinger, “Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism,” London Sch. Economics., 
October 31, 2006, at www2.lse.ac.uk/PublicEvents/pdf/20061031_JohnBellinger.pdf, 2006, 
Accessed June 8, 2017. 
157 In Al-Aulaqi v. Obama a ruling favoring the Obama administration, the Court observed that 
“…the fact that the United States’ armed conflict with al-Qaeda exists in one particular location 
does not mean that it cannot exist outside this geographic area” (See, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 
(D.D.C.2010) (No. 10 Civ. 1469). Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
and Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at p.1.). 
158 Allen Cowell,”Pakistan Sees Shared Intelligence Lapse,” N.Y. Times, May 4, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes. com/2011/05/05/world/asia/05react.html, Accessed June 8, 2017.  
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intelligence officials increasingly believed active or retired Pakistani military or 
intelligence officials provided some measure of aid to Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin 
Laden, allowing him to stay hidden just a mile from an elite military academy.”159 
Beyond the obvious lack of trust that one senses, both the New York Times and 
Wall Street Journal sources suggest why the United could neither sought consent 
or shared information with Pakistan before the invasion to its territory that 
resulted in the killing of Osama Bin Laden. 
What exactly constitute unwilling and unable? From the victim-State 
perspective, it simply means whether the host State has demonstrated a clear and 
convincing willingness and is logistically capable or able to suppress the sources-
of-threat from its territory.  For example, in the Pakistan-US relationship during 
the war on terror, many facts should stand out when evaluating Pakistan’s 
willingness or ability of Pakistan to suppress the threat posed by Bin Laden and 
Al Qaeda on either the United States, NATO and Afghan forces, or to the 
security of other States that suffered the 9/11 al Qaeda attacks.  More 
specifically, the victim state must (1) ask the host State to address the threat and 
provide adequate time for the host State to respond; (2) reasonably assess the 
host State’s control and capacity of the threat; (3) reasonably assess the host 
State’s proposed means to suppress the threat; and (4) evaluate prior interactions 
between the victim State and the host State.  It must be understood that for host 
of reasons state practice does not mandate that a victim State such as the US 
seeks the support of the host State (Pakistan) before an invasion is executed. 
Exempted situations include those where a victim State has strong reasons to 
believe that the host State is colluding with the non-state source-of-threat, or 
where asking the host state to take steps to suppress the threat might lead the 
host to tipping off the non-state actor before the victim-State can undertake its 
mission against the non-state actor.160 
Thus, the test just stated is an action-based test that requires a careful 
examination of Pakistan’s conduct in the US initiated war on terror and US 
expectation of Pakistani role in that war.  This also requires an assessment of 
the United States’ perception of Pakistani support relative to the mission of 
finding Bin Laden or the Al-Qaeda operatives. Thus, the purpose of Operation 
Enduring Freedom in “President Bush’s National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism” released February 14, 2003 is worth reiterating as well as its major 
goals: (1) to capture of Osama Bin Laden, (2) to eradicate Al-Qaeda terrorist safe-
havens, and (3) to promote regime change in Afghanistan.161 Pakistan’s 
assistance relative to the stated goals is decisive in any assessment of what 
influenced the United States to go alone after Bin Laden, a decision that might 
stand scrutiny to the conclusion that Pakistan was either “unwilling or unable” 
to fully assist the United States in its mission on war on terror. To both the 
United States and Pakistan there was an undeniable lack of trust which wore 
                                                            
159 See Adams Entous, Julian Barnes & Matthew Rosenberg, “Signs Point to Pakistan Link,” 
Wall St. J., May 5, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704322804576303553679080310.html, 
Accessed June 8, 2017.  
160 See John Bellinger, Note 99 above. 
161 See The White House Office of the Press Secretary, February 14, 2003, http://georgewbush 
whitehouse.archives.gov /news /releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html.  
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down considerably, especially during the declared decade of the war on terror.162 
The bases of such mistrust it has been asserted were often very different and 
conflicting in expectations and national interests.163  
Well before the US intervention and killing of Osama Bin Laden, 
Pakistan had long harbored doubts over whether the United States respected its 
sovereignty.  Pakistan pointed to the fact that US aircraft in transit to 
Afghanistan, flew outside the established air corridor from the Arabian Sea in 
violation Pakistani territorial sovereignty.164  The Pakistani military and its 
Intelligence Service had always been suspicious of the real motives of the United 
States and how a long term relationship with the US would benefit their own 
interest. 165 On the other hand, there is also the observation that the United 
States primary concern has always been whether the Pakistani establishment and 
elements within it, receiving US financial aid, publically proclaimed allegiance 
to US causes while in private acting against US global interests in the war on 
terror.166 Overcoming these suspicions required creating trust in an effort to 
sustain the critical effort of achieving the objectives of the global war on 
terrorism. 
In light of these doubts, the killing of Osama Bin Laden on May 4, of 
2010 signaled to Pakistan that the United States could act alone to defend its 
self-defense interest, especially where it deemed that Pakistan was either 
unwilling or incapable of outsourcing an avowed enemy of the United States. 
The practical effect of US behavior should be seen less as the willingness to act 
with impunity on the territory of a foreign state and more as the share 
brazenness to root out terrorists out who were eager to cause another 9/11 on 
United States before they could do so.  The fact that Osama Bin Laden could 
hide in plain sight of Pakistan's intelligent Services (ISI) reinforced US suspicion 
that privately Pakistan was unwilling to assist the US in the war on terror. The 
other possibility—that Bin Laden perhaps was sheltered by the Pakistan's 
Intelligence is even more terrifying. Yet, it also supports the trustless thesis, that 
Pakistan was not a reliable partner in the war on terror. This is a stronger 
conclusion as US officials in the past had consistently maintained that Al-Qaeda’s 
top leaderships were hiding in Pakistan.  
  Lastly, the invasion and capture of Abu Anas al-Libi in Libya who 
planed Al-Qaeda’s 1998 bombing of two US Embassies in east Africa, similar to 
the invasion of Pakistan, from the US perspective, signaled as the New York 
Times put it “a limit to its patience.”167  Thus, two years after NATO intervention 
                                                            
162 Randall L. Koehlmoos, “Positive Perceptions to Sustain the US-Pakistan Relationship” (2010) 
40 Parameters, (2, Summer):46-57.  
163 See Koehlmoos Note 105 above. 
164 See Koehlmoos Note 99 above. 
165 See Karen DeYoung  “U.S., Pakistan Tread Delicately Toward More Cooperation,” The 
Washington Post, 29 April 2010, A8. 
166 See Reza M. Pirbhai. The Trust Deficit:  US / Pakistani Relations, Then and Now, The 
Global Realm http://www.counterpunch.org/pirbhai05272011.html, June 3, 2011.  
167 See Carlotta Gall and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Libya Condemns U.S. for Seizing Terror 
Suspect,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/, October 6, 2013; also see Peter Baker and 
David E. Sanger, “Raids Show the Limits of U.S. Military Strikes”  
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that removed Qaddafi from power and waiting for the new Libyan government 
to go after suspected terrorists’ cells in Libya, the US signaled with this invasion 
and capture, its willingness to go alone. 
 
 
Table 3: List of Security Council Measures Adopted on Aspects of United Nations Focus on 
Terrorism, 1999-2014 
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Table 4: International Counter-Terrorism Conventions, Pre and Post 9/11 
 
Table 4                                                   International Counter terrorism  Conventions  Pre and Post 9/11* 
 
Terrorism Convention, Purpose & Date of Passage Summary of Major content of each instrument 
1  Convention  on  Offences  and  Certain  Other  Acts 







2  Convention  for  the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure 


















4  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of 
Crimes  Against  Internationally  Protected  Persons 
















6   Convention  on  the  Physical  Protection  of  Nuclear 






7  Protocol  for  the  Suppression  of  Unlawful  Acts  of 
Violence  at  Airports  Serving  International  Civil 
Aviation  (1988).            Extends  &  Supplement  to  the 
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8  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  Unlawful  Acts 
Against  the  Safety  of  Maritime  Navigation,  (1988) 














the  Safety  of  Fixed  Platforms  Located  on  the 
Continental Shelf (1988) (applies to terrorist activities 
on  fixed  offshore  platforms)  (Fixed  Platform 
Protocol) 












































Encourages  States  to  cooperate  in  preventing  terrorist  attacks  by  sharing  information  and  assisting  each  other  in  connection  with  criminal 
investigations and extradition proceedings; and  

























Lessons from Cases, Events and Incidents 
  
State responsibility and State duty today: The lessons drawn are at best 
ambiguous but in the end, one can draw some obvious positive trends from the 
cases, events and incidents presented in this article.   
The first lesson on “self-defense” is that in the post 9/11 world, most 
NATO countries, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the UN 
Security Council have all recognized that terrorist attacks by any violent non-
State Actor located within a State or otherwise, present sufficient enough cause 
to use force for self-defense.  To follow that position Tables 3 and 4 provides a 
detail listing of UN resolutions and explanation in the area of terrorism.  Table 
3 or example provide a listing of Security Council Measures adopted on aspects 
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of United Nations focus on terrorism from 1999 through 2014.  It is comforting 
to see that the United Nation has been in the forefront.  Also, Table 4 is a listing 
of 14 International Conventions and protocols initiated by the United Nations 
dealing with terrorism and related to state responsibilities for combating 
terrorism. 
These conventions and protocols all relate to state responsibilities for 
combating terrorism, and are provided in a familiar format. Typically they: (1) 
define a particular type of terrorist violence as an offence/crime under the 
convention (i.e., the seizure of an aircraft in flight by threat or violence); (2) 
require member State Parties to penalize that activity/conduct in their domestic 
law; (3)identify certain bases upon which the member State are responsible or 
required to establish jurisdiction over the defined offence (territoriality or 
nationality); and (4) create an obligation on member State parties in which a 
suspect is found to establish jurisdiction over the convention offence and/or 
to refer the offence for prosecution if the member state party does not extradite 
pursuant to other provisions of the convention. The last element is the principle 
of no safe haven for terrorists where for example, Security Council Resolution 
1373 of September 28, 2001 mandates the Member State in which a suspect is 
found to establish jurisdiction over the convention offence as an essential 
anti-terrorism obligation on Member States. 
The second lesson is on “State Responsibility” and is on the recognition 
that in spite the seeming prevalence of terrorist acts perpetrated by violent non-
State Actors in the post 9/11, international law requires that victim States act 
responsibly within prevailing rules and practices of international law. What this 
means is that they obtain proper consent before launching attacks against non-
state actors located within the territory of another State. Lastly, that victim 
States be mindful that the failure by host States to terminate terrorist groups' 
activities within their territory or deny safe-haven does not effectively grant carte 
blanche permission to use force. Under the traditional right of self-defense, the 
legality for the any use of force must be established before any action is 
contemplated. That is, where necessary and appropriate, (1) it must be shown 
that the host state is unwilling or unable to reduce or eliminate the source of the 
threat, and (2) all means adopted and damage inflicted must be proportionate to 
the initial harm caused to the victim state, and (3) any use of force is very 
temporary and one that does not result in non-consensual occupation or 
annexation of the State or territory.  To most critics, very little has changed. 
As in the past, the UN Charter continues to limits the use of force to 
collective security however, one that is duly authorized by the Security Council 
as provided under Chapter VII of that Charter.  Under what can be termed as I 
do here as the minimalist view of Article 51, self-defense is justified only as a 
reaction to an armed attack in the most imminent of the circumstances. 
Contrasting the minimalist view is what I also term as the post 9/11 maximalist 
relaxed view of international affairs and especially Article 51. This view holds 
that the Charter does not require that an armed attack is attributed to a State 
actor in order for a victim state to invoke the right to self-defense for retaliation.  
There is therefore no distinction between a State and a non-State actor. The 
problem with the later maximalist view is that attacking a non-state actor within 
another state will almost always require using military operations in the 
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territory of that State. That being the case, if the host state does not grant 
consent, then such any use of force on its territory is an act of aggression, and 
therefore an illegal use of force consistent with UN Charter prohibition.  
The collision course between the harsh reality of the real world fight 
against terrorism and the danger it presents and the rule law is undeniable. Put 
simply, the reality of the current infinite capacity of VNSA to launch armed 
attacks against States defies the continued relevance or the strict adherence to 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. To underscore the point using the Israeli-
Hezbollah conflict in 2006, Israel's use of force in the Lebanese territory was and 
would be problematic. It will be if the acts of Hezbollah cannot be attributed to 
any state or if the acts of Hezbollah are attributable to either Syria or Iran and 
not Lebanon in light of Hezbollah’s occupational history in that country. 
However, in the post 9/11 maximalist view of a relaxed view of the right of self-
defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, Israel's campaign in Lebanon was 
and is legal under international law. 
 
Discussions & Conclusion 
 
State responsibility and State duty in perspective: States unquestionably 
remain sovereign entities whose power to do routine business in international 
affairs are recognized and respected. However, States are less and less the sole 
players on the international scene, and even much less so in armed conflicts. The 
picture this conveys is that States do not have absolute power to control and do 
not have absolute freedom to do as they please. Codified rules of State 
responsibility are clear on this point.  Also, the constraint imposed as displayed 
by international humanitarian laws that structures and limits the conduct of war 
cannot be underestimated. Contemporary application of immunity still premised 
on the 1648 Westphalia understanding of sovereignty which positions the State 
above all orders but its own, is waning at a faster rate.  Yes the State does matter, 
but only on those matters that are essential to statehood and no more. 
The assessment presented in this article shows that current international 
law admits the use of force against terrorist groups which is hardly attributable 
to a specific State. This, of course, is an expansive view and therefore maximalist 
on the matter.  For example, in the post 9/11 world, while the use of force against 
non-state actors in theory is permissible only under certain prescribed 
circumstances, in practice it is far easier to use force today than was the case 
twenty-five years ago. The US killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011 
is a classic example, and so is the second regroup of US led coalition to after ISIS 
in Iraq and Syria in 2014.  Also the use of drones in Pakistan depended on the 
inquiry into many features of context and appropriate application of principles 
of reasonable necessity and proportionality but shows the ease to which States 
can use force. The ease with which force is used today begs the question for 
further explanation however in context specific situation.  
In the post 9/11 international environment, force can be used in 
particular instances, as in the case where the host State is unable or unwilling to 
repress the non-state terrorist organization operating within its territory.  This, 
of course, suggests that all reasonable measures are taken prior to such a use of 
force.  Also, force can be used when a request for intervention has been made by 
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the international community in order to fight or repel non-state groups within 
the territory of a UN member state. In either case, the degree of force required 
(and used) must be proportionate and necessary to deter the specific source of 
the threat.  
Also as the assessment above shows, State practices also demonstrate 
that in the face of mounting threat posed by a terrorist organizations and for 
which there is a consensus at the international community, it is not necessary to 
demonstrate a link between such non-state terrorist organizations and a 
particular State. This suggests that one or more States can use force against 
another State when the latter gives shelter to terrorist organizations in its 
territory. This of course is the case only when the host State does not signal its 
intent to repress the terrorist threat within its territory despite repeated 
requests to do so by the victim state or the international community.  
The United Nations Charter and the numerous initiatives taken by the 
United Nations since late 1990s (see Table 2) also provides for self-defense 
recourse to be used strictly for such a purpose. If for example, a Member State 
were attacked or invaded by another Member state, the Victim State has the 
right to resort to self-defense as provided by Article 51 of the UN Charter. The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has spoken on this matter.  The Victim State 
must demonstrate the involvement of the aggressive State according to strict 
criteria identified by the ICJ and by the International Law Commission. That is, 
where necessary and appropriate, (1) it must be shown that the aggressive state 
is unwilling or unable to reduce or eliminate the source of the threat, and (2) all 
means adopted and damage inflicted must be proportionate to the initial harm 
caused to the victim state, and (3) any use of force is very temporary and one that 
does not result in non-consensual occupation or annexation of the State or 
territory. 
Finally is the case of Failed States, that is, those meeting known 
definitions of failed states used by terrorist organizations as a base from which 
to inflict mayhem on other countries. As shown in the case of Lebanon in this 
article, when State authorities are unable to exercise effective control over part 
or the entire territory, as was the case of Lebanon during the Israeli-Hezbollah 
conflict in 2006, they are fair game for intervention.  And where terrorist 
organizations are operating and using that territory as a launching ground, 
Victim States do not need permission to invade such a sponsoring territory. That 
is, Victim States do not need to seek further approval or meet the strict criteria 
of informing the State harboring the VNSA where the attack is being launch.   
The US killing of Osama Bin Laden, in spite of Pakistan’s avowed 
partnership in the war on terror, is a case in point, and therefore, precedent-
setting in light of the set of facts explaining their prior partnership. The use of 
force is therefore permissible under such circumstances to the extent that such a 
use is proportionate and necessary to deter the specific source of threat from the 
host territory especially where the authorities are unable or unwilling to exercise 
control over their territory or the terrorist group.  In the end, the larger 
prevailing message for accountability and state responsibility is that State 
preferences, be they their sovereign prerogatives or assertions who uphold 
similar rights, cannot operate to avoid adherence to the broader goal of 
international security. 
66
International Journal on Responsibility, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/ijr/vol1/iss2/1 70s: /commons.lib.jmu.edu/ijr/vol1/i s2/1
 
International Journal on Responsibility, Vol. I Issue 1.2 (May) 2018 
65 | P a g e  
 
 
Responsibility, Community, and Conflict Resolution in 




Senior Advisor on Peacebuilding and Development  
to the United Nations in the Philippines, 2013-2014.  
Former Professor in the Conflict Resolution Program 
 Eastern Mennonite University  
Harrisonburg, Virginia, USA. 
 
 
To what or to whom are human beings ultimately responsible and what is the 
mechanism by which responsibility is mediated down to day to day life and decision 
making?   
 
The answer for much of human existence was the gods and religious 
systems.  Later, as civilizations rose, emperors and kings wrapped themselves 
in mantles of the gods and demanded obeisance.   In recent centuries, alarmed 
by the brutality and injustice of tyrants and religious warfare, societies have 
separated the realms of sacred and secular and turned to rule of law and 
democracy to guide the latter. 
In America, classical liberalism (predecessor to both conservatism and 
liberalism as known today) took deep root and has shaped national discourse on 
responsibility for centuries.  Conservatives emphasize economic freedom, 
liberals emphasize individual freedom168.  But they share deep individualism 
and skepticism about giving too much power to government.   
As a result, they also share a tendency to foster conflict avoidance, for 
both tend to license a simple parting of ways.  When protection of individual 
freedom is sacrosanct, and imposition of government anathema, unless 
processes and structures for jointly exploring differences have been carefully 
constructed, the solution to differences easily becomes to withdraw and pursue 
separate futures.  
Conflict avoidance has not always obtained; intense battles have been 
fought.   But neither conservatives nor liberals have a history of deep 
commitment to dialogue in the midst of differences or a track record of 
investment in the skills and processes of dialogue.  
This narrow repertoire of response to conflict - pitched battle and 
avoidance - seemed to serve the needs of the nation well for several centuries.  
But events of recent years now raise concerns about the foundations of social 
cohesion in American that seemed unimaginable a few years ago.  Americans of 
                                                            
168 See for example, Yuval Levin, The Great Debate: Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, and the 
Birth of Right and Left (Basic Books, 2014) 
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all political persuasions increasingly feel that something is seriously wrong and 
question whether the “center will hold”.   
Having spent a lifetime in professional practice of conflict resolution in 
a variety of settings, I ponder our present situation with alarm and 
disappointment.  Like others, I worry about the “center" holding.   And I am 
disappointed that, despite several decades now of activity and apparent 
progress, the field of conflict resolution seems to be little engaged with the 
crisis.    
I know a large number of conflict resolution practitioners with 
magnificent skills that would be beneficial in polarized situations in America 
today.  But so far as I am aware, like everyone else they are on the sidelines, 
uninvited and unable to gain entry to situations where they are desperately 
needed. 
What does conflict resolution have to offer in this time? 
Conflict Resolution for Utilitarian Reasons 
 
In the thirty plus years in which conflict resolution has been prominent 
as a movement in the United States, the case for its contribution has largely 
been made on utilitarian grounds.  Conflict resolution, we have said, is faster, 
cheaper, and produces better solutions than litigation.169   
                                                            
169 A common argument for conflict resolution is that existing options for resolving conflict are 
expensive and inefficient.  An early and powerful proponent of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
or ADR as it is often called, has been the American Bar Association.  The ADR movement is 
commonly traced to a 1976 speech, sometimes described as the “big bang moment of ADR”, 
when Harvard Law Professor Frank Sanders argued "that traditional litigation systems process 
only certain kinds of disputes effectively” and suggested that the remaining types of disputes 
might better be addressed through other mechanisms. (From 
https://law.uoregon.edu/images/uploads/entries/Michael_Moffitt-Before_the_Big_Bang-
The_Making_of_an_ADR_Pioneer.pdf.)  In the decades since, lawyers have played an active 
role in encouraging the use of arbitration, mediation, facilitation and other activities that deploy 
responses to conflicts that have repeatedly been shown to be faster, more effective, and often 
more satisfactory to disputants in their outcomes than litigation. Another common utilitarian 
case for conflict resolution is cost.  A 2012 infographic reports that 15 million civil cases are 
filed annually in the US.  Americans spend 2.2% of their GDP on tort cost, which is about 30% 
higher than second place Italy, and double that of third-place Germany.   Per capita tort costs 
have increased by eight fold since 1950, even after adjusting for inflation. In the business world, 
wrote Dan Dana, a veteran conflict resolution trainer, in Measuring the Financial Cost of 
Organizational Conflict: “Unresolved conflict represents the largest reducible cost in many 
businesses, yet it remains largely unrecognized.” (MTI Publications: 1999). Yet another 
utilitarian reason for conflict resolution is widespread ineptness in conflict resolution.  This 
results in inefficiencies in organizations.  A Grovo survey found that 98% of managers said that, 
in their company, managers need more training, and conflict resolution was one of the topics 
managers most frequently identified as a need.   A survey by survey by Roffey Park found that 
57% of managers said that “inaction” was their organization’s main method of conflict 
resolution, and that avoidance and “pretending it isn’t there” were common responses.  Even 
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I agree with these utilitarian arguments and have made them myself.  
But increasingly I think that advocating conflict resolution on utilitarian 
grounds may handicap possibilities for achieving the larger benefits of our 
work.  When conflicts turn out to be deep-rooted and trenchant, perseverance 
flags if those involved expect quick results.    
       Of greater consequence, a utilitarian emphasis overlooks perhaps the 
most important reason why conflict resolution should play a central role in 
society: the learning and use of conflict resolution skills facilitates the 
development of human beings and society capable of taking responsibility for 
making decisions and resolving problems in the midst of controversy.    
Until quite recently, a limited repertoire of responses to conflict and an 
ad hoc approach towards teaching the skills and values of conflict resolution 
were adequate equipment to navigate the challenges of communities and 
society.  Today the forces of disintegration are so strong, the technology-
enabled pull of individualism so powerful, the occasions for integrative 
experiences and unifying narratives so few, that old responses are out-dated.  
In unique ways, conflict is capable of catalyzing high level responses in 
human beings that mobilize our best resources.  But not when preparation is 
haphazard.  To achieve high-level responses we must approach things 
differently than in the past.    
Conflict Resolution as a Foundation of Existence 
 
Let us start from the given that human beings are tribal creatures, 
hardwired to seek out and live in proximity to others.   At some deep level we 
know, as our ancestors knew, that we need partnerships with others.  Survival 
itself requires it.  Dependency on community is perhaps most undeniable when 
we are young and again when we are old.  But even in the more autonomous 
middle years, maintaining communal connections is a central concern for most 
people.  
This deeply imprinted awareness of reliance on community gives 
conflict and its resolution a special place in the human psyche, for we know 
instinctively what they portend.   Unresolved conflict threatens danger to and 
loss of community, and thus death, for in our ancient past, safety required 
numbers.  Successful resolution portends continuation and renewal of 
community and thus survival.   
Activities and processes of conflict resolution, then, have more impact 
in the human psyche then we might estimate from the significance of the issues 
alone that humans quarrel about.  Weighty though the issues of a given dispute 
may be, the symbolic impact of conflict and human response to it may be even 
weightier in the psyche.  
Successful experiences of conflict resolution assure us that we are not 
helpless to defend against loss of community and connection to others.  Aside 
from the practical implications of agreements, to experience or witness a 
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existential renewal and hope.  By the same token, to experience efforts at 
conflict resolution that fail threatens the foundations that sustain us. 
If this analysis is true, we are wired to pay attention to conflict 
resolution and to invest in achieving it. We feel anxious when we are not 
connected as allies to others. Conflict and how to resolve it, then, is not a 
matter of mere utilitarianism. We are programmed to consider it a foundation 
of existence.  So why not then act on this deep knowledge? 
Brooks on Loss of Covenantal Attachments 
 
       In a recent, thought-provoking essay, columnist David Brooks wrestles 
with the requirements of building a humane society.   He draws on 
psychological attachment theory and a 2014 essay by Yuval Levin170 to make 
his case. 
At the foundations of American life, Brooks writes, there once was "a 
society with strong covenantal attachments — to family, community, creed and 
faith. Then on top of them we built democracy and capitalism that celebrated 
liberty and individual rights.” 
Deep covenantal attachments, says Brooks, provide human beings with 
the foundation required to use freedom well.   Without them, we grow selfish: 
"Freedom without connection becomes alienation.” 
When large numbers of people come to take freedom without 
connection for granted, the result is chaos and breakdown.  “[T]hat’s what we 
see at the bottom of society — frayed communities, broken families, opiate 
addiction,” Brooks writes. “Freedom without a unifying national narrative 
becomes distrust, polarization and permanent political war.” 
Brooks attributes grave outcomes to loss of covenantal attachments.   
When people are deprived of good covenantal attachments, "they will grab bad 
ones.  First, they will identify themselves according to race.”  People become so 
deficient in meaningful attachment that they are unable to cope with those who 
differ from them: "The only people who can really know me are in my race. Life 
is a zero-sum contest between my race and your race, so get out.” 
From racism, things go to tribalism.  Political demagogues encourage 
simple in-group and out-group dichotomies and build political movements out 
of them.  This is the appeal of Trump.  "As history clearly demonstrates, people 
will prefer fascism to isolation, authoritarianism to moral anarchy. 
The solution, Brooks holds, is to renew covenantal relationships.  "If we 
are going to have a decent society we’re going to have to save liberalism from 
itself.  We’re going to have to restore and re-enchant the covenantal 
relationships that are the foundation for the whole deal. The crucial 
battleground is cultural and pre-political.” 
                                                            
170 “Taking the Long Way: Disciplines of the Soul are the Basis of a Liberal Society”, First 
Things, October, 2014. TAKING THE LONG WAY 
DISCIPLINES OF THE SOUL ARE THE BASIS OF A LIBERAL SOCIETY 
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Covenantal Relationships Require Skilled Conflict Resolution 
 
I agree that loss of covenantal relationships lies at the core of what is 
happening in America today.   But Brooks' suggestion that the cause is too 
much liberalism - resulting in isolation - is shallow.   Ineptness at community 
building lies at the core of both liberalism and the conservative communities 
whose demise Brooks mourns.   
“Re-enchantment” of covenantal relationships, Brooks’ answer to the 
problem, is similarly facile, suggesting a magical solution.  A way out of this 
impasse will have to include addressing injustices and developing new ways of 
responding to conflict.   
Brooks points to the weakness of liberalism of giving priority to 
individual freedom at the expense of covenantal relationships.   However, he 
ignores the dark side of many conservative institutions and practices:  Deep 
connection and community exist in such communities only for those who fit in 
or blend in.  Those whose social status, history, preferences, appearance, 
identify, or priorities differ from a certain ideal type are second-class citizens.  
As such they are expected to  put up and shut up. 
Some amount of abnegation of self, equally distributed across the 
human community, is arguably good, perhaps compelling individuals beyond 
the narcissism that seems to come naturally for human beings.   
But intolerable oppression is rife in conservative settings.  Those unable 
or unwilling to accept the norms of their group are often lonely, scorned, 
isolated, ridiculed, exiled, or worse.   Hence there is good reason for the rise of 
liberalism: A significant portion of people in most covenantal groups have 
experienced at one point or another the pain of not fitting in. For some, this is 
chronic.   
Conservative institutions, though effective in fostering covenantal 
relationships, often have terrible processes for managing diversity and conflict.  
Those in power impose their will on others.  Those not in power withdraw to 
survive, or over-rule their own views, wishes, needs, and preferences to go 
along with the majority.  
Peace is often valued such setting, for the chaos of conflict is 
threatening and disruptive.  But the peace sought is not achieved through 
vigorous mutual engagement, but rather through acquiescence and submission.   
The latter may reduce conflict on the short-term.  But the long-term 
cost is severe, not only to individuals but to the entire community.  When 
dissenters are chronically squelched or driven out, groups lose their ability to 
self-correct. Weaknesses and failures of leaders go unchecked.  The ability of 
the entire community to adapt to change is diminished.   
Brooks has it wrong, then, in asserting that covenantal relationships 
once formed a pristine core to which liberalism later added an outer layer of 
freedom now gone to excess.  The core itself was deeply deficient and survived 
only at enormous cost to minorities of many kinds.  The institutions that 
fostered covenantal relationships often relied on destructive social processes for 
their power.   Let there be no return to those days.  
How then to make restoration of covenantal relationships a central part 
of our response to the polarizations of our times, without returning to the 
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oppressive structures and processes of the past?   The answer lies, I believe, in 
re-thinking old assumptions about conflict and revising our responses to it.   
Liberals and Conservatives from the Perspective of Conflict Styles 
Liberalism and conservatism share a common tendency: aversion to 
conflict and an instinct to end it by disengaging from conversation.  Liberalism 
values diversity and makes room for it, but it does so in ways that are often 
conflict avoidant.  Its underlying individualism facilitates too-ready a parting 
ways and avoidance of difficult discussions, thus undermining covenantal 
relationships. 
Conservatism, for its part, values the peace of quiescence and actively 
pursues it by squashing dissent.  Certain things should not be talked about and 
dare not be challenged.  Those who do so anyway are often silenced or 
removed. 
We can gain further insight on these responses from conflict style 
analysis.  An early and enduring model for evaluating the dynamics of conflict 
is the Blake Mouton Managerial Grid, an analytic tool for assessing styles of 
leadership, proposed in 1964 by Robert Mouton and Jane Blake, and used as 
organizing principle in a variety of conflict analysis tools.   The latter include 
the Thomas Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument and my Style Matters conflict style 
inventory, which adds elements that recognize the impact of stress and culture.   
The Mouton Blake model assesses situations according to two key 
factors, commitment to goals (or agenda) and commitment to relationship (or 
to pleasing others).  By intersecting these factors in a grid, the Mouton Blake 
framework (hereafter referred to as the Five Style Model) posits five distinct 
responses.  When considering conflict, these are referred to as conflict styles:   
- Forcing or Directing - High commitment to goals and low commitment to 
relationships 
- Accommodating or Harmonizing - Low commitment to goals and high 
commitment to relationships 
- Avoiding - Low commitment to goals and low commitment to 
relationships 
- Collaborating or Cooperating - High commitment to goals and high 
commitment to relationships 
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A key concept in the Mouton Blake framework is appropriate response.  
Each conflict style has intrinsic strengths and weaknesses, and effective conflict 
response requires discernment in each situation in light of its unique 
requirements171.  But in fact few people make informed choices, relying instead 
on habit and often favoring one or two styles over others.   
From the perspective of the Mouton Blake Model, over-reliance on the 
Directing/Forcing style as a response to conflict is common in conservative 
communities.  Conflicts are quickly polarized and turn into power struggles, 
resulting in broken relationships and marginalization of nonconformists.   
         The Directing/Forcing conflict style, as the diagram above makes clear, 
gives low priority to relationships and deep damage to them often results in 
conflict.  Recognizing this, individuals often choose silence and withdrawal in 
the face of conflict, for they know that if they challenge others they are likely to 
be targeted with a Directing/Forcing response.  
                                                            
171 See my short online “Intro to Conflict Styles” for more on this. 
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This means that not only Directing/Forcing but also Avoiding is over-
used as a conflict style.  In practice, this manifests in a pattern common in 
many conservative communities: long periods of cottony silence punctuated by 
occasional outbreaks of intense conflict.  
From the perspective of the Mouton Blake model, liberalism too is 
over-reliant on Avoidance, thanks to its underlying individualism.  Given 
liberal high commitment to individual freedom, conflict quickly leads to a 
parting of ways. Both conservative and liberal communities then are seen to 
rely heavily on conflict avoidance. 
Neither conservative communities, rich in covenantal relationships, nor 
liberal communities, rich in individual freedoms, bring a balanced repertoire of 
responses to conflict.  For different reasons, both neglect the practice and 
teaching of skills required to engage difficult issues  without damaging 
relationships. 
Conflict Response and Covenantal Relationships 
 
Technology greatly expands options for individuals and make it ever 
easier to live in isolation from others.  This means that sustaining covenantal 
relationships is likely to grow ever more difficult, and if Brooks’ analysis is 
correct, that dynamics of tribalism are likely to grow more problematic in the 
future.   
A number of attributes of conflict make it a potent resource in resisting 
this, but a particular response to it is required: 
1) Re-think attitudes towards conflict so as to harness its energy.     
       One of my first learnings as a young professional working in 
organizational conflict was the discovery that dynamics in a room shifted 
when, as a resource person, I adopted a positive, inquisitive attitude towards 
the presence of conflict.  Faces softened and voices shifted from angry and 
demanding to intense and engaged, often within minutes.  
Conflict is easier to deal with when invited rather than discouraged.  
When people consider conflict to be wrong or irresponsible, they make it a 
habit to hide their true feelings.  Dishonesty soon becomes normal.  
Frustration and anxiety rise and inevitably candor overcomes caution.  When 
it does, battles immediately follow.  People assume that others are now casting 
aside integrity and that warfare is the only realistic response.   
When instead disagreement is invited and the airing of diverse views is 
considered a contribution to the health of community, a different dynamic 
results.  Anxiety is still present, of course, but not in its bitter, aggressive, 
judgmental forms.  Reason and principle remain accessible, even in the heat of 
differences. 
Treating conflict as a normal part of relationships transforms it from a 
destructive force to an energizing one.  Nothing focuses attention, stirs energy, 
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and attracts engagement like conflict172.   Harnessing this energy with robust 
constructive processes of dialogue and decisionmaking must become a central 
goal of any community that cares about covenantal relationships.   
The problem with modernity, after all, is not that it is intrinsically 
destructive, but that it disrupts and diverts attention from the things required 
to build deep relationships and stable communities.  Every smart phone bearer 
carries a world of interesting engagements, waiting to be summoned from 
pocket or purse.  To build covenantal relationships requires social processes 
capable of break through these self-constructed cocoons that increasingly 
isolate people.    
Conflict is one of the few aspects of human life capable of doing this.  
The atomizing and isolating trends of our times make it ever more important 
that we recognize conflict as a moment of opportunity.   We must direct the 
energy that it brings towards responses that bring true dialogue, and in the 
process, help create individuals and communities capable of covenantal 
relationships. 
 
2) Recognize isolation and alienation, not ideology, as the drivers of the conflicts that 
threaten the fabric of American society today.   
The deep polarizations that increasingly threaten the very foundations 
of society are rooted in more than competing ideologies.  Modernity, on a daily 
basis, erodes the ties of community itself.   The individual reigns supreme, 
empowered by technology to construct life and relationships in the mold of 
personal preferences.  Information that differs, and people who differ, are easily 
blocked out.   
The phenomenon of “fake news” is a reflection of this reality.  
Technology now assists individuals to coalesce into influential movements that 
convincingly propagate their own self-sustaining vision of reality, isolated from 
serious intellectual or social challenge by those whose experience differs. 
We can’t address this dystopian reality by sending specialists to the 
frontlines somewhere.  We have to address the core problem of alienation 
underlying it, the pervasive isolation from meaningful engagement with 
diversity of any kind that makes individuals easy marks for extremists.   
Alienation at this level can’t be remedied by setting up dialogue across 
the major gaps that divide society.  We have to start more modestly, with a 
goal of simply reducing the alienation and isolation that characterizes daily life.  
On both sides of the ideological spectrums, evidence abounds that people have 
a hard time getting along, not only with their predictable opponents, but with 
their own fellow partisans.  Our strategies must move at a level that targets the 
needs within groups as much as between them. 
 
                                                            
172 It’s hardly chance that readership for some newspapers increased drastically in the heat of the 
2016 elections, for the New York Times by 47% and for the Washington Post reportedly by 
75%. 
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3) Give greater attention to community building as a goal of intrinsic value, as a pre-
requisite to a peaceful social order; and to conflict resolution as a facilitator of 
community building.   
Although conflict between groups receives a great deal of attention, 
conflict within groups is widely ignored.   Behind the scene in every well-
known public conflict - whether Israel/Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Ireland, or 
current polarization between Democrats and Republicans in the US - exists 
serious intra-party conflict.   These less visible conflicts often turn out to be the 
biggest obstacle to resolution of the public inter-party conflicts themselves.   
When groups that nurture covenantal relationship weaken or when 
they are riven by internal tension, a common strategy for unification is to stoke 
conflict with external groups.   Heightened perceptions of a common enemy 
predictably serve to unify group members.   
In an era in which covenantal relationships are under great threat, then, 
it is urgent to find ways to build community without resorting to the shortcuts 
of tribalism, which creates community at the expense of denigration of others.  
A key strategy in this must be to strengthen the ability of groups to deal with 
internal issues.  As networks and groups are better able to work out their own 
differences with each other, they will have less need to rely on the predictable 
but destructive strategies of demonizing opponents outside. 
This applies across the spectrum of groups.  Strange as it may sound, 
helping radicals learn constructive ways of working out differences with other 
radicals would reduce their danger to others.       
There would be many ways to work at this in various settings.  But the 
common denominator would be to improve the quality of how communities 
conduct meetings, set priorities, make decisions, and resolve conflicts.   
A community is shaped, after all, by many small moments and micro-
responses to the diversities that people carry into every gathering, small or 
large.   Are divergent views welcome, are divergent people welcome?   Do 
participants interact respectfully with those who challenge them?  Are decision 
making processes transparent and participatory?  Is there clarity and easy 
access to information about things pertaining to structures, power, and use of 
resources?   Conflict resolution has enormous contributions to make on these 
issues.    
 
4) Treat conflict resolution as a full spectrum of responses. 
The case made for conflict resolution has often focused on a limited 
understanding of its potential, often presented only in reference to mediation of 
micro-level, interpersonal conflicts.  This limited focus ensures that when 
conflict has systemic roots, as the polarization now threatening us has, conflict 
resolution is considered irrelevant.    
Conflict resolution competencies should be presented embedded in a 
larger context of functions.  Only then is the full potential contribution of the 
field visible.  Below is one example that highlights how each level is essential 
for effective response at higher levels.  For example, mediation skills assume 
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certain predecessor skills and in turn are an essential pre-requisite for effective 







5) Integrate conflict resolution training broadly into education.  
A consequence of the prominence of lawyers in promoting mediation in 
its early years and the rapid growth of community mediation centers with a 
focus on mediation of interpersonal conflicts and divorces is that conflict 
resolution has come to be understood largely as an alternative to courts.    
 
Conflict resolution is indeed such an alternative and it should continue 
to be.  But it is also potentially much more.  To achieve this larger community 
building potential will require more than occasional workshops for a peace-
oriented fringe of society.  Conflict resolution components need to be attached 
to every level of education and every profession.  
Conflict comes with the life for learners of every level, whether school 
children, university students, or professionals in training.   The need to 
function effectively in groups, to define key issues, set priorities, explore 
options, and make decisions with others is intrinsic to human functioning.  
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Relevant issues and pressing needs, for which appropriate skills can be taught 
and practiced, reside at every level of education. 
If it seems utopian to hope that such an agenda could be inserted into an 
already crammed educational environment, it should be pointed out that 
professional schools and agencies of many kinds have already initiated the 
offering of such skills training.  Typically such offerings come in response to 
utilitarian concerns - the awareness of practitioners in the professions involved 
of the high costs of badly managed conflict to their profession.   
Many of those who live and work in the world of professions and 
projects understand the practical costs of badly managed conflict as well or 
better than the philosophers of peace.  Some have learned or teach related skills 
under rubrics such as problem solving, personnel management, leadership 
skills, human resource management, etc. 
Now we are in a time when a large number of people harbor serious 
concerns about the sustainability of our entire system.  Yet many of these same 
people, through their professional experiences, have learned skills with great 
potential to build common purpose among diverse people in the presence of 
high stress.   
From their own lived experience, the latter know that as a society we 
already possess, in scattered pockets and veins, the knowledge and skill 
required to shore up our faltering system.  They surely know as well that the 
structures are lacking to teach and use these skills on the scale needed. 
My suggestion then is for a new initiative from the field of conflict 
resolution.   What might result if we made a systematic outreach to the 
educational institutions around us?  
I return in conclusion to the question with which the essay began: To 
whom are we responsible as we face the many issues of pressing importance 
that confront humanity, and what is the mechanism by which we connect this 
responsibility to day-to-day life at the lowest level?   
Humanity long answered the question by pointing too high in the 
cosmos, first to the gods, then to their stand-ins, the kings, and then to the 
state.  However, recognizing the injustice and brutality unleashed by those 
answers, classical liberalism in the US, the parent of both liberalism and 
conservatism as we know them today, turned in the opposite direction.   
But in turning to the individual as the ultimate focus of discourse on 
responsibility, we have aimed too low.   The implications of this are becoming 
rapidly more apparent as technology expands the ability of individuals to create 
isolated and self-sufficient universes independent of deep relationships. 
 
Responsibility in the end must lie in the hands of those involved in and 
those affected by the issues in contention.  This rules out neither query after 
divine guidance nor baseline principles of individual rights.  But the processes, 
forums, and norms shaping discourse and decisionmaking should look to those 
involved and those affected by the issues in disputes as key interlocutors. 
To achieve this would require the enskilling of humanity at all levels in 
competencies of dialogue, problem-solving, and conflict resolution that today 
are possessed by only a minority.   We already know what those competencies 
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are, what each is capable of, and how to teach them.   The key missing piece is 
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This study argues that for international conflict, and for many conflict situations within a 
nation, the most pragmatic, responsible option is neither coercive nor evasive. It proposes an 
alternative strategy, dubbed courtship, that is neither. By coercion is understood violence or any 
other form of dominant control or forcing the enemy against their will, including many methods 
often described as nonviolent such as economic sanctions, majority rule, and the rule of law. By 
evasion is understood appeasement, deception, self-exile, or any attempt to run away, cover up 
one’s needs, or hide from the aggressor. The study introduces healthy community as a refinement 
of Martin Luther King Jr’s beloved community. A healthy community is founded on a 
widespread public commitment whereby no party attempts to evade conflict, and no party 
attempts to control or coerce others—no one exercises control of the social situation. In a healthy 
community there is respectful longstanding healthy confrontation between parties that see the 
world differently and come to different moral and ethical conclusions. The parties’ commitment 
to renounce control provides safety for negotiation. Within a healthy community, justice is the 
practical experience that negotiation with one’s opponent produces positive results. The 
epistemological claim is made that knowledge can only grow through the friction and tension 
arising from the diverse points of view within a healthy community. Courtship is then 
introduced as a non coercive unilateral strategy designed to bring an enemy into healthy 
community. To respond to the obvious objection (“If you won’t use coercion or evasion, won’t 
your enemy just wipe you out?”) the study discusses the relative success of courtship, coercion and 
evasion. Criteria are given for deciding when to use courtship, and when to trust to coercion or 
evasion. An analysis of the American civil rights movement of the 1960s is given using the lens 
of courtship. Courtship is distinguished from coercive nonviolence, principled nonviolence, and 
diplomacy. Courtship is our opportunity, it is within our agency, it is our responsibility. 
Introduction 
This study makes a difficult, almost outrageous claim: that for international 
conflict, and for many conflict situations within a nation, the most pragmatic, 
responsible option is neither coercive nor evasive. It proposes an alternative strategy, 
dubbed courtship, that is neither. 
This study uses the term coercion to cover violence, military power, use of 
weapons, oppression, exile, rape, power of class or gender or race etcetera, indeed any 
attempt at dominant control, including many recourses often described as nonviolent, 
such as economic sanctions, majority rule, and the rule of law. The latter two have a 
coercive foundation—citizens who continue to disregard the law will eventually be put 
in jail, with violence if need be. Economic sanctions are an attempt to coerce one’s 
opponent into a desired behavior against their will. This study lumps all of these under 
the term coercion. 
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This study uses the term evasion to cover appeasement, deception, self-exile, or 
any attempt to avoid, run away, cover up one’s needs, or hide from an aggressor. 
The terms coercion and evasion will be here used mostly as descriptions of 
group behavior, whereas their parallels on the individual level are characterized as fight 
and flight. Since the beginning of life on earth, human ancestors evolved in the presence 
of predators. The most effective rejoinder to an attack by a non-communicative predator 
is either fight or flight (including hiding as a form of flight)—they are evolutionarily 
proven survival mechanisms. The concern herein is with predators that can and do 
communicate well—humans—and in particular, parties of humans. In this study, the 
term party can be taken to mean a political party, but is always used more largely, to 
denote any large group of people sharing some common identity and/or value system, 
such as ethnicity, religion, ideology, culture or geographical community. 
Reinhold Niebuhr, who in his youth was a pacifist socialist activist pastor, 
matured into a prominent anti-pacifist “realist” in the 1930s. While not agreeing with 
him on all points, Martin Luther King Jr. was much taken with Niebuhr’s perspective 
(King, Jr., 1954). Niebuhr was skeptical both of the good behavior of uncoerced parties, 
and of the effectiveness of non-noercive methods. He argued that “[a]ll social co-
operation on a larger scale than the most intimate social group requires a measure of 
coercion” (Niebuhr, 1932, p. 3) and that “[t]he selfishness of human communities must 
be regarded as an inevitability” (1932, p. 272). He concluded that non-coercive social 
idealists could never “make their vision of a just society effective” (Niebuhr, 1932, p. 13). 
This study describes a non-coercive option that arguably Niebuhr never considered and 
examines this option in the light of his scepticisms. 
We are responsible for those actions we could have changed, to the degree we 
could have changed them. If one assumes the most effective rejoinder to coercion is 
coercion, then responsibility can become a weasel word justifying coercion and imperial 
intervention. Under this logic, someone who chose to talk to the leadership of a terrorist 
organization, rather than kill them when they had the chance, is negligent—bears some 
responsibility if their intervention did not prevent the organization from attacking. Had 
they killed the leadership, but the organization nonetheless was able to execute their 
attack, they would not likely be accused of negligence, which only demonstrates our 
culture's deep faith in the stature of violence as the best response to violence. This study 
challenges that faith on empirical grounds. 
This study speaks to the body of scholarship on coercive nonviolent political 
action surveyed, for example, in Sharp, Paulson, Miller, and Merriman (2005). Most 
activists in the nonviolent movement downstream from Sharp’s three part The Politics of 
Nonviolent Action (1973) have generally accepted Niebuhr’s view that effective 
nonviolence must be coercive, including such coercive elements as sanctions, the rule of 
law, and majority rule. This study, presenting an alternative that is not perceived as 
coercive by one’s opponent, sees coercion as an often avoidable, often unfruitful cost to 
the real process of establishing justice. 
The concept of healthy community is introduced below as a refinement, or 
perhaps restoration to founding principles, of the beloved community as developed by 
Martin Luther King Jr. and others in the American civil rights movement. Where 
theKingCenter.org describes beloved community as “a realistic, achievable goal that could 
be attained by a critical mass of people committed to and trained in the philosophy and 
methods of nonviolence” (“The King Philosophy,” n.d.), this study holds that healthy 
community is a realistic, achievable goal that could be attained by a critical mass of people 
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committed to and trained in the philosophy and methods of courtship, also introduced 
below. 
This study can be seen as promoting a form of proactive peacebuilding (fostering 
healthy community), via a particular intervention (courtship). In the lens of the Dual 
Concern Model (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992), negotiators representing a healthy 
community in conflict with another party enjoy a mandate for strong levels of concern 
for outcomes for both parties, i.e. to problem solve while shunning either concessive or 
coercive options. A healthy community even has the capacity, via courtship, to increase 
the capacity of the opposing party to perform at such a high level. This study also 
transcends the us-versus-them stance implicit in the Dual Concern Model, in that it 
demonstrates that we need each other, i.e. it values the continued existence of the other 
as distinct from us and challenging us, and thus gives grounds for why we should have 
concern for outcomes of both parties. Healthy community creates a higher notion of us 
that transcends the lower us/them distinctions that it preserves and values. 
The appropriate use of coercion: the limited rule of law 
 
A good metaphor for understanding appropriate coercion is a surgeon’s scalpel. 
While surgery can certainly be beneficial, no one believes that cutting is the root of 
health. Every use of a scalpel makes a wound, a trauma that will have to be managed 
until it heals. The least damage done, the better—microsurgery is a great advance over 
large-scale surgery. Surgery isn’t used to treat malaria, or tuberculosis, or dozens of 
other diseases. 
As the scalpel makes a wound requiring healing, coercion creates a social trauma 
requiring healing. Healing will have to come from elsewhere, later. While competent 
coercion can exchange greater, irrevocable damage for limited coercion damage, that 
coercion damage must be within our ability to manage while it heals, or it will fester. 
And clearly an unlimited use of the scalpel of coercion, such as in war, causes 
unmanageable trauma. 
A fundamental justification of government is security. A government, by violent 
coercion if needed, prevents the use of violence by anyone else in its territory, and 
promises to protect the weak (shopkeepers, farmers, all who focus on production rather 
than proficiency with weapons) from being robbed or oppressed by the strong (raiders, 
anyone with superior strength or arms) inside its territory, and also from the strong 
who would invade from outside its territory.  A government maintains its monopoly on 
violence within its territory, since otherwise it can’t pretend to offer security. 
The rule of law implemented by a government reflects the surgeon and scalpel 
metaphor, at least in those countries where there is a historical skein of legal 
development whose clear intent is to limit the trauma from, and abuse of, the violent 
coercion that underlies the rule of law. As with surgeons, it is required that judges and 
lawyers have extensive education and qualifications. To avoid abuses many limits (such 
as defending human rights, requiring warrants, requiring the state to prove its case, and 
providing appellate courts) are placed on the use of government power. 
The rule of law has proper application where there is broad social consensus: to 
protect from rape, robbery and murder, to regulate vehicular traffic, the marketplace 
and financial institutions, and to protect the environment. It is within our current 
competence to manage the limited trauma to society of using coercion to enforce social 
cooperation on very broadly agreed-upon norms. 
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There is still much work to be done here, but I affirm the historical intent, the 
path that many countries are on, to limit the trauma done by the application of violence 
under the rule of law, and to limit the rule of law to norms which enjoy wide consensus 
within society. Under such conditions the scalpel of the rule of law is life-saving. I 
affirm this limited “measure of coercion” (Niebuhr, 1932, p. 3). 
The rule of law is insufficient 
 
However, the rule of law, alone, has not brought peace and justice. The rule of 
law is abused by applying it beyond its proper bounds, for lack of a credible alternative. 
It’s like using surgery to treat malaria. Such abuse turns it into a monster and is the 
main impediment to progress on the historical path to limiting the rule of law. The rule 
of law is not sufficient, for at least three reasons. 
First, trying to control an ugly situation by long term coercion is analogous to 
daily surgery to correct a chronic problem—there can be no healing. Occupation fails 
for the obvious reason: communities rarely change their values just because they are 
coerced to behave according to someone else’s values. Even if you succeed at 
compromising one generation, the next plots its revenge for the damage inflicted on 
their identity. 
Second, what happens when a society can’t agree on a law to be ruled by? 
Societies having significant parties that cannot agree on the law and are in a state of 
civil unrest or war, need something to get them to a place where a coherent law can be 
framed within a broad consensus. Even perfect majority rule can establish laws that 
oppress minorities. What can people do who find themselves on the short end of a broad 
consensus? For the oppressed, the law is the problem, not the solution. 
Third, jurisdiction presents a problem. A legal system must exercise a monopoly 
on violent power within its territory, its jurisdiction, otherwise it can’t offer security. 
What happens when the territorial boundaries between different legal systems are in 
dispute? Our planet has been cursed by turf wars between competing governments. 
In short, the rule of law is helpful for the me-us problem (how to maintain 
collaboration within a group sharing common values), but doesn't do well with the us-
them problem (how to maintain collaboration between parties having different values). 
An option is needed beyond the rule of law. 
This study would dispense with both evasion and coercion (including the rule of 
law) between parties and proposes an alternative. It is easy to think “Nonsense. There 
are very tough people in this world. If the weak cannot flee them, and are not protected 
by coercive strength, the strong will just come and take all their stuff, move them off 
their land, reduce them to slavery, or eliminate them.” 
To respond adequately to the above objection, this study has to offer an 
alternative to coercion or evasion, and evaluate the effectiveness of the new alternative 
relative to coercion or evasion in conflicts involving large groups of people. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of different strategies this study needs to be clear 
about the goal. Thus other than the Introduction and Conclusion, this study is in three 
sections: 
 
The Goal: a Healthy, Just Society 
Courtship: an Alternative to Coercion or Evasion 
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Evaluation: When is Courtship Better Than Either Coercion or Evasion? 
 
The Goal: a Healthy, Just Society 
 
In English, the word conflict does not always imply violence. Two parties that 
live within a commitment to each other to use neither coercion nor evasion can still 
have a heated conversation where past traumas are exposed, and much grief and anger 
are expressed, and mutually incompatible perceptions of the same events are asserted, 
and mutually incompatible requests are made. They are stuck within their commitment 
to each other to use neither coercion nor evasion, to face their problem and muddle 
through it together, even when there does not seem to be a resolution at hand. I value 
such conflict, it is a hallmark of every healthy community, and I contend below that it is 
the signature of a just society. 
Healthy Community 
 
A healthy community is founded when overwhelming numbers of people from two 
or more conflicting parties—ethnic groups, movements, religious groups, 
communities—demonstrate their mutual commitment to life together while refusing 
both coercion and evasion. Their public commitment is that they will not attempt to 
control the situation coercively, nor to evade the conflict inherent in the situation. 
Renouncing both control and appeasement can be excruciatingly uncomfortable 
as we explore and face our real and hard differences without either party being in 
control of the situation. Healthy community means struggling together, not letting each 
other go, and not walking out of our commitment to keep struggling with each other 
until something new is born. Our differences have no value if we sweep them under the 
rug. Our goal is neither to blend nor compromise, but to create something new that 
changes the situation for each of us. 
The success of either fight or flight is the end of tension, for the enemy is dead, 
or dominated, or placated, or avoided. The result is silence: the end of communication, 
the death of relationship and community, and no more public tension. Such silence is not 
peace. 
Healthy community represents a third option. The success of healthy community 
is life together in tension, life in community despite our differences. Healthy community 
thrives on voicing our identities and needs, on listening, asking, transparency, respect, 
assertiveness, calling to account, and hospitality. It weakens with any attempt to coerce, 
dominate, placate, deceive or hide. 
Fight and flight are visceral reactions deeply wired into us by evolution. The sex 
drive is an equally visceral, deeply wired reaction to difference, and it is a partial 
metaphor for healthy community. Reproductive sex captures well the value, the 
complementarity, of difference—two that are different can make a baby, can make 
something new happen that would be impossible for either one of them alone. Often our 
opponents can do things we can’t, and vice versa. It captures well that we confront each 
other vulnerably. But it does not capture the mutual labor of birthing that often 
characterizes a healthy community. Healthy community is not just a nice abstraction. 
Wooing someone of the opposite... persuasion... into healthy community is as primal and 
deep a reaction to difference as either fight or flight. But it is certainly more difficult, in 
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that it takes two to tango. If the other chooses fight or flight, we don’t have to retreat to 
fight or flight ourselves. We can persist in calling the other to community, but it is 
risky and takes more of a skill set, described as courtship below. 
Humans are finite, limited and therefore fallible. With the best of intentions or 
virtues they often misunderstand, they make mistakes, and they thereby sometimes do 
harm. A healthy society is one where such harms are negotiated between trustworthy 
opponents—where the relationships between people, and between groups of people, are 
committed enough, robust enough, that solutions are sought in healthy conflict. 
Disagreement can be productive when we disagree within the safety of a 
commitment to neither coerce nor evade, a public commitment at least as strong as 
marriage vows: through thick and thin, in sickness and in health, until death. But 
disagreement can feel offensive. Experienced mediation practitioners know that one 
party’s truth-telling can feel like abuse to another party (Mayer, 2009, pp. 141–145). 
Constant hospitality—frequent sharing of tea, coffee, alcohol, food, or whatever else 
might symbolize social acceptance—is needed, because we are constantly offensive to 
each other. 
A healthy community is not a utopia where nothing ever goes wrong. It does not 
require that everyone behave virtuously nor uniformly. It is rarely utterly peaceful. 
Rather, it is a robust, just society which can deal with its problems. 
Epistemology 
 
My son spent years in China learning Mandarin. He did not come back saying 
we should all forget about English because Chinese is better. Or, horrors, that a blend 
between Chinese and English is what we need. Rather, he came back with the ability to 
look at the world through two profoundly different framing systems, and he is the 
better for it. 
Like the proverbial story of the blind people feeling an elephant, each party 
perceives the world differently. Every cultural framework has limitations of language 
and perception and intentions. Some frameworks might feel more of the elephant, some 
less; each framework is in some error, there are better frameworks and worse ones, but 
the story reminds us that none of them do very well. If we keep our commitment to each 
other and keep struggling together even though our perceptions remain different, a 
healthy community of different parties together can comprehend reality better than any 
one party can. The community of different parties, muddling through together, has 
more information about the elephant than has any one party. What we bring to a 
healthy community is our perception, our framework. Each party owes it to the others 
to be themselves, to express their perceptions in all their difference, because otherwise 
there’s no point, no value to the relationship. We need each other. 
There are a lot of major real-world problems (think “riots,” for example) for 
which nobody can design a good solution, but some people can design much better 
solutions than other people. As with the elephant, different people can have different 
points of view on such a problem. None of these points of view are very good, but some 
are better than others. In The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, 
Firms, Schools, and Societies Scott Page (2007) gives strong evidence that a group of 
experts, those who individually design the best solutions, is not the best group to attack 
such a problem. Why? Because, says Page, the experts tend to all have the best point of 
view—not a very good one, but the best one. A better problem-solving group is made 
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up of people who have some experience but have very differing points of view on the 
problem, some of them not the best. Those sub-optimal points of view carry information 
that is not seen from the best point of view. The more diverse group does better because 
the combination of points of view gets at information that the best point of view misses. 
The goal isn't to build the perfect orthodoxy. The goal is a polyglot community 
of different frameworks, because we need to live in that tension. The goal is not 
dependent on discovering one framework that describes the whole elephant—we'll 
never get there, humanity isn’t capable of that. Certainly, we evolve better and better 
understandings, indeed a healthy community is the best place for that evolution, but we 
will never understand perfectly. The pragmatic goal is to be in community even while 
we see differently. Healthy community isn't a means, it is the end. It is, of course, a path, 
a way, but all we aspire to is to live on the way, not to get to the end of the way. 
Indeed, healthy community is an epistemology, one not based on reason or 
objectivity, but on good social process. We need our trustworthy opponents, those who 
see the world differently, to deliver us from our ignorance, from the narrowness of our 
own point of view, from the weakness of our good intentions, from our laziness. (As a 
personal case: I need opponents to deliver me from the ignorance of my privilege as an 
American, white, Anglo, wealthy, educated, hetero, liberal, elder, male.) An agreement 
worked out by opponents represents an epistemological advance. Our trustworthy 
opponents keep us honest and call us to account. Together, we gain some freedom from 
the limitations of language and perception and intentions. 
Justice and the healthy society 
 
Justice is impossible without conflict. In a just, healthy relationship, neither 
party is dancing around the other, trying to be the perfect partner so that the whole 
thing won't blow up. A relationship in which one side is catering to the other—to avoid 
misery—can give the appearance of a peaceful relationship because there is no apparent 
conflict, all is silent. One side has internalized the load of keeping the peace by 
submitting or catering to the other.  If a relationship is utterly peaceful, someone is 
oppressed. 
Given that we are fallible, and finite, and have needs, and see the world 
differently, we will inevitably step on each other's toes. We are offenders, we are 
trespassers. A relationship that is too brittle to support a lot of working-out-of-offenses 
cannot be just. 
Justice doesn’t only deal with the past. There is no justice if victims can’t prevent 
an aggression being repeated in the future. Within a healthy relationship, justice is the 
practical experience that negotiation with one’s opponent produces positive results. 
Both parties’ commitment to renounce control provides safety for negotiation. 
An individual victim of abuse may be able to escape and avoid the abuser 
indefinitely, and I affirm that choice. There’s nothing wrong with flight when it works 
for us. But sometimes our abuser is our parent or child or spouse, our community or 
home culture or legal system. And for parties, evasion isn’t always an option. It is very 
difficult for an oppressed ethnicity, religious group or minority to evade their 
oppressing culture, which has erected a system that controls the oppressed. The 
oppressed have to forge a healthier relationship with their oppressors within which they 
can productively work to dismantle that system. I submit that we don't get justice first, 
and then have a healthy relationship. Justice flows from the health of the relationship. 
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Dealing with past injustice 
 
Reparations, restitution payment, or blood money may be appropriate and 
helpful but can never restore what survivors really want. Survivors want the past 
undone. 
Imagine for a moment a people who have been oppressed for generations, with 
many dead and many traumatized. They grieve the loss of the beauty, the music, the 
discoveries, the lives of the people that could have been, the whole world that could 
have existed. The past is unchangeable, and that future that could have been, is gone—
nothing can be done to restore it. The only way to restoration of relationship between 
the survivors and the aggressors is for the survivors to bear that unredeemable cost, to 
live in this nightmare of a present that they never wanted, and from there dare to desire 
a healthy relationship with their enemy. 
Often survivors don’t want a relationship. They just want to be left alone. That 
is a natural enough reaction, and for individuals it can work. But short of emigration or 
self-exile into closed communities such as the Hutterites, avoidance is not an option for 
minority groups, because interaction with the majority group is inevitable. 
In a longstanding cycle of violence both parties have past trauma to deal with. 
Both parties see themselves as oppressed by the other. Though we live a life we did not 
choose, if we dare healthy community with our enemy, and they dare to meet us there 
too, we can arrive at a livable relationship in tension. The experience of that healthy 
community, in time, can slowly grow our confidence that the trauma won’t happen to us 
again. The experience of healthy community can gradually convince our traumatized 
psyches that the world has a place for us. 
The small contribution that this study brings to King’s vision of beloved 
community is that healthy community envisions how to live, justly, with tension which may 
never cease and which is seen as valuable. Where King said “no matter what he [the 
white man] does to us, our aim must never be to defeat him or to humiliate him, but to 
win his friendship and understanding” (1960a), healthy community aims short of 
friendship or understanding, accepting the absence of coercion and evasion as sufficient. 
Where King spoke of the goal of tension being reconciliation and a resolution of 
conflict, healthy community expects and appreciates the tension of longstanding 
unresolved differences. The one envisions progress towards peacefulness, the other 
envisions progress towards a dance of partners pulling in different directions. 
Epistemologically, the one hopes for an eventual integration into a communal truth, the 
other explicitly values a diverse community of unintegrated voices. King may well have 
had something like a healthy community in mind, but the language of the nonviolent 
movement has not been clear on this point. 
Courtship: an Alternative to Coercion or Evasion 
 
Note to those for whom English is a second language: The verb “to court” has 
nothing to do with the legal system. Dictionary definitions of courtship include “behavior 
designed to persuade someone to marry you” and “the behavior of male birds aimed at 
attracting a mate” (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.). 
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This section deals with dynamics between opposing parties where at least one 
side considers that the other’s behavior is wrong, is causing trauma, is evil—and usually 
that works both ways. Examples would include oppressor/oppressed relationships (such 
as in the Jim Crow American South), and parties on either side of a moral divide (such as 
those for or against same-sex marriage). To simplify the language of the following 
discussion, the first-person plural (we, us, our) is used to denote any party practicing 
courtship, and the term enemy is used to designate the opposing party. As used in this 
study, courtship is a unilateral strategy designed to awake in our enemy the desire to 
build a healthy community with us. 
How do we move from toxic dysfunctional politics to a healthier, more moral 
society? How do we move from a situation of oppression and violence to a healthier, 
more just society? A healthy community implies a mutual (multilateral) commitment. 
To have such a healthy relationship previous oppressors must relinquish all control 
over the surviving victims, which is a very risky thing to do—the survivors may 
respond with violence. So why would an oppressor give up control? Are there any 
unilateral moves that the oppressed can make to bring powerful oppressors to the place 
where they relinquish their power, willingly, and dare healthy community? Finally, 
what steps can those take who find themselves in a party that enjoys privilege at the 
cost of the oppression of some other party? 
In the 1950s and 1960s, King and many others in the civil rights movement 
developed the practice of nonviolent direct action to answer the above questions. Before 
launching mass nonviolent actions, they trained hundreds of demonstrators in how to 
control their reactions to being verbally and physically abused—with curses, taunts, 
dogs, fire hoses and clubs (Lewis & D’Orso, 1999, pp. 249–250).  For lack of space this 
study does not reiterate all of the hard and good lessons learned. Indebted to that 
experience and practice, the following discussion refines King’s practice with an eye 
towards attaining healthy community. If we want a non-coercive relationship, we can 
hardly use coercion to get it. 
 
Courtship includes the following actions: 
 
We announce our desire to forge a healthy community with our enemy. We 
pledge and maintain our respect for our enemy’s safety, identity, history, dignity 
and honor. We extend hospitality. 
 
We announce our desire not to dominate our enemy. We do not respond to 
coercion with coercion if the enemy would perceive that as an attempt to control 
them. We make concrete moves, entailing some risk, that demonstrate our desire 
not to control them. We want our enemy to feel safety, to feel greater freedom to 
act. 
 
We announce our desire not to be dominated. We do not comply with any 
attempt to coerce us to do or not do anything that is not fair. Asking them to 
excuse us, we deliberately cross any lines of control that the enemy has laid 
down that appear to us to be unfair. Given that we avoid using either coercion or 
evasion, we risk imprisonment or death or humiliation, but we do not comply. 
We acknowledge that our enemy may have reason to be offended at us. We 
listen to our enemy, learning their story so well they are convinced we have 
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understood them. If we come to understand that we have done wrong, we 
change our behavior, make amends to the degree we are able, and ask for 
forgiveness of the remainder. 
 
If there are needs of our enemy that can be met without compromising our own 
identity or honor, we share resources to fill those needs. We boldly ask our 
enemy for what we need from them and keep asking until those needs are met. 
 
Courtship inspires our enemy to see us as trustworthy opponents. We do not 
beg for mercy. We do not cooperate with oppression—no display of cooperation with 
oppressors’ coercive power will incite them to cooperate with us. We do not bribe them, 
for we are not appealing to their base instincts. Rather, we are greeting and inspiring 
their highest and truest identity, that part of them which wants to be fair, present in 
every human’s psyche, though often buried deep under insecurity.  
Nowak and Highfield (2012), working at the confluence of evolutionary theory 
and game theory, argue that evolution has bred us for cooperation as much as 
competition, and that for eliciting cooperation one’s reputation that one will treat others 
fairly, is paramount. To presume that most individuals have an instinct for fairness is 
not an idealistic position, but a realistic one. 
Courtship is based on the faith that our enemies are, in the main, not subhuman 
monsters—they have the potential to be trustworthy opponents. This faith may be in 
the face of bitter evidence, but I submit that any party larger than a few hundred that 
has sustained itself for more than a generation has had some success dealing with its 
internal conflicts and has been able to generate strong internal collaboration. Thus, the 
people in it do understand, to some degree, how to negotiate differences, i.e. they 
sometimes practice healthy community among themselves. They value fairness, and 
they are capable of seeing the benefit of healthy community with us, if they come to 
trust us enough. 
Courtship is only non-coercive in that it must be perceived, by our enemy, as 
revealing our desire for a non-coercive relationship. Courtship can use force as long as 
few of the enemy perceive it as an attempt to dominate or control them. For example, 
King (1960b) wrote “When the Negro uses force in self-defense he does not forfeit 
support—he may even win it, by the courage and self-respect it reflects.” That is, 
courtship does not ask “Is this action coercive?” but rather “Will this action inspire our 
enemy to perceive us as trustworthy in a non-coercive relationship?” 
We offer hospitality and respect and opposition. We do not withdraw any of our 
requests for what we truly need. We will not accept less than a healthy peer 
relationship. But our approach must not be tainted with any shred of disrespect. 
When threatened by enemies, we ignore the fearful, tyrannical part of them, to 
speak respectfully to that part of them that we assume is there, that part of them that 
values fairness. We have a claim on that part of their psyche that appreciates and 
understands fairness, we press that claim boldly, taking risks in order to fan the flames 
of their collaborative instinct. We do not let go. Our advocate in this confrontation is 
their own humanity. 
Someone who is fearful or traumatized has great difficulty opening themselves to 
a healthy relationship—they have a fevered need to control the situation. If they also 
have more power than we do, they will have some confidence in their ability to 
dominate. Why should they negotiate with us—risk loss of control—when they have 
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the power to keep control? Therefore, we comfort our enemies' fears, yes, our 
oppressors' fears. They especially fear those they have oppressed, since they deeply feel 
how offensive they have been, and they expect an angry violent response. So, we show 
them hospitality, and make them feel safe. We listen to their stories of their traumas and 
their perception of the situation and express all that back to them until they are satisfied 
that we have understood them correctly. Hospitality, respect, feeling safe, and being 
heard all decrease our enemies' need to maintain control.  
Our only liberation comes from our enemies, our only salvation is our enemies’ 
salvation, our only victory is our enemy’s victory in forging a healthy community with 
us. 
Enemies who are under coercive control of a leader or oligarchy are themselves 
in need of liberation. They form a party exclusive of their oligarchs whose separate 
identity is forged by their experience of domination by their oligarchs. This can be a 
very fraught situation, for their identity with their oligarchs may be sustained by the 
oligarchs’ control of the media, symbols of nationalism, and calls for patriotism. Here 
courtship has to deal with a three-way relationship: us, the party dominated by the 
oligarchs, and the oligarchs, which latter may be a very small and therefore unstable 
group centered around one person. Often the situation is mixed, for example people will 
sometimes distinguish “the American people” from “the American government,” and 
sometimes not. Of course governments bristle at the suggestion that they do not 
represent the will of their people, because that threatens their legitimacy, but it is 
frequently the case. The point is that there may be multiple opportunities for courtship, 
and we must not be blind to internal fault-lines in our enemy. 
Sustainability 
 
It was said above that a healthy community is founded when overwhelming 
numbers of people from two or more conflicting parties demonstrate their mutual 
commitment. By "overwhelming" I mean sufficient that the tipping point of group 
psychology goes their way, instead of towards violence. Courtship is an attempt to get 
to that critical mass, which may be far fewer than a majority. Tipping points can be 
reached by a relatively small number of courageous people willing to stick their necks 
out before the tipping point has been reached, taking the risk that the crowd might tip 
against them. 
Violence is infectious, but so is courtship. Group action, once a tipping point is 
reached, can be quite suddenly united and purposeful. To keep it so requires constant 
positive feedback. I am, like Niebuhr (1932), very skeptical of a party’s ability to reason, 
but unlike Niebuhr, I do not look to reason, but to mutual inspiration. So that's another 
useful thing our erstwhile enemies do for us: our astonished and glad observation of 
their courtship of us helps us maintain our own courtship of them. We get 
extraordinarily strong feedback from observing someone we once feared, practicing 
courtship on us. It is plausible that healthy community can be sustained by a core of 
strong individuals who, whenever there is an offense, take the risk of demonstrating 
courtship. 
Distinguishing Courtship from Nonviolence and Diplomacy 
 
The difference between courtship and principled nonviolence is primarily in the 
intent, and thereby in many pragmatic details. Nonviolence is a negative term, focused 
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on what it isn’t—violence against the enemy—whereas courtship is a positive term that 
values the enemy’s identity and distinctives. Coercive nonviolence has a binary win-lose 
dynamic—you agitate, sanction, use the court system, pass legislation and vote until 
your side wins and the other side loses. This polarizing dynamic induces both sides to 
feel that their enemies are evil. However, if we don’t believe that our enemies are 
capable of fairness, we have demonized them. Courtship is the opposite of such 
demonization in that it bets on the fairness of the enemy and values their different point 
of view even while it refuses their control. Courtship succeeds only when both sides join 
in a mutually positive healthy community. 
The difference between courtship and traditional diplomacy is that diplomacy is 
interstate, whereas courtship, like traditional nonviolence, is a movement within civil 
society. Diplomacy is built on the need for the nation-state to maintain its monopoly on 
violence within its territory, whereas courtship would let an occupying army sweep over 
the land, which for courtship broadens the opportunity to relate to the occupying 
humans and culturally woo them into a just relationship, though this may take decades. 
Courtship does not accept the partitioning of humanity into states. Courtship does not 
accept a state’s use of coercion solely to maintain the state’s existence. 
What if they ignore us? 
 
The classic frustration of the oppressed is that their protests are ignored by the 
powerful. The powerful will have a myth—the myth of the inhumanity of those they 
oppress—that permits them to sustain the privileged life they have. All they want is to 
continue that myth, that status quo, why should they change it and plunge into 
uncertainty? They believe they "own" their privilege, why should they give up what 
they own? The tired dynamic is that the oppressed then turn to violence, or sabotage, or 
terrorism, to try to force the powerful to the negotiation table. 
But an oppressor cannot completely ignore the oppressed. Oppressors must 
actively maintain the oppression, which presents an opportunity. They need laws, 
treaties, regulations, tax incentives, and bureaucratic processes that make the oppressive 
system a web that is difficult to grasp at any strategic place. But there are people who 
implement and maintain the web where it meets the street—the police, the regulators, 
the lawyers, the legislators, the bureaucrats, the soldiers. And there are people in the 
chains of command above them. Being human, all of these people are vulnerable to 
courtship. 
Systemic oppression usually has cultural support. Usually there is a language in 
place that rationalizes and justifies the system. There are voices—preachers, politicians, 
songwriters—who champion that language. They have blinded themselves to the 
injustice—they’ve blocked it out, it’s too painful to look at. And they can’t face the 
ostracism they would face within their own group were they to draw attention to the 
painful reality. But they too are human, and thus vulnerable to courtship. 
In Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil, Hannah Arendt (1963) 
wrote that even Adolf Eichmann, the chief of operations of the Nazi program to 
exterminate Jews, was not an inhuman monster but a horrifyingly normal human. It is a 
corollary that even Eichmann could have been vulnerable to the hospitality and respect 
of courtship evoking in him his birth right allegiance to fairness. 
Finally, no party is homogenous. There will be some people within the 
oppressing party who are more open to courtship from the oppressed party. Those who 
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belong to a party that enjoys privilege over some other party with whom they want to 
live in healthy community, can join with others in their party who think like they do, 
and they can practice courtship towards those who oppose them within their own party. 
The risk is that they may be shunned, exiled, or persecuted along with the oppressed, 
but it is the sole option that expresses their own spirit of fairness. Such courtship can 
loosen the logjam of hardened defensive positions that oppressing parties find 
themselves invested and trapped in. 
An historical analysis 
 
The successful use of courtship is not new, though it is rarely practiced 
unadulterated. This section examines the American civil rights movement of the 1960s 
through the lens of courtship. The Public Broadcasting System video “Birmingham 
1963” (AmericanHistoryRules, n.d.) includes TV news footage of Birmingham police 
chief Bull Connor’s fight against black civil rights demonstrators that summer. The 
images of peaceful black marchers, many of them children, being attacked by police with 
fire hoses and vicious dogs ignited the nation, as white Americans struggled with the 
feeling that they identified more with the black marchers than the white police, that 
they admired the marchers more than the police. The video states: 
 
He [King] was asking white Americans in a sense to, finally, after hundreds of 
years, confront this contradiction: they believed in freedom, and yet they denied 
freedom to African Americans. Which was their true self? In a sense asking 
white America, “Are you Bull Conner, or are you someone who believes in 
human rights?” Forcing people to make a choice, in a non-threatening manner. 
 
In the eloquent letter he wrote from a Birmingham jail, King (1963) writes: 
 
You may well ask: "Why direct action? Why sit ins, marches and so forth? Isn't 
negotiation a better path?" You are quite right in calling for negotiation. Indeed, 
this is the very purpose of direct action. Nonviolent direct action seeks to create 
such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly 
refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the 
issue that it can no longer be ignored. My citing the creation of tension as part 
of the work of the nonviolent resister may sound rather shocking. But I must 
confess that I am not afraid of the word "tension." I have earnestly opposed 
violent tension, but there is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension which is 
necessary for growth. 
 
 
People who parse the world into winners and losers, who believe that having 
coercive power over one’s enemy is the only pragmatic way to bring about justice, 
cannot understand King. His direct actions were very public and persistent ways to not 
comply with unjust laws, to ask for what the black community needed, and to inspire 
the fairness response in white Americans. The purpose of direct action was to get to 
confrontation at the negotiation table. The power of direct action was the realization by 
white Americans that they admired the black resisters' courage, that the resisters were 
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their heroes, that the resisters were displaying their, white Americans’, deeper identity 
and spirit. This was courtship. 
As already mentioned, King accepted violent self-defence. However, King chose 
not to use violence in direct mass actions, because courtship is not a defensive posture. They 
were crossing enemy lines of control. Their direct actions were deliberate trespasses 
onto what southern law reserved as white turf—white-only restaurants and facilities, 
the front of the bus. Courtship is invasive—we are asking for a relationship of peers—so 
be successfully courted, our enemies must feel our commitment not to coerce or 
dominate. 
Many in the nonviolent movement make the mistake of using power politics—
they really want the other side to lose—and so deprive themselves of being lastingly 
effective. 
In (Lewis & D’Orso, 1999), now U.S. Congressman John Lewis gives a first-hand 
account of the whole civil rights movement of the 1960s. By the end of chapter sixteen, 
after the movement had endured all the beatings, shootings, teargas and bombings of 
the Freedom Rides and Birmingham and Mississippi and Selma, Lewis writes: 
 
Something was born in Selma during the course of that year, but something died 
there, too. The road of nonviolence had essentially run out. Selma was the last 
act. 
... 
We're only flesh. I could understand people not wanting to get beaten anymore. 
The body gets tired. You put out so much energy and you saw such little gain. 
Black capacity to believe white would really open his heart, open his life to 
nonviolent appeal, was running out. (Lewis & D’Orso, 1999, p. 347) 
 
The movement attempted to use the federal government to force the southern 
states to end segregation. They built on Supreme Court decisions declaring segregation 
unconstitutional in education and in interstate commerce. Their strategy was to 
generate national political momentum that would force the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations to intervene against southern states to uphold federal law.  
Their strategy worked, in that it attained its goal of forcing southern states to 
end legalized segregation. Their nonviolent courage inspired the nation, and the 
widespread political support they generated resulted in the US Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and US Voting Rights Act of 1965. In terms of courtship, they successfully courted the 
majority of American voters, whose political power then turned to demolishing legal 
segregation in the south. By Lewis' account, the political impact of the horrific TV 
footage of the peaceful marchers' fate on the bridge out of Selma impelled the federal 
government to send federal troops, federal marshals, and the FBI to protect the 
marchers from the sheriff posses and the populace as they walked through the hate-
laced countryside from Selma to Montgomery.  Lewis continues: 
 
Now we needed to deal with the subtler and much more complex issues of 
attaining economic and political power, of dealing with attitudes and actions 
held deep inside people and institutions that, now that they were forced to allow us 
through the door, could still keep the rewards inside those doors out of our 
reach. Combating segregation is one thing. Dealing with racism is another. 
(Lewis & D’Orso, 1999, p. 349) [emphasis mine] 
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In short, the movement hadn't set out to heal its relationship with its enemies. 
The Klan supporters who signed up for the sheriff posses and cheered the club-swinging 
mounted police, were coerced by the feds, not courted into healthy community with 
blacks. 
Bull Connor’s violence against the demonstrators had the support of 
Birmingham's mayor and city council, but Connor, the mayor and the council were 
elected representatives of a wider community and dealt with many other issues than the 
demonstrations. Successful leaders of large sustained groups have some semblance of 
empathy and fairness. Even the relatively unified and very prejudiced leadership of 
Birmingham felt the impact on their political base of the moral contrast between the 
demonstrators and the police. One cannot conclude that they, or their segregationist 
political base, were immune to courtship, but in the end, the movement did not 
successfully court them. Not for lack of trying, but the fact that the segregationists were 
coerced by the federal government made courting next to impossible. 
The movement's great but limited results were a result of the limitations of their 
strategy. I'm not saying what they did was an error—they had an opportunity to force 
the system to behave by its own values, and they seized that opportunity to take a giant 
step in the right direction. Clearly school integration and access to public universities, 
facilities, restaurants and accommodations would not have been won in the 1960’s 
without federal coercion. 
But there was work left undone. In 2017 the laws are no longer overtly 
prejudicial, but American society has found more indirect structures to maintain 
oppression of blacks. If courtship had been exclusively practiced and continued, the 
movement might have taken steps to protect the southern states from federal coercion, 
making plain that what they were after was a healthy relationship with the white 
community. This would have been a very difficult and long-term strategy. Probably the 
old generation would have had to die off before it came to fruit. But it is at least 
plausible that by now, 60 years later, we would have been better off than we are. 
The way forward is to raise our strategic sights to the healing of our whole 
society. We need to court each other into a healthy community. It is a daunting 
proposition, but I believe there is no other final solution. Our weapons are courage, 
hospitality, humility, mutual inspiration and perseverance. 
Evaluation: When is Courtship Better Than Either Coercion or Evasion? 
 
A cynic might say “Let’s get practical here. Do you really think that power can 
just be wished away?” 
It is easy to think of nightmare scenarios which seem impossible to solve by 
courtship. The cynic continues "Suppose you’re awakened in the middle of the night by 
a man with a Glock who has come into your house to rape and kill. Do you really think 
that trying to court his humanity is going to work?" There's a whole class of nightmare 
scenarios (a purse snatcher, a high school shooter) that question our ability to react 
effectively to stop individual or group violence with anything less than violence. 
Another class of nightmare scenarios involves massive structural systemic evil 
involving large groups of people: slavery, the holocaust, human trafficking, the trail of 
tears, Darfur, trying to challenge a tyrannical regime from below. The cynic rounds out 
his remarks with: “You’ve just jumped down from your boxcar at Birkenau. Do you 
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really think you can talk your way out of a death camp? Do you somehow think those 
Jews didn’t try to evoke mercy from the guards, or that none of those prisoners were as 
sophisticated or spiritual as you? Never again.” 
If evasion is not possible, the most reliable defense against evil such as the Glock 
scenario is not courtship, but to call 911, i.e. to invoke the coercion of the rule of law, 
since broadly accepted social values condemn rape and murder. And in the Birkenau 
scenario the prison guards were pawns, many chosen for their lack of apparent empathy, 
within a very coercive command hierarchy. So, these are worst-case scenarios for 
courtship, though I still want to examine them closely. 
What happens if we can't appeal to the law to help us, either because it has failed 
us or because it is not available to us? In the Glock scenario, if we're staring down the 
barrel of a pistol, calling on the law is perhaps not an option. In the Birkenau scenario 
the law is part of the systemic evil, it is part of the problem, not the solution. In either 
case, supposing we have some weapon—mace, a gun, a grenade—the question here is 
whether violent self-defence is more productive than courtship. 
The question here is not moral, but pragmatic. If we’re cowering in our church 
or mosque, temple or synagogue or arena, surrounded by a bloodthirsty genocidal mob, 
and some of our young guys want to make a brave sortie to either cow the mob or fight 
a path for us all to escape to a safer place, more power to them. In those circumstances I 
affirm flight or fight. I affirm those who hide in holes or deceive their way out, or those 
who turn at bay, show their teeth, and fight to the last. The last-ditch defensive fight 
against all odds is not the cause of the great evils in this world, save that the media and 
the politicians push us to panic before we are truly threatened, and cite “the best defence 
is a good offense” to legitimize state pre-emptive violence against another state. 
But pragmatically, if we’ve got a bullhorn, or if the mob has effective leadership 
and we've got a mobile phone to talk to them, courtship could be a better bet. If there is 
any way to effectively communicate to those threatening us, and they are in any state to 
listen, courtship could be a better bet. And most certainly courtship is a better bet if they are a 
whole people, an ethnicity or nation. 
Even the worst-case scenarios for courtship do not justify the belief that the sole 
effective response to violence is violence. Courtship is not a reliable solution to these 
scenarios, but neither is violence nor hiding. The chance of having a happy ending to 
the nightmare situations is tiny, whether we choose coercion, evasion or courtship. But 
beyond revealing our blind faith in violence, our thinking about such nightmare 
scenarios often suffers from the following defects. 
The first is to ignore reliability. Violent self-defence isn’t very reliable. We 
daydream about getting the drop on the perpetrator, but reality usually doesn’t work 
that way. In the Glock scenario, if we are surprised, then even if we're carrying a gun 
and are trained, the chance of our surviving our attempt to fire is small. The same is 
doubly true for the Birkenau scenario. So, to outperform violence as a practical means of 
self-defence, courtship does not have to be always successful—just more often than 
violence is. There will of course be cases in which violence would have worked, and 
courtship wouldn’t, and vice versa. We’ll never be able to perfectly predict which are 
which, so we’ve got to go with probabilities. 
In the Glock scenario, it is not hard to imagine conditions under which one 
should shoot. If I'm a good shot and I have the drop on the guy and yet he still makes a 
move to shoot, I shoot first. In the more likely case that he’s got the drop on me and is 
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conflicted about his intent, courtship is a better bet. My chances are tiny—but better 
than with violence. 
One cannot infer from the Glock and Birkenau nightmares that violence is in 
general more reliable than courtship. 
A second defect in our thinking is to ignore structure. Situations such as 
Birkenau, where the guards implementing the horrors were selected for the task and 
caught in a net of Nazi SS surveillance and reprisal, are bad tactical territory for self-
defence by either violence or courtship. If the person threatening us is themselves 
encased in a system, an organizational structure where they know they are being 
watched, and they know they will suffer if they don’t obey an order, then they are not 
free. They are themselves oppressed. They may kill us in an attempt to appease/placate 
the demands of their commanders/oppressors. Whether using violence or courtship, 
anyone would prefer attacking when and where the organizational structure is not so 
strong. 
Whether using violence or courtship, to have a reasonable chance we have to 
attack the system before we get to Birkenau. 
A third defect in our thinking is to not count the benefits. While violence can 
prevent harm to us from taking place, courtship presents the possibility of both 
preventing the harm and bringing the would-be perpetrator into a just relationship. In a 
case in which the two approaches have equal chances of preventing harm to us, 
courtship is preferable because if it succeeds, much more has been accomplished. 
A fourth defect in our thinking is the ease with which politicians and the media 
manipulate us by our fears. Certain scenarios stick in our minds because they frustrate 
our human experience and expectation that courtship very often does work. We are 
fascinated by imaginary scenarios in which it doesn’t. Such scenarios engage all our 
fears of being losers, of suffering injustice, and we're like moths circling a flame. The 
media take advantage of our fascination to sell their products. Such scenarios have 
become common plot devices of movies and novels, in which some utterly implausible 
solution is usually found, through incredible luck, that lets the good guys kill all the bad 
guys in a nice, bloody catharsis. The result is to distract us with nightmare situations 
rather than helping us seize the opportunities we must court people to change the 
dynamics ahead of time, before our options run out. 
Finally, one attraction of a violent response to violence is that we really hate to 
be losers. We will even spite ourselves so as not to be second best. Game theorists have 
studied (Chaudhuri, 2011) pairs of people playing simple games involving real money 
but no chance of communication between players. Game theorists find that these players 
choose to lose in absolute terms in order not to lose in relative terms. Lacking 
communication, we’d rather suffer less than our opponent, than gain less than our 
opponent. 
Courtship, by contrast, is not a way to guarantee coming out on top. Unlike the 
games mentioned above, in the real world we can communicate with each other. 
Courtship is communication that induces synergy: a mutually productive life together. 
It creates the possibility for health and wealth. It insists on justice—we don’t let go 
until the situation is fair. But courtship comes at the relationship from below, not from 
above. We are not in control, and we take a calculated risk of coming out second best, 
based on our hope of inspiring a much more productive response. We risk losing, to 
create a just relationship. 
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This study takes the establishment of a healthy society as the highest goal, 
where the term healthy implies a capacity for robust, sustainable struggle over 
longstanding differences of values within a commitment to use neither coercion nor 
evasion. Short of such a society, if a group is attacked their right to hide or counterattack 
is not here disputed, nor are these choices labelled morally bad. Rather, the wisdom of 
either under many conditions is questioned, and an alternative called courtship is 
recommended to move the conflict towards health. 
This study would have us limit the role of government to enforcement of laws 
which enjoy a broad consensus. The practice of extra-national courtship is not the 
purview of governments, at least not any more than that of any other institution, 
culture, ethnicity or other human party that can court its adversaries. On a thumbnail, 
the model of change espoused here is that if we strengthen the capacity of parties to 
inspire and sustain healthy relationships, the rest (good governance, robust justice, 
sustainable peace) will follow. 
Thus, it is our duty, opportunity and responsibility as participants in civil 
society, our duty as religious leaders, politicians, educators, authors, journalists, NGO 
activists, song and script writers, media creators and so on, is to increase public 
understanding of the practices of healthy community, which lead to robust civil health. 
Civil health should be as highly regarded and widely understood as hygiene and public 
sanitation. 
However, no amount of education will change people’s gut reactions. Only the 
experience in smaller, local, less threatening conflicts, of the justice flowing from a 
healthy relationship with a trustworthy opponent, can prepare a party to brave 
courtship during a larger, more global and more threatening conflict. We cannot expect 
the latter without long experience in the former. So, we must lead our communities in 
the practice of what we teach. The opportunities are many.  
King admired the phrase “The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends 
toward justice” (1958, p. 14). Betting on courtship is a calculated, long term 
evolutionary strategy. Conflict can be temporarily extinguished by killing or fleeing, 
oppressing or placating now, but that only defers the costs to future generations, when 
the conflict will be even greater. To minimize the total cost to all generations, we 
should bring the whole risk into now, into our lifetime. It may cost us our lives, but we 
may save the lives of many in the future. We should risk being open to a mutual 
salvation with our enemies, or else the future costs will be far greater. Courtship is our 
opportunity, it is within our agency, it is our responsibility. Over time, the lowest cost 
and least reversible path to justice and peace is for us to face our enemies, invoke the 
human fairness in them, state our needs, court them to join us in a healthy relationship, 
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Call for Papers  
The Editorial Board of the International Journal on 
Responsibility is pleased to announce an intention to publish 
two issues in coming months – one a student issue, and the 
other a special issue. A call for papers for these issues will 
be distributed during the summer and fall of 2018. 
In the interim, submissions on any aspect of responsibility 
are welcomed for peer-review by the journal’s Editorial 
Board and may be sent to both the Editor-in-Chief and 
Managing Editor by email (contact details below). 
 Instructions for the preparation of manuscripts appear on 
page 139 of this issue. Thank you for considering 
submitting a paper to the International Journal on 
Responsibility.  
Editor-in-Chief, Terry Beitzel, Ph.D. beitzetd@jmu.edu 
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Instructions for the preparation of manuscripts for submission to the International Journal on 
Responsibility: 
 Manuscripts may be up to 8000 words in length, submitted by email to beitzetd@jmu.edu and 
carriehs@jmu.edu as MS Word attachments.  
 
 Documents should be double-spaced, and formatted and referenced in accordance with the 
Harvard System of Referencing. Authors may wish to consult the excellent, open access Guide to 
the Harvard System of Referencing provided by Anglia Ruskin University, available at: 
https://libweb.anglia.ac.uk/referencing/harvard.htm ).  
 
 Authors represent that any work that is not their own which appears in their submitted manuscript 
is either in the public domain, is included with the express permission of the copyright holder, or 
is reproduced in accordance with the doctrine of fair use.  
 
 In submitting a manuscript to the International Journal on Responsibility, authors represent that 
the manuscript has not been previously published elsewhere (either in part or in its entirety), that 
the manuscript is not currently under review by any other publisher for publication, and that the 
manuscript will not be submitted to any other publisher for consideration if accepted for 
publication by the International Journal on Responsibility, or until notice of rejection has been 
provided to the author by the Editorial Board of the International Journal on Responsibility.  
 
 The International Journal on Responsibility takes pride in being an open access journal. Authors 
retain copyright to their submitted work, and grant a non-exclusive Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License to James Madison 
University, in advance of publication, allowing the work to be published in the International 
Journal on Responsibility. Authors agree not to transfer copyright to their work to any third party 
post-acceptance for publication by the International Journal of Responsibility, and agree to 
indemnify James Madison University, the International Journal on Responsibility, their 
employees, agents and representatives, from any losses arising from a third party’s claim against 
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